Now you see me: Exposing fileless malware

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Attackers are determined to circumvent security defenses using increasingly sophisticated techniques. Fileless malware boosts the stealth and effectiveness of an attack, and two of last years major ransomware outbreaks (Petya and WannaCry) used fileless techniques as part of their kill chains.


The idea behind fileless malware is simple: If tools already exist on a device (for example PowerShell.exe or wmic.exe) to fulfill an attackers objectives, then why drop custom tools that could be flagged as malware? If an attacker can take over a process, run code in its memory space, and then use that code to call tools that are already on a device, the attack becomes more difficult to detect.


Successfully using this approach, sometimes called living off the land, is not a walk in the park. Theres another thing that attackers need to deal with: Establishing persistence. Memory is volatile, and with no files on disk, how can attackers get their code to auto-start after a system reboot and retain control of a compromised system?

Misfox: A fileless gateway to victim networks


In April 2016, a customer contacted the Microsoft Incident Response team about a case of cyber-extortion. The attackers had requested a substantial sum of money from the customer in exchange for not releasing their confidential corporate information that the attackers had stolen from the customers compromised computers. In addition, the attackers had threatened to “flatten” the network if the customer contacted law enforcement. It was a difficult situation.

The Microsoft Incident Response team investigated machines in the network, identified targeted implants, and mapped out the extent of the compromise. The customer was using a well-known third-party antivirus product that was installed on the vast majority of machines. While it was up-to-date with the latest signatures, the AV product had not detected any targeted implants.​

The Microsoft team then discovered that the attackers attempted to encrypt files with ransomware twice. Luckily, those attempts failed. As it turned out, the threat to flatten the network was a plan B to monetize the attack after their plan A had failed.


Whats more, the team also discovered that the attackers had covertly persisted in the network for at least seven months through two separate channels:

  • The first channel involved a backdoor named Swrort.A that was deployed on several machines; this backdoor was easily detected by antivirus.
  • The second channel was much more subtle and interesting, because:
    • It did not infect any files on the device
    • It left no artifacts on disk
    • Common file scanning techniques could not detect it
The second tool was a strain of fileless malware called Misfox. Once Misfox was running in memory, it:

  • Created a registry run key that launches a “one-liner” PowerShell cmdlet
  • Launched an obfuscated PowerShell script stored in the registry BLOB; the obfuscated PowerShell script contained a reflective portable executable (PE) loader that loaded a Base64-encoded PE from the registry

Misfox did not drop any executable files, but the script stored in the registry ensured the malware persisted.

Fileless techniques


Misfox exemplifies how cyberattacks can incorporate fileless components in the kill chain. Attackers use several fileless techniques that can make malware implants stealthy and evasive. These techniques include:

  1. Reflective DLL injection
    Reflective DLL injection involves the manual loading of malicious DLLs into a process’ memory without the need for said DLLs to be on disk. The malicious DLL can be hosted on a remote attacker-controlled machine and delivered through a staged network channel (for example, Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol), or embedded in obfuscated form inside infection vectors like macros and scripts. This results in the evasion of the OS mechanism that monitors and keeps track of loading executable modules. An example of malware that uses Reflective DLL injection is HackTool:Win32/Mikatz!dha.
  2. Memory exploits
    Adversaries use fileless memory exploits to run arbitrary code remotely on victim machines. For example, the UIWIX threat uses the EternalBlue exploit, which was used by both Petya and WannaCry, and has been observed to install the DoublePulsar backdoor, which lives entirely in the kernel’s memory (SMB Dispatch Table). Unlike Petya and Wannacry, UIWIX does not drop any files on disk.
  3. Script-based techniques
    Scripting languages provide powerful means for delivering memory-only executable payloads. Script files can embed encoded shellcodes or binaries that they can decrypt on the fly at run time and execute via .NET objects or directly with APIs without requiring them to be written to disk. The scripts themselves can be hidden in the registry (as in the case of Misfox), read from network streams, or simply run manually in the command-line by an attacker, without ever touching the disk.
  4. WMI persistence
    Weve seen certain attackers use the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) repository to store malicious scripts that are then invoked periodically using WMI bindings. This article [PDF] presents very good examples.
Fileless malware-specific mitigations on Microsoft 365


Microsoft 365 brings together a set of next-gen security technologies to protect devices, SaaS apps, email, and infrastructure from a wide spectrum of attacks. The following Windows-related components from Microsoft 365 have capabilities to detect and mitigate malware that rely on fileless techniques:
Windows Defender Antivirus


