{"id":420906,"date":"2026-10-01T16:10:48","date_gmt":"2026-10-01T16:10:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/?p=420906"},"modified":"2026-10-01T16:10:48","modified_gmt":"2026-10-01T16:10:48","slug":"fake-employee-email-paycheck-direct-deposit-scam","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/fake-employee-email-paycheck-direct-deposit-scam\/","title":{"rendered":"Fake Employee Email Can Redirect Your Next Paycheck to a Stranger&#8217;s Bank"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>An email reaches payroll just before the next run. It appears to come from an employee who opened a new bank account.<\/p><div id=\"mwtad1109486740\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309684--placement_406659\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3957935887\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>\n<p>The request is routine enough to process quickly. Before changing the destination, payroll needs to answer one question the email cannot settle.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"data:image\/gif;base64,R0lGODlhAQABAAAAACH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==\" class=\"wp-image-420907 lazyload\" alt=\"Illustrative fictional email impersonating an employee and requesting a direct-deposit change\" width=\"1672\" height=\"941\" loading=\"eager\" title=\"\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1672px) 100vw, 1672px\" data-src=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/payroll-email-hero.png\" data-srcset=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/payroll-email-hero.png 1672w, https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/payroll-email-hero-300x169.png 300w, https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/payroll-email-hero-1024x576.png 1024w, https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/payroll-email-hero-1536x864.png 1536w\"><\/figure>\n<div id=\"mwtad1073409320\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309746-ad_309685-placement_406660\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"4456629336\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>Overview<\/h2>\n<h3>The attacker impersonates the employee, not the payroll department<\/h3>\n<p>In this scam, an outsider writes to HR or payroll as if they are an employee. They ask that future wages go to a different bank account.<\/p><div id=\"mwtad3611763111\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_381396-ad_309685-placement_406667\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"1471373341\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>\n<p>The employee may never receive a phishing link or lose a password. The fraud can begin and end as an email conversation with payroll.<\/p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ic3.gov\/PSA\/2019\/PSA190910\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FBI&#8217;s Internet Crime Complaint Center specifically distinguishes<\/a> this spoofed employee request from a separate attack involving stolen payroll-portal credentials.<\/p>\n<p>That distinction matters. Advice limited to changing the employee&#8217;s password will not fix a payroll process that accepts unauthenticated banking changes by email.<\/p><div id=\"mwtad3121693166\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309686-ad_309685-placement_406668\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-right: 10px;margin-bottom: 50px;margin-left: 10px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"6935453015\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>\n<h3>A recent attempt was stopped by contacting the real worker<\/h3>\n<p>In a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reddit.com\/r\/Scams\/comments\/1wtjb97\/us_employers_paycheck_direct_deposit_scam_warning\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">September 2026 report<\/a>, an employer received an email using an employee&#8217;s identity and asking to change the bank for the next paycheck.<\/p>\n<p>The address was not the employee&#8217;s usual address. The employer showed the message to the worker, who said they had not sent it.<\/p>\n<p>The sender later provided a bank-information PDF. That detail makes the request look administratively complete, but it does not authenticate the person requesting payment.<\/p><div id=\"mwtad2155057681\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_381401-ad_309685-placement_406669\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-right: 10px;margin-bottom: 50px;margin-left: 10px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"5315249587\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>\n<p>GO2Bank, named in that account, is a real banking service. Its appearance on a purported form does not make the bank the scam operator.<\/p>\n<p>The reported attempt was intercepted. We cannot claim a diverted paycheck in that case or identify who controlled the destination account.<\/p>\n<h3>This is a documented payroll-diversion pattern<\/h3>\n<div id=\"mwtad1383270522\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_381404-ad_309685-placement_406670\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-right: 10px;margin-bottom: 50px;margin-left: 10px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"8735619847\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><p>The FBI documented more than 1,000 complaints about this BEC payroll-diversion variation during an 18-month period ending in June 2019.<\/p>\n<p>Those figures are historical, not a measurement of the September 2026 case. They establish that the pattern is broader than one online complaint.<\/p>\n<p>Current warning signs include:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>An employee name appears with a new, unfamiliar email address.<\/li>\n<li>The requested account is supplied as a PDF or bank letter by email.<\/li>\n<li>The sender stresses the next payroll cutoff.<\/li>\n<li>The request bypasses the employer&#8217;s normal self-service or signed process.<\/li>\n<li>The message says to use a new telephone number for confirmation.<\/li>\n<li>The worker cannot confirm the change through a number already on file.