{"id":402633,"date":"2026-08-16T06:11:19","date_gmt":"2026-08-16T06:11:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/?p=402633"},"modified":"2026-08-16T06:11:19","modified_gmt":"2026-08-16T06:11:19","slug":"linkedin-purchase-inquiry-email-scam","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/linkedin-purchase-inquiry-email-scam\/","title":{"rendered":"LinkedIn Purchase Inquiry Email Scam Can Steal Your Company Email Password"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A LinkedIn notification says a senior buyer wants pricing for products your company may sell. The message includes a name, title, overseas trading company, and a purchase list that appears valuable enough to deserve a fast response.<\/p><div id=\"mwtad158112765\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309684--placement_400588\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3957935887\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>\n<figure><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/linkedin-purchase-inquiry-email.png\" alt=\"Reconstruction of a fake LinkedIn business invitation containing a purchase inquiry\" title=\"\"><\/figure>\n<p>The LinkedIn Purchase Inquiry email scam turns that ordinary sales opportunity into a credential theft route. The supposed product list is only a backdrop for a fake identity-verification form.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad1026339139\" class=\"mwtadp1 mwtadentity-placement\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"> \r\n<ins class=\"adsbygoogle\"\r\n     style=\"display:block; text-align:center;\"\r\n     data-ad-layout=\"in-article\"\r\n     data-ad-format=\"fluid\"\r\n     data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\"\r\n     data-ad-slot=\"7312657698\"><\/ins>\r\n <\/div><p>Both the invitation button and Give a Quote Now can lead away from LinkedIn to an IPFS-hosted page. A spreadsheet preview is deliberately obscured until the visitor enters a company email address and password.<\/p>\n<p>Do not sign in through the message. Open LinkedIn and your business mailbox independently, then confirm whether the inquiry exists before sharing a quotation, document, or credential.<\/p>\n<figure><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/linkedin-document-verification-page.png\" alt=\"Reconstruction of the fraudulent encrypted purchase order page requesting business email credentials\" title=\"\"><\/figure>\n<div id=\"mwtad3467028774\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309747-ad_309691-placement_400589\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"9589536513\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>Overview<\/h2>\n<h3>A believable buyer profile targets sales instincts<\/h3>\n<p>The email claims that a contact named lisa_fan, described as a Senior Partner and Managing Director, has sent a purchase inquiry through LinkedIn.<\/p>\n<p>It may associate the contact with a Hong Kong trading firm and ask for minimum order quantities.<\/p>\n<p>Sales teams regularly receive unfamiliar inquiries, so the story does not feel as obviously alarming as a password-expiration warning. The possibility of a new customer encourages the recipient to open the document before completing normal checks.<\/p>\n<h3>Two buttons lead to the same off-platform trap<\/h3>\n<div id=\"mwtad3722484985\" class=\"mwtadp3 mwtadentity-placement\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"https:\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\"\r\n     crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script>\r\n<ins class=\"adsbygoogle\"\r\n     style=\"display:block; text-align:center;\"\r\n     data-ad-layout=\"in-article\"\r\n     data-ad-format=\"fluid\"\r\n     data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\"\r\n     data-ad-slot=\"5910219726\"><\/ins>\r\n<script>\r\n     (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});\r\n<\/script><\/div><p>The message offers an invitation-acceptance button and a Give a Quote Now button. Different labels make the email feel interactive, but both can direct the victim to the same fraudulent destination.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad1733501469\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309686-ad_309691-placement_400597\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"6935453015\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><p>The page is hosted through IPFS, a legitimate decentralized storage protocol. IPFS hosting does not validate the uploader, company, purchase order, or login form displayed inside the content.<\/p>\n<h3>The locked spreadsheet exists to harvest mailbox credentials<\/h3>\n<p>A blurred or partially visible purchase order appears behind a verification prompt. The form claims the document is encrypted and asks the visitor to confirm identity with a username and password.<\/p>\n<p>The requested password belongs to the victim&#x27;s email provider, not to a legitimate purchase-order system. Once submitted, it can expose correspondence, customer data, invoices, password resets, and trusted relationships with vendors.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The subject claims there are two new LinkedIn business invitations.<\/li>\n<li>A contact named lisa_fan supposedly wants product information.<\/li>\n<li>The sender is described as a senior buyer or managing director.<\/li>\n<li>The email asks for a product list and minimum order quantity.<\/li>\n<li>Accept Invitation and Give a Quote Now lead to the same destination.<\/li>\n<li>The destination is outside linkedin.com.<\/li>\n<li>An IPFS page displays a purchase-order spreadsheet as background.<\/li>\n<li>A pop-up calls the document encrypted.<\/li>\n<li>The form requests a business email address and password.<\/li>\n<li>Credentials entered into the page are delivered to the attackers.