{"id":425172,"date":"2026-10-08T08:37:06","date_gmt":"2026-10-08T08:37:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/?p=425172"},"modified":"2026-10-08T08:37:06","modified_gmt":"2026-10-08T08:37:06","slug":"quickbooks-callback-code-sharing-scam","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/quickbooks-callback-code-sharing-scam\/","title":{"rendered":"QuickBooks Code-Sharing Scam: A Support Callback Can Become a $5,000 Loss"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>You contact support about a checking-account problem. A follow-up call arrives at just the right moment, and the person seems to know what you needed.<\/p><div id=\"mwtad2953829129\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309684--placement_406659\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-right: 10px;margin-bottom: 50px;margin-left: 10px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3957935887\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>\n<p>The QuickBooks code-sharing scam exploits that context. A conversation that feels connected to your own request still needs a clear boundary around what you authorize.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/malwaretips-quickbooks-code-scam-1.png\" class=\"wp-image-425173\" width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" style=\"aspect-ratio: 1536 \/ 1024\" alt=\"Illustrative support message presenting a verification code as permission to view a checking account\" title=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/malwaretips-quickbooks-code-scam-1.png 1536w, https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/malwaretips-quickbooks-code-scam-1-300x200.png 300w, https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/malwaretips-quickbooks-code-scam-1-1024x683.png 1024w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" \/><\/figure>\n<div id=\"mwtad2700546779\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309746-ad_309685-placement_406660\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"4456629336\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>Overview<\/h2>\n<h3>The concern is a deceptive code request, not QuickBooks itself<\/h3>\n<p>This scam uses a support explanation to obtain a verification code or account authorization. The caller&#8217;s stated purpose can differ from the action the code enables.<\/p><div id=\"mwtad2971601472\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_381396-ad_309685-placement_406667\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-bottom: 50px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"1471373341\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>\n<p>QuickBooks and Intuit are legitimate services. Intuit&#8217;s fraud guidance warns about impersonation and verification-code requests outside the normal sign-in process.<\/p>\n<p>A genuine support issue does not authenticate every subsequent contact. Caller ID, a case reference, or knowledge of your business can make an unverified request feel familiar.<\/p>\n<p>Do not share a code marked private or approve money movement just because a caller says it is needed to view an account.<\/p><div id=\"mwtad914852701\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309686-ad_309685-placement_406668\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-right: 10px;margin-bottom: 50px;margin-left: 10px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"6935453015\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>\n<h3>Reported checking incidents involved a callback and unauthorized transfers<\/h3>\n<p>One customer described contacting support about a missing tax form, receiving a callback, and sharing a code supposedly needed for account viewing and escalation.<\/p>\n<p>The customer then reported an unauthorized $5,000 instant transfer and a $75 fee. Other public customer reports describe similar callback and checking-account concerns.<\/p>\n<p>The original reporter later said Intuit reimbursed the full $5,075. That resolution matters, but it is not a guarantee that every reported incident will have the same outcome.<\/p><div id=\"mwtad1061694206\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_381401-ad_309685-placement_406669\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-right: 10px;margin-bottom: 50px;margin-left: 10px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"5315249587\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li>You already have a real support issue or account task.<\/li>\n<li>An incoming contact claims to be handling that issue.<\/li>\n<li>Account or ticket details are offered as reassurance.<\/li>\n<li>A code is described as a harmless viewing or escalation step.<\/li>\n<li>The message&#8217;s warning or actual authorization is unclear.<\/li>\n<li>Money movement or account changes follow that you did not intend.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>The reports do not establish an insider or platform breach<\/h3>\n<p>Public accounts do not provide the technical evidence needed to determine how each caller obtained information or who caused each unauthorized transfer.<\/p>\n<p>Do not turn speculation about employees, a chatbot, suppressed notifications, or account access into a finding. Those explanations remain unproven.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad1051676333\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_381404-ad_309685-placement_406670\" style=\"margin-top: 50px;margin-right: 10px;margin-bottom: 50px;margin-left: 10px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"8735619847\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><p>This report addresses the deceptive code-sharing pattern and practical protections. It is not a claim that all support callbacks, routine identity checks, or dispute decisions are scams.<\/p>\n<p>The reconstructed screens illustrate the reported request and generic code warning. They are not actual customer messages, transcripts, or proof of a particular technical compromise.