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div id=\"mwtad1491743143\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309747-ad_309685-placement_406661\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"9589536513\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>Why a Voided Check or Bank Letter Is Not Identity Proof<\/h2>\n<div id=\"mwtad4086814640\" class=\"mwtadp5 mwtadentity-placement\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"https:\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\"\r\n     crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script>\r\n<ins class=\"adsbygoogle\"\r\n     style=\"display:block; text-align:center;\"\r\n     data-ad-layout=\"in-article\"\r\n     data-ad-format=\"fluid\"\r\n     data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\"\r\n     data-ad-slot=\"8560433799\"><\/ins>\r\n<script>\r\n     (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});\r\n<\/script><\/div><p>Payroll staff understandably ask for documentation before changing direct deposit. A document can confirm the account information was typed consistently without proving who requested the change.<\/p>\n<p>A criminal can create a PDF with an employee&#8217;s name and a routing number. The recipient account may be real and still be controlled by someone else.<\/p>\n<p>The bank&#8217;s logo and address are not enough. Those details are public, and a document image can be altered.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad179570726\" class=\"mwtadp6 mwtadentity-placement\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"https:\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\"\r\n     crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script>\r\n<ins class=\"adsbygoogle\"\r\n     style=\"display:block; text-align:center;\"\r\n     data-ad-layout=\"in-article\"\r\n     data-ad-format=\"fluid\"\r\n     data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\"\r\n     data-ad-slot=\"4034304343\"><\/ins>\r\n<script>\r\n     (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});\r\n<\/script><\/div><p>Even a real account under an employee&#8217;s name would not establish that the employee authorized this specific payroll instruction.<\/p>\n<p>The September employer noticed another mismatch: the targeted worker did not actually use direct deposit. That made the request easier to reject.<\/p>\n<p>Other cases will not offer such an obvious clue. A worker who already receives deposits can plausibly switch banks.<\/p>\n<p>The most reliable test is independent contact. Call a number previously recorded by the employer or speak to the employee in person.<\/p>\n<p>Do not reply to the questionable email and ask \u201cIs this really you?\u201d The person controlling that mailbox or spoofed address can simply answer yes.<\/p>\n<p>Do not use a new number printed on the attached form. That would let the same sender control both the request and the verification.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad340068617\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309748-ad_309685-placement_406662\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3906789406\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>How the Employee Direct-Deposit Scam Works<\/h2>\n<h3>Step 1: The attacker identifies a payroll contact<\/h3>\n<p>A company website, job posting, professional profile, or leaked directory can reveal who handles HR and payroll.<\/p>\n<p>The attacker needs surprisingly little information. A worker&#8217;s name and employer may be enough to begin a believable request.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 2: An email claims to be from that employee<\/h3>\n<p>The display name may match the worker while the actual address is a new Gmail account or a lookalike company domain.<\/p>\n<p>A compromised genuine mailbox is possible in some campaigns, but the September report did not establish that. Its sender used an unfamiliar address.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 3: The message asks about the next paycheck<\/h3>\n<p>The attacker says they opened a new account and want direct deposit moved before payroll closes. The request sounds like ordinary employee administration.<\/p>\n<p>It may ask what form payroll needs, rather than supplying bank details immediately. That conversational opening can make the exchange feel cooperative.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 4: A bank form supplies the destination<\/h3>\n<p>The sender returns an account document or typed routing information. A real bank name can make the paperwork appear credible.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"data:image\/gif;base64,R0lGODlhAQABAAAAACH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==\" class=\"wp-image-420908 lazyload\" alt=\"Illustrative fictional payroll dashboard holding a direct-deposit change for independent employee verification\" width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" loading=\"lazy\" title=\"\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-src=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/payroll-change-detail.png\" data-srcset=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/payroll-change-detail.png 1536w, https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/payroll-change-detail-300x200.png 300w, https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/payroll-change-detail-1024x683.png 1024w\"><\/figure>\n<p>The document is not proof of authority. Payroll must verify the employee separately before moving wages.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 5: A hurried staff member may update the record<\/h3>\n<p>If the organization accepts email as sufficient authorization, the next payroll file can route earnings to the supplied account.<\/p>\n<p>Many employers have a cutoff. The scammer may time the request so there is little room for a callback before processing.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 6: The missing deposit reveals the diversion<\/h3>\n<p>The legitimate worker expects pay as usual. They may learn something changed only when their normal account remains empty.