Revoke.cash FAQ<\/a> distinguishes approval cleanup from recovery and explains why a compromised seed phrase needs a different response.<\/p>\nThat distinction prevents two costly mistakes: assuming disconnection fixes everything, or paying a supposed specialist to perform an impossible reversal.<\/p>\n
A legitimate network fee may be required for an onchain change. Verify the destination and purpose rather than accepting a separate payment to an unknown support wallet.<\/p>\n
After containment, revisit how the offer reached you. Remove notification permissions or an unsafe extension if relevant, and update bookmarks that pointed toward the wrong site.<\/p>\n
Keep the lesson specific. The problem is unauthorized authority granted through an impostor promotion, not that every decentralized application or real wallet is automatically fraudulent.<\/p>\n
Check what remains before attempting another action<\/h3>\n
An address may hold assets on several networks. Make an inventory from trusted wallet views or explorers, and record where permissions or transfers appear.<\/p>\n
Don’t move every asset blindly to a destination supplied by someone offering help. Verify the new address yourself, including how it was generated and who controls it.<\/p>\n
If assets are held through an exchange rather than a self-custody wallet, contact that exchange about its own access controls. A browser-wallet revocation procedure may not apply.<\/p>\n
Likewise, avoid importing recovery words into a new app solely because a stranger recommends it. A supposed repair can become the point where previously private keys are exposed.<\/p>\n
If the history is difficult to interpret, seek help with public transaction identifiers. Someone explaining the records does not need your private phrase to read them.<\/p>\n
Keep records of any remaining exposure after the first action. A failed revocation or unconfirmed transaction is not the same as a completed permission change.<\/p>\n
Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\nIs rabbysend.site the official Rabby website?<\/h3>\n
No. The real wallet’s website is rabby.io. This separate reward page uses its identity without establishing authorization from the wallet project.<\/p>\n
Will connecting alone empty my wallet?<\/h3>\n
Connection is not the same as a transfer or unlimited approval. Review what you actually authorized instead of assuming every connection produces an identical outcome.<\/p>\n
Does disconnecting cancel token permissions?<\/h3>\n
Not necessarily. Website connections and onchain permissions are different. Review and revoke unsafe authorizations separately on the networks involved.<\/p>\n
Can a hardware wallet make a fake claim safe?<\/h3>\n
No. Keeping keys on hardware can protect them, but the device cannot make a deliberately approved malicious transaction beneficial. Read the request before confirming it.<\/p>\n
What if I entered my recovery phrase?<\/h3>\n
Consider the phrase compromised. Seek a safe migration to a new wallet with newly generated words, rather than relying only on permission cleanup.<\/p>\n
Can an antivirus recover stolen crypto?<\/h3>\n
No. Security software addresses device threats. Blockchain tracing, account containment, and reporting are separate tasks, and none guarantees that transferred assets will be recovered.<\/p>\n
The Bottom Line<\/h2>\n
Do not connect or approve requests through the rabbysend[.]site airdrop. Its borrowed Rabby identity is not evidence that the reward is authorized.<\/p>\n
If you already interacted, inspect the actual authorization history. Revoke unsafe permissions where applicable, treat exposed recovery words seriously, and refuse offers demanding another payment to recover funds.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
A Rabby-branded page offers an airdrop, with two obvious choices: connect a wallet or claim the reward. The design keeps the next action simple. Before letting a reward page interact with your assets, look beyond … <\/p>\n
Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":51,"featured_media":433823,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[49],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-433822","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-scam-reports","masonry-post","generate-columns","tablet-grid-50","mobile-grid-100","grid-parent","grid-50","resize-featured-image"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/433822","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/51"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=433822"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/433822\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":433824,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/433822\/revisions\/433824"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/433823"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=433822"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=433822"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/malwaretips.com\/blogs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=433822"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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