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad3495906633\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309747-ad_309685-placement_406661\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"9589536513\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>Why an Expected Callback Still Needs Its Own Check<\/h2>\n<p>An unexpected bank call is easier to question than one arriving after you have asked for help. The real support task supplies a believable reason to listen.<\/p>\n<p>You may also have spent a long time trying to reach the right department. A person who says they can finally resolve the issue feels useful.<\/p>\n<p>The contact can exploit that relief. A code request sounds like the small remaining step between you and finishing the task.<\/p>\n<p>But finishing the support task and authorizing a financial action are different things. The caller&#8217;s explanation must not replace understanding what the account is asking you to approve.<\/p>\n<p>Knowing a business address or ticket detail does not settle that question. It may make the call more specific without establishing the caller&#8217;s authority.<\/p>\n<p>Nor does a matching incoming number prove identity. Caller-ID information can be misleading, so it should not be your sole verification method.<\/p>\n<p>The right pause is practical, not confrontational. Stop the code request, reopen your established support route, and verify the contact and proposed action there.<\/p>\n<p>You do not need to keep explaining yourself to the incoming caller. A genuine account problem can still be resolved through authenticated support.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad3503825240\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_309748-ad_309685-placement_406662\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3906789406\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>How the QuickBooks Code-Sharing Scam Works<\/h2>\n<h3>Step 1: A real account task creates the context<\/h3>\n<p>The person is already looking for a document, fixing a checking problem, or contacting support. That task makes follow-up communication seem expected.<\/p>\n<p>In the detailed customer report, the original need was a tax form. The reported theft was not the form itself, but what happened during the subsequent interaction.<\/p>\n<p>Do not assume you caused a scam by needing support. The useful lesson is to verify a new request even when its timing fits your real task.<\/p>\n<p>Keep a record of the support route you used, case reference, and what assistance was promised. It can help you compare later contact with the original process.<\/p>\n<p>A callback should not create unlimited permission to access funds. Each account change or financial instruction still needs its own clear purpose.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 2: The incoming person claims to continue the support case<\/h3>\n<p>The caller says the issue has been escalated or assigned to them. They may reference information that makes the conversation feel connected to your account.<\/p>\n<p>That connection is a claim to verify. The public reports do not establish one explanation for how the information became available.<\/p>\n<p>Do not infer a proven breach or dishonest employee from the timing alone. Equally, do not treat familiarity as permission to ignore the requested action.<\/p>\n<p>Use the official account or support channel to confirm the callback. Avoid a number or link newly supplied by the person whose identity you are checking.<\/p>\n<p>If they offer another incoming call as proof, that does not make the check independent. You still need a route outside their control.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 3: A verification code is described as account viewing or escalation<\/h3>\n<p>The person introduces a code request as part of helping you. The explanation may sound less sensitive than signing in or moving money.<\/p>\n<p>A verification code can be connected to different account actions. Its actual role depends on the service and request, not simply what the caller says.<\/p>\n<p>Read the entire message and any account prompt. A warning not to share the code is meaningful, even when the person asking claims to be support.<\/p>\n<p>Do not approve an unfamiliar sign-in, recovery, recipient change, or transfer to make a caller&#8217;s explanation work. Stop when the requested authorization does not match your task.<\/p>\n<p>Intuit&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/quickbooks.intuit.com\/learn-support\/en-us\/help-article\/fraud\/identify-suspicious-activity-phishing-scams-fraud\/L2NzZQnZu_US_en_US\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">phishing and fraud guidance<\/a> explains the danger of requests for credentials and codes outside the normal process.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/malwaretips-quickbooks-code-scam-2.png\" class=\"wp-image-425174\" width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" style=\"aspect-ratio: 1536 \/ 1024\" alt=\"Illustrative verification code message warning the recipient not to share the code with anyone\" title=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/malwaretips-quickbooks-code-scam-2.png 1536w, https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/malwaretips-quickbooks-code-scam-2-300x200.png 300w, https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/malwaretips-quickbooks-code-scam-2-1024x683.png 1024w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" \/><\/figure>\n<h3>Step 4: Access or authorization can lead to activity you did not intend<\/h3>\n<p>If an attacker obtains useful access or approval, they may be able to make account changes or initiate financial activity. The exact action varies.<\/p>\n<p>The customer report describes an instant transfer discovered after the call. It does not establish a universal technical sequence for every incident.<\/p>\n<p>Do not assume that withholding a later card detail protects everything already exposed. A previously shared code or approval may need separate investigation.