<\/p>\n<p>The employer may then need to contact its bank, payroll provider, and receiving institution quickly to request a recall or hold.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 7: The same script is tried again elsewhere<\/h3>\n<p>A failed attempt can be repeated with a different worker, employer, or bank document. A single intercepted email should trigger a review of similar requests.<\/p>\n<p>The real employee should be notified. They may need reassurance that the employer did not change their pay instructions.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad1365630192\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_318930-ad_309685-placement_406663\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3818335085\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>How This Differs From a Fake Payroll Login Email<\/h2>\n<p>Many payroll scams target employees directly with a false login page. The worker enters a password, and the intruder changes details inside the real payroll system.<\/p>\n<p>This case targets the staff member authorized to make the change. The email itself is the instruction, and the payroll process is the target.<\/p>\n<p>The FBI explicitly notes the difference. Conflating them can send victims toward the wrong response.<\/p>\n<p>If no employee account was accessed, rotating that employee&#8217;s password may still be prudent when compromise is suspected, but it is not the primary control.<\/p>\n<p>Payroll needs to freeze the proposed bank change, verify the worker, and examine whether other employee records were altered.<\/p>\n<p>If a genuine mailbox was compromised, the employer also needs identity and email incident response. The investigation should determine that from logs, not assume it.<\/p>\n<p>The bank destination is evidence, not a verdict on the bank. Financial institutions can be used by criminals without authorizing the fraud.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad2163045392\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_381388-ad_309685-placement_406705\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3191649120\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>A Payroll Process That Breaks the Scam<\/h2>\n<p>Require a change through the established employee portal or a controlled form. Do not accept a new bank account solely because an email carries a familiar name.<\/p>\n<p>Call the employee using a number already in the personnel record. If the number itself was recently changed, verify that change independently too.<\/p>\n<p>For a small company, a brief in-person conversation can work. Record the confirmation and the person who performed it.<\/p>\n<p>Use dual approval for changes close to a pay run. A second reviewer can catch an unfamiliar sender or an account changed outside policy.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nacha.org\/news\/checklist-approach-reduce-fraud-payroll-origination\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Nacha recommends<\/a> controls such as independently validating account changes and dual control for payroll origination.<\/p>\n<p>Notify the worker through an existing channel when bank details change. A message to the new email address in the request is not sufficient.<\/p>\n<p>Hold unusual requests that arrive just before the cutoff. A delayed change is inconvenient; a diverted paycheck is worse.<\/p>\n<p>Train staff to see the complete email address, not only the display name. Mobile mail clients often hide the detail that matters.<\/p>\n<p>Keep an audit trail of the old and new destination, request source, verification method, approver, and effective payroll period.<\/p>\n<p>If the worker says no, document the attempt and report the destination account to the originating bank or appropriate fraud channel.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad892194380\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_381392-ad_309685-placement_406664\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"2944237110\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>The Payroll Cutoff Is Part of the Pressure<\/h2>\n<p>A direct-deposit request arriving just before payday feels urgent for an understandable reason. Nobody wants to delay an employee&#8217;s wages.<\/p>\n<p>The scammer can exploit that instinct by asking for the change \u201cthis pay period\u201d while presenting the delay as a payroll problem.<\/p>\n<p>A rushed approval, however, can send the full paycheck to an account the worker never named. The urgency should trigger verification, not bypass it.<\/p>\n<p>Employers should tell workers how long genuine bank changes take. Clear expectations make an \u201cemergency\u201d exception less persuasive.<\/p>\n<p>A request after the cutoff can be scheduled for a later payroll run. The staff member can explain that choice through a known channel.<\/p>\n<p>Do not rely on a statement that the old account is closed. Confirm that claim with the employee; it may be the pretext for overriding controls.<\/p>\n<p>If a worker truly has an urgent banking problem, the employer can use its established exception process. The stranger&#8217;s email should not invent one.<\/p>\n<p>For larger payroll teams, flag destination changes inside the final payroll review. A second person should compare them against verified requests.<\/p>\n<p>Reviewing only the total payroll amount will miss a diversion. The sum can remain unchanged while one employee&#8217;s destination changes.<\/p>\n<p>A change report should include the prior account suffix, new account suffix, effective date, requester, verifier, and approval time.<\/p>\n<p>That report should be retained securely. It helps the employer trace what happened if the worker calls after a missing deposit.<\/p>\n<p>The same fraud can target bonuses or reimbursements, not only regular wages. Verification controls should cover every employee payment destination.<\/p>\n<p>Pay attention to replies in an existing email thread as well. A compromised account can make the change look more familiar than a new Gmail message.<\/p>\n<p>That possibility is why \u201ccompany email only\u201d is not a complete rule. A callback or authenticated self-service step remains valuable.