Windows Defender AV blocks the vast majority of malware using generic, heuristic, and behavior-based detections, as well as local and cloud-based machine learning models. Windows Defender AV protects against fileless malware through these capabilities:

  • Detecting script-based techniques by leveraging AMSI, which provides the capability to inspect PowerShell and other script types, even with multiple layers of obfuscation
  • Detecting and remediating WMI persistence techniques by scanning the WMI repository, both periodically and whenever anomalous behavior is observed
  • Detecting reflective DLL injection through enhanced memory scanning techniques and behavioral monitoring
Windows Defender Exploit Guard


Windows Defender Exploit Guard (Windows Defender EG), a new set of host intrusion prevention capabilities, helps reduce the attack surface area by locking down the device against a wide variety of attack vectors. It can help stop attacks that use fileless malware by:

  • Mitigating kernel-memory exploits like EternalBlue through Hypervisor Code Integrity (HVCI), which makes it extremely difficult to inject malicious code using kernel-mode software vulnerabilities
  • Mitigating user-mode memory exploits through the Exploit protection module, which consists of a number of exploit mitigations that can be applied either at the operating system level or at the individual app level
  • Mitigating many script-based fileless techniques, among other techniques, through Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules that lock down application behavior
Windows Defender Application Control


Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) offers a mechanism to enforce strong code Integrity policies and to allow only trusted applications to run. In the context of fileless malware, WDAC locks down PowerShell to Constrained Language Mode, which limits the extended language features that can lead to unverifiable code execution, such as direct .NET scripting, invocation of Win32 APIs via the Add-Type cmdlet, and interaction with COM objects. This essentially mitigates PowerShell-based reflective DLL injection attacks.

Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection


Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP) is the integrated platform for our Windows Endpoint Protection (EPP) and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) capabilities. When it comes to post breach scenarios ATP alerts enterprise customers about highly sophisticated and advanced attacks on devices and corporate networks that other preventive protection features have been unable to defend against. It uses rich security data, advanced behavioral analytics, and machine learning to detect such attacks. It can help detect fileless malware in a number of ways, including:

  • Exposing covert attacks that use fileless techniques like reflective DLL loading using specific instrumentations that detect abnormal memory allocations
  • Detecting script-based fileless attacks by leveraging AMSI, which provides runtime inspection capability into PowerShell and other script-based malware, and applying machine learning models
Microsoft Edge


According to independent security tester NSS Labs, Microsoft Edge blocks more phishing sites and socially engineered malware than other browsers. Microsoft Edge mitigates fileless malware using arbitrary code protection capabilities, which can prevent arbitrary code, including malicious DLLs, from running. This helps mitigate reflective DLL loading attacks. In addition, Microsoft Edge offers a wide array of protections that mitigate threats, fileless or otherwise, using Windows Defender Application Guard integration and Windows Defender SmartScreen.

Windows 10 S


Windows 10 S is a special configuration of Windows 10 that combines many of the security features of Microsoft 365 automatically configured out of the box. It reduces attack surface by only allowing apps from the Microsoft Store. In the context of fileless malware, Windows 10 S has PowerShell Constrained Language Mode enabled by default. In addition, industry-best Microsoft Edge is the default browser, and Hypervisor Code Integrity (HVCI) is enabled by default.

Continue reading...
 

shmu26

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The article speaks of
Windows Defender Application Control
which apparently is Microsoft's implementation of the default/deny model. It seems to be available only on Enterprise editions of Windows.
Has anyone tested WDAC, or know whether it is any good?
 

shmu26

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The article speaks of
Windows Defender Application Control
which apparently is Microsoft's implementation of the default/deny model. It seems to be available only on Enterprise editions of Windows.
Has anyone tested WDAC, or know whether it is any good?
My guess is that it is buggy and half-baked, like most of the time when Microsoft tries to replace dedicated 3rd party software with a Windows feature.
But if anyone has tried it out on Enterprise, it would be interesting to hear a report.
 
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509322

The article speaks of
Windows Defender Application Control
which apparently is Microsoft's implementation of the default/deny model. It seems to be available only on Enterprise editions of Windows.
Has anyone tested WDAC, or know whether it is any good?

Enterprise\Education-only which requires volume licensing or a Visual Studio subscription.

Plus, Windows Defender ATP requires a subscription.

On top of that, Windows Defender Application Control is meant to be used in conjunction with Device Guard and Trusted Platform Module.

Throw-in AppLocker and Group-Policy.

