MORTAR EXPOSED: Victim-ID Extensions, README-[ID].txt, and a Tor Login

You open Documents the way you did yesterday. The first photo should still be 1.jpg. The second image should still be 2.png. The invoice should still be invoice-2026.pdf. The tax sheet should still be taxes.xlsx. Instead every familiar name has a second ending tacked on, a string that looks like a case number more than a file type. 1.jpg is now 1.jpg.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. 2.png is now 2.png.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. A small text file named README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt is sitting in the same folder, as if it has always belonged there.

That is the trap, not a glitch.

This page is for the hour those names appear. It is not a miracle key. It is a map of the trap, so the note does not become your incident plan.

Overview

MORTAR ransomware locks the files first. Then it keeps the old name and the old type, and hangs a unique victim ID on the end as the new extension. Then it drops a note named README-[victim’s ID].txt and talks like a recovery desk for a company network. The note is a storefront. It claims the attackers already breached the corporate network. It names AES-256 and RSA-2048 as if those letters were a receipt. It says the only way to restore the files is to purchase a decryption tool loaded with a private key they created for that network. It points at a Tor website. It prints a username and a password so the first click feels like logging into a ticket system. In the sample used for this page, the username is sid. The password is 4RcrXfvVksS5ACA, the same victim ID sitting on every locked file. There is no printed $ amount. There is no 50% sale. There is no wallet line to finish. This page will not invent one.

If you are staring at a pile of names ending in .4RcrXfvVksS5ACA and a text file called README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt, you are in a ransom incident, not a broken disk and not a Windows pop-up. The folder is the evidence. The note is a checkout. Stay with the folder, not with the script.

The first tell is the rename. In the sample used for this page, 1.jpg becomes 1.jpg.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. 2.png becomes 2.png.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. invoice-2026.pdf becomes invoice-2026.pdf.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. taxes.xlsx becomes taxes.xlsx.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. family.mp4 becomes family.mp4.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. You can still read what the file used to be. You cannot open it. Windows may call the type a 4RCRXFVVKSS5ACA File and offer a useless “choose an app” box. An app cannot talk locked bytes back into a JPEG. The ID on your disk may differ. Treat 4RcrXfvVksS5ACA as a sample of the format, not as every victim’s code.

The second tell is the note. After the files are locked, the malware drops README-[victim’s ID].txt into the same folders. On the sample machine the file is README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt. README sounds like documentation. A .txt ending Windows already trusts. Put them together and the first English you can still read after the photos break is a sales flyer. The flyer is meant to be opened. It is not meant to be trusted.

The body of that sample talks like a help desk that already owns the building. It asks “What happened to your files?” then answers its own question. We breached your corporate network and encrypted the data on your computers. Documents, databases, photos and more. Military grade encryption algorithms, AES-256 and RSA-2048. You cannot access those files right now. But don’t worry. You can still get those files back and be up and running again in no time. Then it asks how to contact them, and the answer is a purchase. The only way to restore your files is by purchasing a decryption tool loaded with a private key they created specifically for your network. Once run on an “effected” computer, the tool will decrypt all encrypted files, and you can resume day-to-day operations, preferably with better cyber security in mind. The contact is not a phone desk. It is hpo7htcpddfanilknttsymttzfr4usxwjycjpazkleggnvry5bngszyd.onion. The note shouts that you must use Tor Browser. It prints WEBSITE, USERNAME, and PASSWORD. The printed username is sid. The printed password is 4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. A line labeled BACKUP LINK TO SUPPORT TEAM repeats the same onion. That is not a second door. It is the same address printed twice so the first click still lands in their shop.

That is the whole pitch. A locked folder of victim-ID endings. A README-[ID].txt file that talks like a recovery brief. Corporate-network language. AES-256 and RSA-2048 as scare words. One Tor login. Username sid. Password equal to the victim ID. No printed $ figure. No public free decryptor known for this strain. There is no reason to open that onion today because a text file told you to.

