

A look at Cerber Ransomware

Cerber is currently been delivered through RIG EK and appears fast and simple.

The sample I looked at was found been delivered through Rig EK (“waterhole”), a compromised site served it as a delivery method.

Looking at the packet capture I saw

- A list of more than 200 host ip addresses (91.119.56.0 - 91.121.59.255)
- a lot of UDP traffic going to Hungary
- ports 53, 137, 138, 5355, 6892

```
inetnum:          91.120.0.0 - 91.120.255.255
netname:          HU-DATANET-20060821
country:         HU
org:              ORG-DA12-RIPE
admin-c:         ZR1-RIPE
admin-c:         PS235-RIPE
tech-c:          ZR1-RIPE
tech-c:          LS4559-RIPE
tech-c:          MK1117-RIPE
status:          ALLOCATED PA
notify:          net-admin@datanet.hu
mnt-by:          RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT
mnt-by:          AS3340-MNT
mnt-lower:       AS3340-MNT
mnt-routes:      AS3340-MNT
created:         2006-08-21T13:23:07Z
last-modified:   2016-06-02T11:31:35Z
source:          RIPE
```


```
organisation:    ORG-DA12-RIPE
org-name:        GTS Hungary Telecommunications Limited Liability Company
org-type:        LIR
```

- I also observed TCP packets to Amazon services 35 network, 52 network

1175	162.559276872	192.168.5.1	192.168.5.100	DNS	354 Standard query response 0xe717 A services.addons.mozilla.org CNAME olympia.prod.mo
1176	162.567410036	192.168.5.100	35.164.62.191	TCP	66 49191 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
1177	162.567731791	35.164.62.191	192.168.5.100	TCP	66 443 → 49191 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 WS=128
1178	162.568290541	192.168.5.100	35.164.62.191	TCP	60 49191 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0
1179	162.569051452	192.168.5.100	35.164.62.191	TLSv1.2	260 Client Hello
1180	162.569082023	35.164.62.191	192.168.5.100	TCP	54 443 → 49191 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=207 Win=30336 Len=0


- Cypher keys appeared to be exchanged along 54 (amazon network)

The Sample I had appeared to only effect word documents and may have been targeted to that to allow for faster encryption.



- Sample photo showing
 - (right side) test documents and pictures pre execution
 - (left side) kali proxy testing and network settings

Cerber appears very simple which makes it easily marketable, upon execution you are presented with the changed desktop image (right) and personal addresses which are accessible as tor addressing.



- Post execution I can see the word document is scrambled, text document and image files appeared and opened fine.

Cuckoo analysis showed the payload executable running multiple processes.

1st Process phase 1 (2460)-

- I noted a lot of python scripting with this process
- A lot of inspection of .lnk filetypes.
- This process appears to drop a lot of the PNG HELP_HELP files as shown above
- It also writes .py (python) files.

1st Process phase 2 (2460)-

- I noted a lot of inspection of .ini filetypes
- This process appears to drop .dll files

2nd Process phase 3 (3004)-

- Targets registry reads and accesses a lot of keys

1st Process phase 4 (2460)-

- Targets registry making a number of changes

2nd process phase 5 (3004)-

- Still targeting registry accessing an reading large number of keys.

1st Process phase 6 (2460)-

- Registry – Mutexes around speech and voice tokens

2nd process phase 7 (3004)-

- Conducts cleanup using taskkill process.

1st process phase 8 (2460)-

- Creates windows directories and enumerates a large number of directory entries.

2nd process phase 9 (3004)-

- Creates group of appdata directories
- Enumerates a group of windows directories.

1st process phase 10 (2460)-

- Creates desktop drops for help files
- Loads large number of .dll filetypes

2nd process phase 11 (3004)-

- Drops payload executable to appdata local temp.
- Launches group of .dll's

Cerber appears designed for ease of use and currently is been seen trialled with differing delivery methods.

Thankyou

MBYX