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div id=\"mwtad527099243\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309748-ad_309691-placement_400590\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3906789406\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>How Genuine LinkedIn Messages Can Be Checked Without the Email<\/h2>\n<p>LinkedIn provides an inbox and invitation area inside the authenticated service. If a buyer actually contacted the recipient, the invitation or message should be visible after opening linkedin.com or the official mobile application independently.<\/p>\n<p>Official LinkedIn help explains that its emails include a security footer containing the recipient&#x27;s name and professional headline. That personalization can help distinguish bulk phishing, although a copied footer alone is not a guarantee that a message is genuine.<\/p>\n<p>LinkedIn also advises users who are uncertain to open a new browser window, navigate directly to LinkedIn, and check the inbox. That route removes the email&#x27;s button and destination from the verification process.<\/p>\n<p>The platform says it will not ask for a password through an unsolicited message or tell users to download a program.<\/p>\n<p>A purchase inquiry does not create a reason to enter a company mailbox password on an external document host.<\/p>\n<p>A real buyer may share a catalog request, specification, or purchase order, but the sender&#x27;s identity still needs confirmation.<\/p>\n<p>Company domains, business registries, known switchboard numbers, and an established LinkedIn profile provide stronger evidence than a display name.<\/p>\n<p>Even a real LinkedIn member account can be compromised. The correct question is not only whether the profile exists, but whether the request, destination, and credential demand make sense for the claimed transaction.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad2846541118\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309749-ad_309691-placement_400591\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"5354318971\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>Why an IPFS Purchase Order Is Not Proof of a Buyer<\/h2>\n<p>IPFS is a content-addressed storage system that can host legitimate files and websites. It does not certify that a page belongs to LinkedIn, the named buyer, or the company shown in a spreadsheet.<\/p>\n<p>Scammers benefit from shared gateways and long content identifiers because recipients may focus on the unfamiliar technical address rather than the absence of linkedin.com. Hosting infrastructure and business identity are separate questions.<\/p>\n<p>The visible spreadsheet is psychological scenery. It gives the victim just enough information to imagine a serious order while withholding the rows that supposedly matter until verification is completed.<\/p>\n<p>A real encrypted document service would identify the sender, service operator, access method, privacy terms, and support route. It would not need the password for an unrelated mailbox to prove that the viewer is the intended recipient.<\/p>\n<p>The buyer name, title, and company can be copied from public profiles or invented. These fields are inexpensive to produce and should not replace direct verification with the organization through contact details found independently.<\/p>\n<p>The best test is simple: close the page and open LinkedIn directly. If the invitation, conversation, and shared file do not appear in the real account, the email has failed its central claim.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad4260945444\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309750-ad_309691-placement_400592\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"4041237300\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>How the LinkedIn Purchase Inquiry Email Scam Works<\/h2>\n<h3>Step 1: A fake business invitation reaches a company mailbox<\/h3>\n<p>The campaign is sent to sales, purchasing, support, or general company addresses. Public websites and data breaches provide enough information to identify businesses that may respond to an international buyer.<\/p>\n<p>The subject mentions new LinkedIn business invitations, which resembles an ordinary platform notification and may pass through a busy inbox without immediate suspicion.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 2: A detailed buyer identity makes the opportunity feel real<\/h3>\n<p>The message names lisa_fan and assigns a senior commercial role at an overseas trading business. It claims the buyer is interested in products and needs minimum order quantities.<\/p>\n<p>Specific details reduce the appearance of random spam. They do not prove that the named person sent the email or that the company shown has any involvement.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 3: The email offers two apparently useful actions<\/h3>\n<p>One button accepts the supposed invitation, while another promises to open the quotation request. The recipient may believe the buttons perform different LinkedIn tasks.<\/p>\n<p>Both actions can redirect to the same off-platform phishing page. Hovering over each link can reveal that neither destination belongs to LinkedIn.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 4: An IPFS page displays a locked purchase order<\/h3>\n<p>The browser opens a page containing a spreadsheet-style background and a company name such as LightKing Tech Group. A pop-up blocks the document and describes it as encrypted.<\/p>\n<p>The visual preview turns credential entry into a small obstacle between the salesperson and a potentially valuable order.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 5: Fake verification asks for the company mailbox password<\/h3>\n<p>The form requests a username and password to confirm the visitor&#x27;s identity. It may prefill the email address from a query parameter or ask the victim to type both fields.<\/p>\n<p>A legitimate external document system can send a one-time access link or code. It has no reason to collect the password used by the victim&#x27;s separate email provider.