The victim-ID ending is the first warning

Most lockers pick a brand so you notice the change in seconds. MORTAR does not hang .mortar on the end. It hangs a unique victim ID. In the sample, that ID is 4RcrXfvVksS5ACA, so 1.jpg becomes 1.jpg.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA and 2.png becomes 2.png.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. The extra cruelty is how readable the listing stays. You do not have to decode anything. You can still see the photo. You can still see the invoice year. You can still see the word taxes. The familiar words are still in the folder. The files are not familiar anymore.

Do not treat that readable name as a fix. Do not strip .4RcrXfvVksS5ACA off the end and expect Photos or Excel to open the file. Do not run a bulk “extension fixer” you found in an ad. The name is a label. The lock is in the content. Editing the label can make a later trusted tool have a harder time matching the file to what it was. Leave the locked copies as they are until you have a clean machine and a plan that does not start in a criminal Tor login.

The extra ending also does advertising. Anyone who sees vacation.jpg.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA next to README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt can pretend they already have your case. A later fake helper will quote the ID back to you as if that were expertise. The ID is public. It is sitting in the folder. Quoting it proves nothing except that they can read a listing.

README-[ID].txt is a sales floor, not a help file

The ransom note is a plain text file with a name that sounds like documentation. README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt wants the first click after the panic. Plenty of real software drops a README. This one uses that habit against you. It is meant to be the first English you can still read when the photos will not open. The pattern is README-[victim’s ID].txt. The ID in the filename is the same ID glued onto 1.jpg.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. That match is branding, not proof they can unlock the photo.

Double-clicking it opens Notepad. That is why a panicked first click feels like opening the help page. It is not help. It is the demand, written so it looks official enough to follow. The filename is built to look like paperwork. README. A victim ID. A .txt ending Windows already trusts. Paperwork is easier to obey than a threat.

Keep the file on disk. Then close it. Do not treat it as a set of steps you should follow. Do not tidy the filename. Do not shorten it to “the readme” when you write the incident down. Copy README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt the way you would copy a serial off a stolen laptop. That string is how a responder matches this locker. It is not a coupon you redeem by opening hpo7htcpddfanilknttsymttzfr4usxwjycjpazkleggnvry5bngszyd.onion and typing sid plus the victim ID.

“We breached your corporate network” is a costume

The note opens by claiming a breach of the corporate network. It lists documents, databases, and photos. It talks as if the whole firm is already down, even when the hit is one shared drive, a small office, or a home PC that happens to hold payroll. That voice is the costume. A six-person shop and a real company can get the same speech. The point is not accuracy. The point is to stop you from calling your own people. If the page can make you feel like the network is already lost, the Tor login starts to look like the only door left. It is not.

CISA describes this kind of squeeze in the official StopRansomware Guide. Ransomware locks files and then demands money. The MORTAR note never prints the $ figure. The missing number is not mercy. It is a blank invoice that gets filled after you log in. You cannot tell from the flyer alone whether a real company network was touched, and you should not try to settle it by opening their onion.

AES-256 and RSA-2048 are a shout, not a lab report

The sample says the data was encrypted using military grade encryption algorithms, AES-256 and RSA-2048. That pair is meant to shut down argument. It sounds like a standard. It sounds like a lab. It sounds like something you cannot argue with at the kitchen table. It is still attacker copy. Naming two ciphers is not the same as handing you a proof. It is also not a reason to start typing keys into a Tor form they own.

What the note is actually selling is helplessness. If the lock is “impossible” without their private key, then their login is the only aisle. If the lock is “impossible,” then a later $ figure starts to feel like the last remaining lever. Naming AES-256 and RSA-2048 does not put a key on your desk. It does not prove the implementation. It does not prove they still have a key. It does not prove they will send one if you log in as sid.