* * * * *
  • Mitigating many script-based fileless techniques, among other techniques, through Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules that lock down application behavior
You can achieve the above by not using Microsoft Office or if you must use Microsoft Office by simply disabling processes - in AppGuard. It's a whole lot less cumbersome.
 
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Andy Ful

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Actually, Windows Defender ASR is good but not sufficient to protect against all known types of malicious office documents and script trojan downloaders. Anyway, one can use Exploit Guard to block child processes in office applications, but I did not check it for usability. Another built-in Windows solution that can be used is SRP (default deny + PowerShell Constrained Language mode) and blocking Windows Script Host. For the paranoid like protection, one can also block vulnerable applications (sponsors) using SRP (via GPO, Hard Configurator, Simple Software Restriction Policies). Configuring SRP should be made by experienced user, but may be applied on computers of inexperienced ones.
The best solution is probably using online office applications (Google drive, Office Online) or Universal Apps (AppContainer).
The excellent solution can be restricting the office applications using AppGuard, that can add some additional valuable security features like for example memory protection.
I think that also ReHips (free) in Permissive mode can be used for this task - it allows executing all applications (some are monitored for children processes), but most popular office applications (MS Office, LibreOffice, OpenOffice, WPS Office) are sandboxed (documents are saved in the real system) which is a light version of AppContainer.
Any sandboxing solution with virtualization (Sandboxie paid version, Comodo Firewall) is also very secure, but maybe not as convenient as mentioned above.
Some experienced users will like Excubits drivers or ani-exe programs to fight malicious documents.
Good protection can be probably applied when properly configuring NVT OSArmor, but this will require some testing to be sure.
 
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509322

Actually, Windows Defender ASR is good but not sufficient to protect against all known types of malicious office documents and script trojan downloaders. Anyway, one can use Exploit Guard to block child processes in office applications, but I did not check it for usability. Another built-in Windows solution that can be used is SRP (default deny + PowerShell Constrained Language mode) and blocking Windows Script Host. For the paranoid like protection, one can also block vulnerable applications (sponsors) using SRP (via GPO, Hard Configurator, Simple Software Restriction Policies). Configuring SRP should be made by experienced user, but may be applied on computers of inexperienced ones.
The best solution is probably using online office applications (Google drive, Office Online) or Universal Apps (AppContainer).
The excellent solution can be restricting the office applications using AppGuard, that can add some additional valuable security features like for example memory protection.
I think that also ReHips (free) in Permissive mode can be used for this task - it allows executing all applications (some are monitored for children processes), but most popular office applications (MS Office, LibreOffice, OpenOffice, WPS Office) are sandboxed (documents are saved in the real system) which is a light version of AppContainer.
Any sandboxing solution with virtualization (Sandboxie paid version, Comodo Firewall) is also very secure, but maybe not as convenient as mentioned above.
Some experienced users will like Excubits drivers or ani-exe programs to fight malicious documents.
Good protection can be probably applied when properly configuring NVT OSArmor, but this will require some testing to be sure.

There is no way that I have found to put PowerShell into Constrained Language Mode on Windows Home or Pro. At least I could find no documented way of doing it.

If you know a good document that covers the full PowerShell language modes and how to set them I sure would appreciate a point to it. All I can ever find is tiny bits of infos here and there that don't add up to much.
 

Andy Ful

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There is no way that I have found to put PowerShell into Constrained Language Mode on Windows Home or Pro. At least I could find no documented way of doing it.

If you know a good document that covers the full PowerShell language modes and how to set them I sure would appreciate a point to it. All I can ever find is tiny bits of infos here and there that don't add up to much.
This feature seems to be not well documented by Microsoft. There are a few articles on this topic, for example:
PSLockDownPolicy and PowerShell Constrained Language Mode
It is also hardly possible to find out that Constrained Language mode is turned on for PowerShell executed as standard user when SRP Default Security Level is set to 'Basic User' or 'Disallowed'.
I did not find a good article about No Language mode. There are some posts which are pointing out that it can be set via PowerShell profile file (it works, I tested this). But, settings from the profile file can be bypassed by using '-noprofile' in PowerShell command line.
 
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509322

This feature seems to be not well documented by Microsoft. There are a few articles on this topic, for example:
PSLockDownPolicy and PowerShell Constrained Language Mode
It is also hardly possible to find out that Constrained Language mode is turned on for PowerShell executed as standard user when SRP Default Security Level is set to 'Basic User' or 'Disallowed'.
I did not find a good article about No Language mode. There are some posts which are pointing out that it can be set via PowerShell profile file (it works, I tested this). But, settings from the profile file can be bypassed by using '-noprofile' in PowerShell command line.