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 6: The stolen inbox becomes a platform for business fraud<\/h3>\n<p>Attackers can search the mailbox for invoices, payment instructions, customer conversations, cloud-service notifications, and password-reset messages. They may create forwarding rules or delete alerts to preserve access.<\/p>\n<p>A hijacked company account gives later messages authentic history and a trusted sender address, making invoice redirection and vendor impersonation far more convincing.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 7: Contacts receive new lures from the compromised account<\/h3>\n<p>The criminal can reply inside existing threads, send another fake purchase order, request changed bank details, or share a malicious file. Recipients may act because the message comes from someone they already know.<\/p>\n<p>One stolen password can therefore expand into business email compromise, customer data exposure, financial theft, and account takeovers across other services where credentials were reused.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad3293999653\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309751-ad_309691-placement_400593\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3690286463\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>Company and Checkout Checks<\/h2>\n<h3>Open LinkedIn directly and inspect the real inbox<\/h3>\n<p>Use a saved bookmark, the official application, or a manually typed linkedin.com address. Look for the named invitation, message history, shared file, and profile inside the authenticated account.<\/p>\n<p>Do not use the email&#x27;s buttons as the method for proving the email is genuine.<\/p>\n<h3>Confirm the buyer through independent company channels<\/h3>\n<p>Find the organization&#x27;s official domain, switchboard, registry entry, and verified staff directory. Contact the company through details obtained independently, not the signature block in the suspicious message.<\/p>\n<p>Ask for the inquiry number, product specifications, delivery destination, and a reply from a verified corporate address.<\/p>\n<h3>Inspect every document destination before signing in<\/h3>\n<p>A LinkedIn message should not require a company mailbox password on an IPFS gateway. Expand shortened links and compare the complete host with the service the page claims to represent.<\/p>\n<p>A lock icon means the connection is encrypted. It does not mean the purchase order, login prompt, or buyer is legitimate.<\/p>\n<h3>Use a controlled quotation process<\/h3>\n<p>Require new buyers to pass normal due diligence before receiving sensitive catalogs, price files, banking details, or credit terms. Share documents through a company-approved portal with auditable access.<\/p>\n<p>A lucrative inquiry should receive more verification, not less, because attackers deliberately use large opportunities to accelerate decisions.<\/p>\n<div id=\"deskad1\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_174270-ad_309691-placement_400594\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"5700081834\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>Warning Signs to Check Before You Act<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>The subject uses awkward wording about two new business invitation.<\/li>\n<li>The email is not personalized with the recipient&#x27;s real LinkedIn details.<\/li>\n<li>A stranger immediately asks for product pricing and minimum quantities.<\/li>\n<li>The buyer identity is supplied only inside the message.<\/li>\n<li>Both buttons lead away from linkedin.com.<\/li>\n<li>An IPFS gateway is used as if it were LinkedIn&#x27;s document service.<\/li>\n<li>A spreadsheet preview is intentionally hidden behind a pop-up.<\/li>\n<li>The page calls a purchase order encrypted without identifying a real platform.<\/li>\n<li>The form requests an email-provider password.<\/li>\n<li>No matching inquiry appears inside the recipient&#x27;s LinkedIn inbox.<\/li>\n<li>The company domain and sender address do not align.<\/li>\n<li>Urgency encourages the sales team to bypass its new-buyer procedure.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>A real sales inquiry can wait long enough for independent verification. No legitimate quotation requires giving an outside page the password to the mailbox receiving the request.<\/p>\n<h2>What to Do if You Have Fallen Victim to This Scam<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>Change the exposed company email password immediately.<\/strong> Open the mail provider through its official portal, not the purchase-order page. Create a unique password and replace it anywhere the same or a similar credential was reused.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Enable phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication.<\/strong> Use a passkey or hardware security key where available. Otherwise enable an authenticator app, then remove unfamiliar telephone numbers, recovery addresses, app passwords, and authentication devices.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Revoke active sessions and application access.<\/strong> Sign out all other sessions and inspect OAuth grants, mail clients, mobile devices, and connected applications. A stolen token or app password may preserve access after the main password changes.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Inspect forwarding rules and mailbox delegates.<\/strong> Remove unknown forwarding addresses, inbox rules, delegates, automatic replies, and filters that hide security messages. Review sent items, deleted mail, and archive folders for activity the user did not create.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Protect finance and cloud accounts linked to the inbox.<\/strong> Prioritize banking, payment services, CRM, document storage, accounting, LinkedIn, and password-reset destinations. Change credentials and review logs wherever the compromised mailbox could approve access.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Search for business email compromise indicators.