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Windows Defender Antivirus has hit a new milestone: the built-in antivirus capabilities on Windows can now run within a sandbox. With this new development, Windows Defender Antivirus becomes the first complete antivirus solution to have this capability and continues to lead the industry in raising the bar for security.


Putting Windows Defender Antivirus in a restrictive process execution environment is a direct result of feedback that we received from the security industry and the research community. It was a complex undertaking: we had to carefully study the implications of such an enhancement on performance and functionality. More importantly, we had to identify high-risk areas and make sure that sandboxing did not adversely affect the level of security we have been providing.


While it was a tall order, we knew it was the right investment and the next step in our innovation journey. It is available to Windows Insiders today. We encourage researchers and partners to try and examine this feature and give us feedback, so we can fine-tune performance, functionality, and security before we make it broadly available.

Why sandbox? Why now?


From the beginning, we designed and built Windows Defender Antivirus to be resistant to attacks. In order to inspect the whole system for malicious content and artifacts, it runs with high privileges. This makes it a candidate for attacks.


Security researchers both inside and outside of Microsofthave previously identified ways that an attacker can take advantage of vulnerabilities in Windows Defender Antiviruss content parsers that could enable arbitrary code execution. While we havent seen attacks in-the-wild actively targeting Windows Defender Antivirus, we take these reports seriously. We immediately fixed potential problems and ramped up our own research and testing to uncover and resolve other possible issues.


At the same time, we continued hardening Windows 10 in general against attacks. Hardware-based isolation, network protection, controlled folder access, exploit protection, and other technologies reduce the attack surface and increase attacker costs. Notably, escalation of privilege from a sandbox is so much more difficult on the latest versions of Windows 10. Furthermore, the integration of Windows Defender Antivirus and other Windows security technologies into Windows Defender ATPs unified endpoint security platform allows signal-sharing and orchestration of threat detection and remediation across components.


Running Windows Defender Antivirus in a sandbox ensures that in the unlikely event of a compromise, malicious actions are limited to the isolated environment, protecting the rest of the system from harm. This is part of Microsofts continued investment to stay ahead of attackers through security innovations. Windows Defender Antivirus and the rest of the Windows Defender ATP stack now integrate with other security components of Microsoft 365 to form Microsoft Threat Protection. Its more important than ever to elevate security across the board, so this new enhancement in Windows Defender Antivirus couldnt come at a better time.

Implementing a sandbox for Windows Defender Antivirus


Modern antimalware products are required to inspect many inputs, for example, files on disk, streams of data in memory, and behavioral events in real time. Many of these capabilities require full access to the resources in question. The first major sandboxing effort was related to layering Windows Defender Antiviruss inspection capabilities into the components that absolutely must run with full privileges and the components that can be sandboxed. The goal for the sandboxed components was to ensure that they encompassed the highest risk functionality like scanning untrusted input, expanding containers, and so on. At the same time, we had to minimize the number of interactions between the two layers in order to avoid a substantial performance cost.


The ability to gradually deploy this feature was another important design goal. Because we would be enabling this on a wide range of hardware and software configurations, we aimed to have the ability at runtime to decide if and when the sandboxing is enabled. This means that the entire content scanning logic can work both in-proc and out-of-proc, and it cant make any assumptions about running with high privileges.


Performance is often the main concern raised around sandboxing, especially given that antimalware products are in many critical paths like synchronously inspecting file operations and processing and aggregating or matching large numbers of runtime events. To ensure that performance doesnt degrade, we had to minimize the number of interactions between the sandbox and the privileged process, and at the same time, only perform these interactions in key moments where their cost would not be significant, for example, when IO is being performed.


Windows Defender Antivirus makes an orchestrated effort to avoid unnecessary IO, for example, minimizing the amount of data read for every inspected file is paramount in maintaining good performance, especially on older hardware (rotational disk, remote resources). Thus, it was crucial to maintain a model where the sandbox can request data for inspection as needed, instead of passing the entire content. An important note: passing handles to the sandbox (to avoid the cost of passing the actual content) isnt an option because there are many scenarios, such as real-time inspection, AMSI, etc., where theres no sharable handle that can be used by the sandbox without granting significant privileges, which decreases the security.


Resource usage is also another problem that required significant investments: both the privileged process and the sandbox process needed to have access to signatures and other detection and remediation metadata. To avoid duplication and preserve strong security guarantees, i.e., avoid unsafe ways to share state or introducing significant runtime cost of passing data/content between the processes, we used a model where most protection data is hosted in memory-mapped files that are read-only at runtime. This means protection data can be hosted into multiple processes without any overhead.


Another significant concern around sandboxing is related to the inter-process communication mechanism to avoid potential problems like deadlocks and priority inversions. The communication should not introduce any potential bottlenecks, either by throttling the caller or by limiting the number of concurrent requests that can be processed. Moreover, the sandbox process shouldn’t trigger inspection operations by itself. All inspections should happen without triggering additional scans. This requires fully controlling the capabilities of the sandbox and ensuring that no unexpected operations can be triggered. Low-privilege AppContainers are the perfect way to implement strong guarantees because the capabilities-based model will allow fine-grained control on specifying what the sandbox process can do.