Without any real documentation that tells me the Enterprise Admins are not configuring Language Modes. It is a mystery to them too. You and I have discussed this before.

What is the point of configuring No Language Mode for the Local User in their PowerShell profile.ps1 if it can be bypassed simply by using '-no profile' in the command line ?

Microsoft security... :LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL:

I see them trying to use PowerShell as a security tool. What a joke. PowerShell has no place on Windows Home. It just isn't necessary and really jeopardizes the system, but Microsoft is going to unilaterally do what it wants and needlessly force ship it on Windows Home. It isn't even necessary on the vast majority of Pro installs. It should be entirely disabled, including it's dangerous libraries, by default.
 
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Andy Ful

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This feature seems to be not well documented by Microsoft. There are a few articles on this topic, for example:
PSLockDownPolicy and PowerShell Constrained Language Mode
It is also hardly possible to find out that Constrained Language mode is turned on for PowerShell executed as standard user when SRP Default Security Level is set to 'Basic User' or 'Disallowed'.
I did not find a good article about No Language mode. There are some posts which are pointing out that it can be set via PowerShell profile file (it works, I tested this). But, settings from the profile file can be bypassed by using '-noprofile' in PowerShell command line.
Without any real documentation that tells me the Enterprise Admins are not configuring Language Modes. It is a mystery to them too. You and I have discussed this before.

What is the point of configuring No Language Mode for the Local User in their PowerShell profile.ps1 if it can be bypassed simply by using '-no profile' in the command line ?

Microsoft security... :LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL::LOL:

I see them trying to use PowerShell as a security tool. What a joke.
I do not understand this too.:)
PowerShell is mostly very useful to hackers and criminals, from the point of view of 99% users.
 
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509322

I do not understand this too.:)

PowerShell is mostly very useful to hackers and criminals, from the point of view of 99% users.

Niewiarygodne, prawda ?

Unbelievable, isn't it ?

PowerShell was created and is supposed to be one of Microsoft's creations that leads to the new Golden Age of Windows Administration, yet there is virtually zero official documentation. And what documentation there is comes from various parties and most of it is terrible.
 

Andy Ful

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Niewiarygodne, prawda ?
Unbelievable, isn't it ?
Your Polish is better than Google translate. You must have some Polish roots.:)
.
PowerShell was created and is supposed to be one of Microsoft's creations that leads to the new Golden Age of Windows Administration, yet there is virtually zero official documentation. And what documentation there is comes from various parties and most of it is terrible.
And this is even much worse, because the hackers can find out how to use undocumented PowerShell capabilities.:(
 

boredog

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Microsoft Edge


According to independent security tester NSS Labs, Microsoft Edge blocks more phishing sites and socially engineered malware than other browsers. Microsoft Edge mitigates fileless malware using arbitrary code protection capabilities, which can prevent arbitrary code, including malicious DLLs, from running. This helps mitigate reflective DLL loading attacks. In addition, Microsoft Edge offers a wide array of protections that mitigate threats, fileless or otherwise, using Windows Defender Application Guard integration and Windows Defender SmartScreen.

OhOh don't show this to the MS bashers that brag chromebooks, firefox, chrome ect.
 
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509322

Your Polish is better than Google translate. You must have some Polish roots.:)

Believe it or not, it is Google Translate. I cannot believe it because Google Translate used to butcher Polish.

Something like that. Eastern Euro for sure. Slavic Barbarian.

And this is even much worse, because the hackers can find out how to use undocumented PowerShell capabilities.:(

They experiment. Try, try and try again. They don't give up.

Microsoft with its documentation and its security. :LOL:.....:cry:.....:mad:

Learning PowerShell is time well spent. You learn a lot about Windows. ;).....:unsure:
 

WildByDesign

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There is no way that I have found to put PowerShell into Constrained Language Mode on Windows Home or Pro. At least I could find no documented way of doing it.

If you know a good document that covers the full PowerShell language modes and how to set them I sure would appreciate a point to it. All I can ever find is tiny bits of infos here and there that don't add up to much.
From my limited understanding of PowerShell lanaguage modes, you can enable Constrained Language Mode (on Pro here at least) with the following command from an elevated PS:
Code:
[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable(‘__PSLockdownPolicy‘, ‘4’, ‘Machine‘)
You need to close/reopen PS for that to take affect.

From there, you can verify that Contrained Language Mode is enabled via:
Code:
$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode

I only run Pro SKU therefore I cannot confirm for Home.
 