People hear AES-256 and RSA-2048 and go looking for a matching “AES RSA decryptor” in ads. That search is the next trap. A tool that promises to reverse those letters because a ransom note printed them is selling the same fear in a different window. Leave the locked files alone. Do not feed them to a mystery app that asked for admin rights because a text file named two ciphers.

The Tor login is checkout, not support

The printed contact is a Tor website: hpo7htcpddfanilknttsymttzfr4usxwjycjpazkleggnvry5bngszyd.onion. The note shouts !IMPORTANT! TO RESTORE YOUR FILES CONTACT US VIA TOR BROWSER. That shout is not a safety tip. It is a funnel. Tor puts you in a room they own, on a page they can change, with a form they can screenshot and reuse. A login would feel like a ticket. This login is not a ticket. It is how a locked photo becomes a negotiation.

Do not install a fresh Tor Browser because the note said to. Do not “just open the page to see the price.” Do not paste a folder listing into their chat. Do not send a test file to prove you are a real victim. Those fields belong to the people who locked the files. Filling them is the product.

USERNAME sid is a shared handle, not your account

The printed username is sid. It looks short on purpose. It looks like a desk name. It looks like something a real portal would already have waiting for you. It is not your Windows account. It is not a personal login you earned. It is a field they printed so the first visit feels expected. Anyone with the note can type sid. Copycats can type it too. Reciting sid does not mean a later helper “already called the crew.” It means they read the same flyer.

Do not treat sid as a secret you should protect by rushing into the form. Do not treat it as a user ID you need to “claim” before someone else does. There is no seat to claim. The handle is branding, the same way the victim ID is branding. Writing it into their box does not start a warranty. It starts a conversation you cannot enforce.

The password is the victim ID already on disk

The printed password in the sample is 4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. That is not a one-time code they mailed you. It is the same string glued onto every locked file and onto README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt. The note is telling you to use your own evidence as the key to their shop. That is the trick. The ID is already public in the folder. Using it as a password makes the login feel personal, like a case file that only you can open.

Do not type sid and 4RcrXfvVksS5ACA into that Tor form. Do not type them into a lookalike page a stranger sends later. Do not read the password out on a phone call that started with “we can decrypt MORTAR files.” Copy the ID for your own records if you need to describe the incident. Then leave it alone. A password that is already sitting in Explorer is not a secret. It is a handle they want you to carry into their checkout.

A missing $ amount is still a shop

The note never prints a ransom $ figure. It never prints a 50% countdown. It never names a coin. It never prints a wallet. Public copies do not fill that blank, and this page will not invent a $ amount, a wallet, a Session inbox, or a second onion to make the flyer look complete. The missing number is how they get you into the login. Once you are in a chat they own, they can name any $ figure they like. Cheap is a tactic. Large is a tactic. Both are still a payment to the people who locked family.mp4.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.

A blank invoice is not kindness. It is a shorter path to the form. Other families print a price so you feel the quoting is finished. MORTAR skips the number and hands you a username and a password instead. You are supposed to feel that waiting is already a mistake, and that the only adult move is to log in. It is not.

How The Attack Works

The hour after the names change is when the flyer does its best work. The lock is already done. The rest is theater meant to turn a Documents folder into a checkout. Here is the path the sample takes, from the extra ending to the Tor form, without turning their note into a procedure you should follow.

1. The lock keeps the old name and hangs a victim ID on the end

MORTAR does not hide the original filename behind a code. It keeps the old name and the old type, then appends the victim ID as a new extension. In the sample, 1.jpg becomes 1.jpg.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. 2.png becomes 2.png.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. The listing still has one object per file. The shock lands because the names still look like yours. The lock is in the content, not in the label.

Windows may now offer to pick an app for the unknown type. Decline it. There is no player for .4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. There is no photo viewer that can reconstruct a JPEG from locked bytes because the extra ending looks like a serial. The ID is how they keep your pile separate from the next victim. It is also how they make the password field on their Tor page feel already filled in.