<\/p>\n<p>Do not blame the employee for having public job information. Professional profiles are normal; the payroll process must withstand a stranger knowing a name.<\/p>\n<p>In the September example, the employer asked the worker directly before processing. That one independent step prevented the email from becoming a payment instruction.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad980452941\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_381392-ad_309685-placement_406665\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"2944237110\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>What to Do if You Have Fallen Victim to This Scam<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li>Pause the requested change. If payroll has not run, freeze the bank update and call the real employee using a number already on file.<\/li>\n<li>If wages were sent to the wrong account, contact the employer&#8217;s bank and payroll processor immediately. Request a recall or reversal and preserve the payment trace.<\/li>\n<li>Tell the affected worker plainly what happened and when. Confirm where future wages will be sent and how the employer will address the missing pay.<\/li>\n<li>Preserve the email and headers, PDF, account details, approvals, logs, payroll file, and callback records. Do not keep the only evidence inside a personal inbox.<\/li>\n<li>Check for additional changes. Search recent payroll requests for the same wording, sender domains, bank details, or timing near pay cutoffs.<\/li>\n<li>Investigate whether an employee or payroll mailbox was compromised. A spoofed email and a genuine-account takeover require different technical containment.<\/li>\n<li>Report the receiving account and attempted fraud to the relevant financial institution. Share facts, not unsupported accusations about the bank or account holder.<\/li>\n<li>File a detailed complaint with <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ic3.gov\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">IC3<\/a> in the United States and contact local law enforcement where appropriate.<\/li>\n<li>Close the process gap. Require independent verification and documented approval before accepting future direct-deposit changes.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>If the email included a file and somebody opened it, security staff should evaluate that file. The documented September attempt does not itself prove malware delivery.<\/p>\n<p>A recovery service claiming it can retrieve wages for an upfront fee should be treated with suspicion. Work through the employer and financial institutions.<\/p>\n<h2>Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n<h3>Can a scammer redirect pay without knowing the worker&#8217;s password?<\/h3>\n<p>Yes, if payroll accepts an impersonated email as authorization. The FBI distinguishes this from stolen-portal-credential payroll fraud.<\/p>\n<h3>Does a bank form prove the email came from the employee?<\/h3>\n<p>No. A document can contain real banking details while the instruction itself is fraudulent. Confirm the worker through an independent channel.<\/p>\n<h3>Was GO2Bank involved in the September attempt?<\/h3>\n<p>The reporter said the sender supplied a document naming GO2Bank. That does not establish bank involvement or identify who controlled the account.<\/p>\n<h3>Should payroll call the number in the request?<\/h3>\n<p>No. Use a telephone number already held in the employer&#8217;s personnel record, not one supplied in the suspicious email.<\/p>\n<h3>What if the payment has already been sent?<\/h3>\n<p>Contact the employer&#8217;s bank and payroll processor immediately to seek a recall, preserve the payment trace, notify the worker, and report the fraud.<\/p>\n<h3>Does an unfamiliar email address always mean fraud?<\/h3>\n<p>No. Employees can use personal addresses. For a bank change, unfamiliarity is a reason for independent confirmation, not an automatic accusation.<\/p>\n<h2>The Bottom Line<\/h2>\n<p>A fake employee email can turn a routine payroll change into a redirected paycheck. The September attempt was stopped because the employer checked with the real worker.<\/p>\n<p>Verify every bank change through a channel the sender did not supply. If a payment has moved, speed and a complete record are essential.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad3501776140\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_176819-ad_309685-placement_406666\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"8386082122\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>An email reaches payroll just before the next run. It appears to come from an employee who opened a new bank account. The request is routine enough to process quickly. Before changing the destination, payroll &#8230; <\/p>\n<p class=\"read-more-container\"><a title=\"Fake Employee Email Can Redirect Your Next Paycheck to a Stranger&#8217;s Bank\" class=\"read-more button\" href=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/fake-employee-email-paycheck-direct-deposit-scam\/#more-420906\" aria-label=\"Read more about Fake Employee Email Can Redirect Your Next Paycheck to a Stranger&#8217;s Bank\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":51,"featured_media":420907,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[49],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-420906","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-scam-reports","masonry-post","generate-columns","tablet-grid-50","mobile-grid-100","grid-parent","grid-50","resize-featured-image"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/420906","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/51"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=420906"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/420906\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":420909,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/420906\/revisions\/420909"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/420907"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=420906"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=420906"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=420906"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}