5

509322

From my limited understanding of PowerShell lanaguage modes, you can enable Constrained Language Mode (on Pro here at least) with the following command from an elevated PS:
Code:
[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable(‘__PSLockdownPolicy‘, ‘4’, ‘Machine‘)
You need to close/reopen PS for that to take affect.

From there, you can verify that Contrained Language Mode is enabled via:
Code:
$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode

I only run Pro SKU therefore I cannot confirm for Home.

Thanks @WildByDesign . I knew of it. It's from unofficial Microsoft documentation like 99.99 % of what is out there.

But there are other language modes, not just Constrained. And other OS versions.

Microsoft with its near 0 documentation and what documentation it does put out there being not very helpful.

People should learn PowerShell. It is full of the nasty stuff.
 

shmu26

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From my limited understanding of PowerShell lanaguage modes, you can enable Constrained Language Mode (on Pro here at least) with the following command from an elevated PS:
Code:
[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable(‘__PSLockdownPolicy‘, ‘4’, ‘Machine‘)
You need to close/reopen PS for that to take affect.

From there, you can verify that Contrained Language Mode is enabled via:
Code:
$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode

I only run Pro SKU therefore I cannot confirm for Home.
Thanks for the command.
There are PS scripts that Microsoft runs on Windows 10 for maintenance purposes, such as the one I will paste below.
Will constrained language block Microsoft maintenance scripts?

[Process: [3636]C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe] [MD5 Hash: FF59EF73460173ABDB10EDE1A0BC9CE6] [Publisher: Microsoft Corporation] [Parent: [1228]c:\windows\system32\svchost.exe] [Command-Line: C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -NonInteractive -NoProfile -WindowStyle Hidden "& C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\SmbShare\DisableUnusedSmb1.ps1 -Scenario Server"]

Here is a pretty similar one:
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -NonInteractive -NoProfile -WindowStyle Hidden "& C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\SmbShare\DisableUnusedSmb1.ps1 -Scenario Client"

So my question is whether constrained language might possibly interfere with Windows maintenance or update processes? As you can tell, I am searching for that sweet spot that offers as much protection as you can get without causing issues.
 
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509322

Thanks for the command.
There are PS scripts that Microsoft runs on Windows 10 for maintenance purposes, such as the one I will paste below.
Will constrained language block Microsoft maintenance scripts?

[Process: [3636]C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe] [MD5 Hash: FF59EF73460173ABDB10EDE1A0BC9CE6] [Publisher: Microsoft Corporation] [Parent: [1228]c:\windows\system32\svchost.exe] [Command-Line: C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -NonInteractive -NoProfile -WindowStyle Hidden "& C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\SmbShare\DisableUnusedSmb1.ps1 -Scenario Server"]

Here is a pretty similar one:
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -NonInteractive -NoProfile -WindowStyle Hidden "& C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\SmbShare\DisableUnusedSmb1.ps1 -Scenario Client"

So my question is whether constrained language might possibly interfere with Windows maintenance or update processes? As you can tell, I am searching for that sweet spot that offers as much protection as you can get without causing issues.

Those scripts will still execute in Constrained Language mode. If you want to learn why, the answer is here:

PowerShell Constrained Language Mode

Don't get too excited. Constrained Language Mode is bypassable using PowerShell 2.0.

I've said it millions of times. PowerShell should be disabled. There is no sweetspot for PowerShell. Disabling it on Windows breaks nothing in 99.999% of cases. It isn't needed by virtually 100 % of non-Enterprise, non-geek users. You don't need it enabled.

My wanting to know about configuring the language modes was just to know, and nothing else.
 
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shmu26

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Those scripts will still execute in Constrained Language mode. If you want to learn why, the answer is here:

PowerShell Constrained Language Mode

Don't get too excited. Constrained Language Mode is bypassable using PowerShell 2.0.

I've said it millions of times. PowerShell should be disabled. There is no sweetspot for PowerShell. Disabling it on Windows breaks nothing in 99.999% of cases. It isn't needed by virtually 100 % of non-Enterprise, non-geek users. You don't need it enabled.

My wanting to know about configuring the language modes was just to know, and nothing else.
Agreed that PS constrained language is not a panacea, but it is a step in the right direction.
 
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jogs

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I think next level of file-less malware may not use PS other programs like it. They will be able to use any software that's on a victims PC. Like hijacking the update mechanism of any software a lot of data could be downloaded and uploaded without the AVs detecting it. Its a very difficult task but malware is getting more and more sophisticated.
 
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