2. README-[ID].txt turns a break-in into a ticket

Once the names are branded, the malware needs a voice. README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt is that voice. It sits in the same folders as the locked files so the first sort puts help next to harm. On many machines a text file sorts near the top, especially with README in capitals. You open it because it looks like the only thing that still speaks English.

The body is long enough to feel like a briefing and short enough to finish before a relative walks into the room. What happened. Corporate network. AES-256 and RSA-2048. Don’t worry. Purchase a tool. Tor Browser. Username. Password. Each beat closes a door. The breach claim closes “maybe Windows just glitched.” The cipher names close “maybe it is a simple rename.” The purchase line closes “maybe there is a local tool.” The login closes “maybe I should wait overnight” by handing you a finished form.

Notice what the note does not give you. It does not give you a company, a refund policy, or a way to prove the other side will ever send a key. It does not give you a $ amount. It does not give you a test decrypt. It does not give you a deadline. It gives you a tone that says this is already decided. That tone is the product. Read the file as a sales flyer. Then close it. Keep it on disk.

3. Corporate-network language makes one folder feel like a whole firm

We breached your corporate network. Encrypted the data on your computers. Documents, databases, photos and more. Resume day-to-day operations. That is office language. It is meant to sound like a serious incident ticket, not a street threat. Serious language is easier to obey. A person who would never pay a cartoon virus still thinks, maybe this one is a real firm talking to a real firm.

The same speech also isolates you from your own help. If the network is already “breached,” then the intern, the MSP, and the cousin who “knows computers” all feel too small. The Tor page feels like the grown-up desk. That is the point. A locked photo on a home PC can still get the corporate costume. Do not let the costume pick the next click.

4. AES-256 and RSA-2048 close the argument

After the breach claim, the note rests on AES-256 and RSA-2048 as if famous ciphers were a receipt. It even dresses them as military grade. That pair is meant to end the conversation you have not even started. Cipher plus private control sounds like math you cannot beat at the kitchen table. It is still a sales paragraph. It is not a lab report. It is not a reason to skip copies that were never mounted. It is not a reason to skip a trusted decryptor project later if one appears.

You do not need to argue cryptography with a text file. You need to stop treating the file as a technician. Leave 1.jpg.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA named as it is. Leave README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt where it is. The algorithms printed in that note are part of the pitch. They are not a recovery procedure.

5. “The only way to restore your files” is the shop

The recovery step in the sample is a purchase. The only way to restore your files is by purchasing a decryption tool loaded with a private key they created specifically for your network. Once run on an “effected” computer, they say, the tool will decrypt all encrypted files. That spelling is theirs. The promise is theirs. The product is a story about a unique key that only they hold.

A unique key for your network sounds like a custom job. Custom jobs feel expensive and official at the same time. That is the squeeze. There is still no printed $ amount. There is still no proof the tool exists. There is still no reason to buy a story from the people who locked the files. Do not hunt for “MORTAR decryptor” in ads. Do not run a binary a stranger named after the victim ID. A file called decrypt-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.exe is not a repair. It is a second problem.

6. The Tor website is the door they want you to walk through

The printed door is hpo7htcpddfanilknttsymttzfr4usxwjycjpazkleggnvry5bngszyd.onion. The note repeats it as the website and again as the BACKUP LINK TO SUPPORT TEAM. Same host. Same shop. Repeating it does not make it a safety net. It makes the first click harder to miss. Copy that string into the incident record if you need an identifier. Do not paste it into Tor “just to see.”

A later message may send a different onion and call it the real portal. This page will not invent a second one. The documented address is the one in the sample note. If your copy on disk shows that same host, that is the tell. If a stranger sends a new one, that is still a shop, or a copycat standing in the same doorway. Do not open either as a recovery step.

7. USERNAME sid is not your account

The recovery step after the onion is a login. USERNAME: sid. That is the whole name. It is short so it feels already provisioned. Support portals use short usernames. Criminal shops use them too, because a filled username makes the password field feel like the only remaining work.