<\/p>\n<p>Check the account through its official interface. Look for transactions, new recipients, profile changes, or access that you do not recognize.<\/p>\n<p>Save the visible record and contact the real provider promptly. Avoid repeatedly refreshing the account while continuing to follow the suspicious caller&#8217;s instructions.<\/p>\n<h3>Step 5: The incident needs a financial response and an account response<\/h3>\n<p>An unauthorized transfer and exposed account access are related but different problems. A password change alone may not address money already moved.<\/p>\n<p>Likewise, a payment investigation does not automatically remove unfamiliar sessions or reverse account changes. Ask the provider about both sides of the incident.<\/p>\n<p>The original customer&#8217;s later reimbursement should be reported fairly. It does not identify the perpetrator, prove every allegation, or establish a standard refund timetable.<\/p>\n<p>Do not pay a new contact to speed up the dispute. Use your established case references and authenticated bank or product support.<\/p>\n<p>If the person calls again claiming the problem is fixed, verify that through the genuine account. Their reassurance is not a substitute for confirmed records.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mwtad1807528744\" class=\"gas_fallback-ad_318930-ad_309685-placement_406663\" style=\"margin-top: 30px;margin-bottom: 30px;\"><script async src=\"\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-7750719144850257\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display:block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-7750719144850257\" \ndata-ad-slot=\"3818335085\" \ndata-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins>\n<script> \n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); \n<\/script>\n<\/div><h2>Caller Identity, Code Purpose, and Payment Authorization Are Separate<\/h2>\n<h3>A recognizable caller is not enough<\/h3>\n<p>You might recognize a number, company name, or case reference. Those details can be useful context, but they do not independently authorize the request.<\/p>\n<p>Reopen support through the official product or company website. Intuit&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.intuit.com\/company\/contact\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">contact page<\/a> provides established product-support routes.<\/p>\n<p>Ask whether the specific contact and action fit your case. You should not need a stranger&#8217;s new link to verify your existing account.<\/p>\n<h3>A legitimate code can be used under a false explanation<\/h3>\n<p>A code arriving from a genuine service does not prove that the caller&#8217;s description is accurate. An attacker may have triggered an actual account action.<\/p>\n<p>Do not focus only on the sender of the SMS. Also ask why it arrived and what the person wants you to do with it.<\/p>\n<p>When the message says not to share it, do not let a verbal assurance override that boundary. Confirm the process independently before continuing.<\/p>\n<h3>Looking at an account is not consent to move money<\/h3>\n<p>A support task can involve reviewing account information without authorizing a transfer. Treat any money movement, new recipient, or financial permission as a separate decision.<\/p>\n<p>If a prompt mentions an action you did not request, cancel it. Do not approve it because the caller says the wording is generic.<\/p>\n<p>Report exactly what you saw and shared. Avoid guessing whether the code was for login, viewing, recovery, or transfer when the message did not clearly establish that.<\/p>\n<h2>What the Reported Reimbursement Does and Does Not Mean<\/h2>\n<p>The original customer updated the public account to say Intuit reimbursed the money and fee. Leaving out that update would misrepresent the reported outcome.<\/p>\n<p>It still does not prove how the fraud happened. A reimbursement is a financial resolution, not a published technical finding about the support chain.<\/p>\n<p>Nor does one resolution establish your account&#8217;s protections or dispute deadline. Business checking products and transaction types can have different terms.<\/p>\n<p>Ask the actual checking provider what process applies to your payment. Keep copies of submissions, supporting records, responses, and case numbers.<\/p>\n<p>A disputed or denied claim is not, by itself, proof that the provider runs a scam. Keep the criminal activity and the dispute-handling concern separate.<\/p>\n<p>If the loss is substantial or the process is unclear, seek qualified advice appropriate to your account and jurisdiction. Do not rely on a private recovery solicitor&#8217;s guarantee.<\/p>\n<h2>What to Do if You Have Fallen Victim to This Scam<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Stop the code request and further approvals.<\/strong> End the interaction if the purpose is unclear or the message tells you not to share the code.<\/p>\n<p>Do not provide another code to reverse the first one. Contact authenticated support through the product or official site instead.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Check account activity from a trusted route.<\/strong> Review transactions, recipients, profile details, and available security events in the real account.<\/p>\n<p>Record anything unexpected without using the caller&#8217;s links. If access is blocked, use the provider&#8217;s official recovery and fraud-reporting process.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Contact the checking provider about money movement immediately.<\/strong> Explain the callback, what you shared, and the transaction you did not intend.<\/p>\n<p>Ask about stopping pending activity, protecting remaining funds, and the applicable dispute process. Keep the transfer amount and any separate fee clearly identified.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Notify genuine QuickBooks or Intuit support.<\/strong> Provide your established case reference, the contact timeline, and the reported unauthorized activity.<\/p>\n<p>Ask them to assess account access and coordinate the appropriate escalation. Do not submit banking passwords or fresh authentication codes in an unsolicited message.