<\/strong> Review recent invoice threads, beneficiary changes, quotation requests, purchase orders, and urgent payment messages. Confirm sensitive instructions with customers and vendors through a previously known telephone number.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Warn colleagues, customers, and suppliers.<\/strong> Tell contacts to distrust recent links, files, bank-detail changes, and password requests from the account. Provide a safe channel for confirming messages sent during the possible compromise window.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Scan any device that downloaded content.<\/strong> Run a complete scan with Malwarebytes or another trusted security product if the IPFS page delivered a file, extension, or installer. Remove unfamiliar software and apply browser and operating-system updates.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Block the phishing route for other employees.<\/strong> Use AdGuard to reduce malicious advertising and familiar phishing destinations after this linkedin-purchase incident. Keep verifying new domains independently. Add confirmed indicators to company mail and web filters while recognizing that new IPFS content identifiers can appear.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Report the campaign through verified channels.<\/strong> Forward the original message with full headers to phishing@linkedin.com, notify the mail provider, IPFS gateway operator, and internal security team, and preserve the page address and screenshots.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Reject paid account-recovery approaches.<\/strong> A stranger who promises to restore the mailbox, trace the criminals, or recover money for an advance payment may be extending the attack. Work with the provider, employer, insurer, law enforcement, or a verified incident-response firm.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h2>Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n<h3>Is the LinkedIn Purchase Inquiry email legitimate?<\/h3>\n<p>No. The reviewed message leads to an external credential-harvesting page rather than a genuine LinkedIn conversation. Verify every real invitation by opening linkedin.com directly.<\/p>\n<h3>Can a real buyer contact me through LinkedIn?<\/h3>\n<p>Yes, but the message should exist inside the authenticated LinkedIn inbox. A real inquiry does not require the password to your separate business email account.<\/p>\n<h3>Does IPFS hosting make the document safe?<\/h3>\n<p>No. IPFS is a storage protocol, not an identity or safety certification. Criminals can publish phishing content through the same infrastructure used for legitimate material.<\/p>\n<h3>What if I entered my email but not the password?<\/h3>\n<p>The attackers may now know which provider and company account to target. Expect additional phishing, secure the account, and report the page, but the greatest takeover risk begins when a valid password is submitted.<\/p>\n<h3>Why would attackers want a company mailbox?<\/h3>\n<p>A business inbox can contain invoices, customer data, reset links, cloud access, and trusted conversations. Criminals can use it to redirect payments or send convincing fraud to contacts.<\/p>\n<h3>How do I report a fake LinkedIn email?<\/h3>\n<p>Preserve the full message and headers, then forward it to phishing@linkedin.com. Business users should also notify their internal security team and email provider.<\/p>\n<h2>The Bottom Line<\/h2>\n<p>The LinkedIn Purchase Inquiry email scam uses the prospect of a new customer to move sales staff from a fake notification to an IPFS-hosted password form.<\/p>\n<p>A visible spreadsheet, detailed buyer title, or LinkedIn logo does not prove the inquiry. Open LinkedIn directly, verify the buyer independently, and never enter a mailbox password into an external document page.<\/p>\n<p>If credentials were submitted, change them immediately, revoke sessions, inspect mailbox rules, protect linked services, and warn every contact who may receive a follow-up message from the compromised account.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad2133712818\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_176819-ad_309691-placement_400595\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"8386082122\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A LinkedIn notification says a senior buyer wants pricing for products your company may sell. The message includes a name, title, overseas trading company, and a purchase list that appears valuable enough to deserve a &#8230; <\/p>\n<p class=\"read-more-container\"><a title=\"LinkedIn Purchase Inquiry Email Scam Can Steal Your Company Email Password\" class=\"read-more button\" href=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/linkedin-purchase-inquiry-email-scam\/#more-402633\" aria-label=\"Read more about LinkedIn Purchase Inquiry Email Scam Can Steal Your Company Email Password\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":51,"featured_media":402623,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[49],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-402633","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-scam-reports","masonry-post","generate-columns","tablet-grid-50","mobile-grid-100","grid-parent","grid-50","resize-featured-image"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/402633","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/51"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=402633"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/402633\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":403181,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/402633\/revisions\/403181"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/402623"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=402633"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=402633"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=402633"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}