Do not type sid into that form. Do not type it into a lookalike. Do not tell a broker “the username is sid” as if you were handing over a company account. The handle is public in the note. Anyone who has README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt already has it. Sharing it does not verify you. Using it does not open the photos.

8. PASSWORD is the ID already sitting on every file

PASSWORD: 4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. That is the sample victim ID. It is already in the filenames. It is already in the README name. The note is not giving you a secret. It is pointing at a string you can see in Explorer and asking you to carry it into their form. That is how a folder listing becomes a login.

Do not use sid plus the victim ID as a password. Not on their Tor page. Not on a page a later helper sends. Not in a password manager “just in case.” Keep the ID as evidence. Keep a sample file that still ends in that ID. Keep README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt. Those artifacts identify the strain. They are not credentials you should spend.

9. Third parties will sell a MORTAR conversation

After a ransomware incident, search results fill up with companies that say they can decrypt MORTAR or “all .4RcrXfvVksS5ACA files.” Some of those shops are ordinary overpriced consultants. Plenty are a second scam. They will quote README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt so they sound close to the case. They will mention AES-256 and RSA-2048. They will mention sid. They will mention the onion. They will ask for a sample file, a remote-access session, or a deposit before they name a $ figure.

A demo that “unlocks one file” is not proof they can unlock the vacation photo. Anyone can open one junk file they control. Anyone can send you a login that makes a Tor window appear. A Tor window is not Photos opening 1.jpg again. If a later message skips the original onion and asks for coin over ordinary mail, that is still the same market, or a copycat standing in the same doorway. Do not answer.

A real public decryptor, when one exists, shows up on an official project page that already existed before your incident. It does not need a Tor login. It does not need sid and the victim ID. If the pitch is “we can decrypt, pay us first,” you are still in the market the ransomware created. There is no public free decryptor known for this strain. Until a trusted project publishes one, treat any site that says “we already have the MORTAR key” as a second sales pitch.

10. Payment and that Tor login close nothing

Paying a stranger for a private key is not a guarantee. The people who send the note can take the money and disappear. They can send a string that only makes a decryptor show an error. They can come back later and lock the same machine again. A Tor thread makes that outcome easier, not harder. You cannot leave a review on a criminal onion. The CISA StopRansomware Guide is blunt about this kind of squeeze. Paying does not ensure the files come back, does not ensure the systems are clean, and does not ensure anyone on the other side keeps a promise.

Opening hpo7htcpddfanilknttsymttzfr4usxwjycjpazkleggnvry5bngszyd.onion is the free version of the same dead end. There is no public free decryptor known for this strain. Starting a login does not rebuild a JPEG. It only keeps you in their story while the rest of the disk still needs a real plan.

If this is a company machine, tell counsel and your incident lead. If this is a home PC, tell the people whose files lived on it. Change passwords from a clean device. Watch bank and email alerts. Opening that Tor page again is not useful work. It is the checkout, even when the note left the $ line blank on purpose.

What To Do If Your Files End in a Victim ID

Do not open hpo7htcpddfanilknttsymttzfr4usxwjycjpazkleggnvry5bngszyd.onion. Do not use username sid and the victim ID as a password. Do not pay. Do not invent a $ amount, a wallet, a Session inbox, or a second onion to finish README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt. Do not send a test file. Do not send proof of payment. If you already opened the page before you found this page, stop there. Do not pay a deposit to “hold the original price” for anyone who quotes the note.

• STEP 1: Use Rkill to terminate suspicious programs.
• STEP 2: Use Malwarebytes to remove for Ransomware and Unwanted Programs
• STEP 3: Use HitmanPro to remove Trojans and other Malware
• STEP 4: Use AdwCleaner to remove Malicious Browser Extensions and Adware
• STEP 5: Perform a final check with ESET Online Scanner
• STEP 6: Restore the files encrypted by ransomware

STEP 1: Use Rkill to terminate suspicious programs.