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Secure exposed credentials and sessions.<\/strong> Change compromised or reused passwords through official services and review unfamiliar access or recovery information.<\/p>\n<p>Keep multifactor authentication enabled. Do not approve unexpected requests while completing recovery, even if another caller claims they belong to the fraud team.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Save the incident record privately.<\/strong> Preserve SMS wording, call details, case references, transaction records, correspondence, and the sequence of what happened.<\/p>\n<p>Do not publish live codes, full account numbers, employee information, or identity documents. Factual records are more useful than assumptions about who was responsible.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Inspect technical exposure if it occurred.<\/strong> Malwarebytes can assist on supported devices after an untrusted file, app, or remote-access installation.<\/p>\n<p>AdGuard can add protection against known phishing pages and malicious ads. It does not authenticate a caller or cancel an instant transfer.<\/p>\n<p>If no software was installed, do not assume the call infected your device. Tell trusted technical support what links, files, or permissions were actually involved.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Report the fraudulent interaction through established channels.<\/strong> Intuit publishes a security-reporting route on its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.intuit.com\/privacy\/submit-a-question\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">security contact page<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>For internet-enabled financial theft in the United States, also report through <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ic3.gov\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">IC3<\/a> and appropriate local authorities. Keep your financial dispute separate but coordinated.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p><strong>Follow up on confirmed records, not new promises.<\/strong> Track your legitimate cases and ask for the applicable decisions and documentation.<\/p>\n<p>Reject anyone demanding payment to release a reimbursement or remove the alleged breach. A second support story does not make an unverified caller safe.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h2>Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n<h3>Does every QuickBooks support callback indicate fraud?<\/h3>\n<p>No. Genuine support contact can occur. Verify the person and action through an established channel, and keep private codes and financial authorization under your control.<\/p>\n<h3>Can a genuine SMS code still be involved in a scam?<\/h3>\n<p>Yes. The service sending the code may be real while the caller&#8217;s explanation is false. Check why it arrived and what action it relates to.<\/p>\n<h3>Does knowledge of my support ticket prove the caller is genuine?<\/h3>\n<p>Not by itself. The public reports do not establish how each caller learned those details. Confirm the contact through the official support route.<\/p>\n<h3>Have an insider or QuickBooks platform breach been confirmed here?<\/h3>\n<p>No. The material reviewed does not establish those causes. This article concerns reported deceptive code requests and unauthorized activity, not an accusation against identified staff.<\/p>\n<h3>Did the customer reporting a $5,000 transfer recover the money?<\/h3>\n<p>The original reporter later said Intuit reimbursed the $5,000 and $75 fee. That reported resolution does not guarantee the result of another person&#8217;s dispute.<\/p>\n<h3>What if I shared a code but see no unauthorized transaction?<\/h3>\n<p>Contact genuine support to assess the action and account exposure. Review activity and access, and do not supply further codes to the incoming contact.<\/p>\n<h2>The Bottom Line<\/h2>\n<p>The QuickBooks code-sharing scam takes advantage of a moment when a support callback feels expected. Familiar context does not establish what the code will authorize.<\/p>\n<p>Keep a do-not-share code private, verify the contact independently, and report unintended account or payment activity through the real checking provider and authenticated support.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>You contact support about a checking-account problem. A follow-up call arrives at just the right moment, and the person seems to know what you needed. The QuickBooks code-sharing scam exploits that context. A conversation that &#8230; <\/p>\n<p class=\"read-more-container\"><a title=\"QuickBooks Code-Sharing Scam: A Support Callback Can Become a $5,000 Loss\" class=\"read-more button\" href=\"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/quickbooks-callback-code-sharing-scam\/#more-425172\" aria-label=\"Read more about QuickBooks Code-Sharing Scam: A Support Callback Can Become a $5,000 Loss\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":51,"featured_media":425173,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[49],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-425172","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-scam-reports","masonry-post","generate-columns","tablet-grid-50","mobile-grid-100","grid-parent","grid-50","resize-featured-image"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/425172","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/51"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=425172"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/425172\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":425183,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/425172\/revisions\/425183"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/425173"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=425172"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=425172"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=425172"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}