Lastly, a significant challenge from the security perspective is related to content remediation or disinfection. Given the sensitive nature of the action (it attempts to restore a binary to the original pre-infection content), we needed to ensure this happens with high privileges in order to mitigate cases in which the content process (sandbox) could be compromised and disinfection could be used to modify the detected binary in unexpected ways.


Once the sandboxing is enabled, customers will see a content process MsMpEngCP.exe running alongside with the antimalware service MsMpEng.exe.


windows-defender-av-sandbox.png



The content processes, which run with low privileges, also aggressively leverage all available mitigation policies to reduce the attack surface. They enable and prevent runtime changes for modern exploit mitigation techniques such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address space layout randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG). They also disable Win32K system calls and all extensibility points, as well as enforce that only signed and trusted code is loaded. More mitigation policies will be introduced in the future, alongside other techniques that aim to reduce even further the risk of compromise, such as multiple sandbox processes with random assignment, more aggressive recycling of sandbox processes without a predictable schedule, runtime analysis of the sandbox behavior, and others.

How to enable sandboxing for Windows Defender Antivirus today


We’re in the process of gradually enabling this capability for Windows insiders and continuously analyzing feedback to refine the implementation.


Users can also force the sandboxing implementation to be enabled by setting a machine-wide environment variable (setx /M MP_FORCE_USE_SANDBOX 1) and restarting the machine. This is currently supported on Windows 10, version 1703 or later.

Looking ahead: Broader availability and continuous innovation


To implement sandboxing for Windows Defender Antivirus, we took a lot of inputs from the feedback, suggestions, and research from our peers in the industry. From the beginning, we saw this undertaking as the security industry and the research community coming together to elevate security. We now call on researchers to follow through, as we did, and give us feedback on the implementation.


Windows Defender Antivirus is on a path of continuous innovation. Our next-gen antivirus solution, which is powered by artificial intelligence and machine learning and delivered in real-time via the cloud, is affirmed by independent testers, adoption in the enterprise, and customers protected every day from malware campaigns big and small. Were excited to roll out this latest enhancement to the rest of our customers.


And we are committed to continue innovating. Were already working on new anti-tampering defenses for Windows Defender Antivirus. This will further harden our antivirus solution against adversaries. Youll hear about these new efforts soon. Windows Defender Antivirus and the rest of the Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection will continue to advance and keep on leading the industry in raising the bar for security.

Mady Marinescu
Windows Defender Engineering team
with Eric Avena
Content Experience team


Source
 
D

Deleted Member 3a5v73x

I'm running Win 10 PRO v1809

But cannot set sandbox

C:\Windows\System32> setx /M MP_FORCE_USE_SANDBOX 1
ERROR: Access to the registry path is denied
Look if any of your security product is not preventing it. If you are running AppGuard, set to Allow Installs, run cmd as admin, copy-pasta
Code:
setx /M MP_FORCE_USE_SANDBOX 1
value should be saved and set back to your desired Protected/Locked Down.
cmd.PNG

cmd2.PNG
 
Last edited by a moderator:

HarborFront

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Look if any of your security product is not preventing it. If you are running AppGuard, set to Allow Installs, run cmd as admin, copy-pasta
Code:
setx /M MP_FORCE_USE_SANDBOX 1
value should be saved and set back to your desired Protected/Locked Down.
View attachment 200237
View attachment 200238
I ran command prompt as administrator and this time it works right

After reboot and checking with Process Explorer I can see

MsMpEngCP.exe

but I can't see its Description, Microsoft Corporation and AppContainer
 
Last edited:
D

Deleted member 178

They put WD in a sandbox, so what? I amazed they didn't do it from the start...

When i think about it... Sandboxing is to prevent a compromised program to infect the rest of the system... So WD is so weak that it must be isolated? LOOOOL
 

Vasudev

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They put WD in a sandbox, so what? I amazed they didn't do it from the start...

When i think about it... Sandboxing is to prevent a compromised program to infect the rest of the system... So WD is so weak that it must be isolated? LOOOOL
Maybe its Skynet Virus masked as WD AV.
 

Local Host

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Maybe its Skynet Virus masked as WD AV.
If we look at it, all the third-party Anti-Malware Software has holes to exploit, the developers can hardly solve the bugs end users encounter, leave alone holes that black hats find.

So using a sandbox is the way to go, Windows Defender is obviously heavily targeted for malware cause it's used as default on the majorly of Home Users PCs, but the same can be done with any other third-party suite.
 

Burrito

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If we look at it, all the third-party Anti-Malware Software has holes to exploit, the developers can hardly solve the bugs end users encounter, leave alone holes that black hats find.

So using a sandbox is the way to go, Windows Defender is obviously heavily targeted for malware cause it's used as default on the majorly of Home Users PCs, but the same can be done with any other third-party suite.


Yeah.

.
 

ichito

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It's for me a bit hard to imagine how security app will work properly when is sandboxed (what means restricted also)...how it can properly interfere with vital parts of system that have to be protected and by this sometime supervised/modified? Is it special trick in such technology that could resolve such doubts?
 
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