In this first step, we will download and run Rkill to terminate suspicious programs that may be running on your computer.

RKill is a program that was developed at BleepingComputer.com that attempts to terminate known malware processes so that your normal security software can then run and clean your computer of infections. When RKill runs it will kill malware processes and then removes incorrect executable associations and fixes policies that stop us from using certain tools.

1. Download Rkill.

   You can download RKill to your computer from the below link. When at the download page, click on the Download Now button labeled iExplore.exe. We are downloading a renamed version of Rkill (iExplore.exe) because some malware will not allow processes to run unless they have a certain filename.

   

   RKILL DOWNLOAD LINK
   (The above link will open a new page from where you can download Rkill)

2. Run RKill.

   After downloading, double-click the iExplore.exe icon to kill malicious processes. In most cases, downloaded files are saved to the Downloads folder.
   The program may take some time to search for and end various malware programs.

   

   When it is finished, the black window will close automatically and a log file will open. Do not restart your computer. Proceed to the next step in this guide.

STEP 2: Use Malwarebytes to remove Ransomware and Unwanted Programs

In this second step, we will install Malwarebytes to scan and remove any infections, adware, or potentially unwanted programs that may be present on your computer.

Malwarebytes is one of the most popular and trusted anti-malware tools for Windows — and it’s completely free for removing infections. It catches threats that many antivirus programs miss, including adware, browser hijackers, and trojans. Follow the steps below to scan and clean your PC in just a few minutes.

1. Download Malwarebytes

   Click the button below to download the latest version of Malwarebytes for Windows from the official source. The free version is all you need — it will scan your computer and remove adware, browser hijackers, and other malicious software at no cost.

   

   DOWNLOAD MALWAREBYTES FOR WINDOWS (FREE)
   
   (The link opens in a new page where your download will start)

2. Install Malwarebytes

   When the download finishes, open your Downloads folder and double-click the MBSetup file. If Windows shows a User Account Control pop-up, click “Yes” to allow the installation.

   

3. Follow the On-Screen Prompts to Install Malwarebytes

   The setup wizard will walk you through a few quick screens:

   • Choose where you’re installing the program — “Personal Computer” or “Work Computer” — then click Next.

     

   • Malwarebytes will now install on your device. This usually takes under a minute.

     

   • When installation is complete, the “Welcome to Malwarebytes” screen will open automatically.

     

   • On the final screen, click Open Malwarebytes to launch the program.

     

4. Enable “Scan for Rootkits”

   Before scanning, turn on rootkit detection so Malwarebytes can find even the most hidden threats. Click the Settings gear icon on the left side of the screen.

   

   In the settings menu, find “Scan for rootkits” and click the toggle so it turns blue.

   

   Done? Click “Dashboard” in the left pane to return to the main screen.

5. Start the Scan

   Click the blue Scan button. Malwarebytes will automatically update its virus database and start checking your computer for malware.

   

6. Wait for the Scan to Finish

   The scan checks your entire system for browser hijackers and other malicious programs, so it can take several minutes. Feel free to do something else — just check back occasionally to see the progress.

   

7. Quarantine the Detected Threats

   When the scan is done, you’ll see a list of everything Malwarebytes found — malware, adware, and potentially unwanted programs. Click the “Quarantine” button to remove all of them at once.

   

   Malwarebytes will now remove the malicious files and registry entries and move them safely into quarantine.

   

8. Restart Your Computer

   Some threats can only be fully removed after a reboot. If Malwarebytes asks you to restart, click Yes. Once you’re logged back in, your PC is clean and you can continue with the next steps in this guide.

   

STEP 3: Use HitmanPro to remove Rootkits and other Malware

In this third step, while the computer is in normal back, we will download and run a scan with HitmanPro to remove Trojans, rootkits, and other malicious programs.

HitmanPro is a second-opinion scanner — it’s designed to catch what your main antivirus might have missed. Instead of relying on a single detection engine, it checks the behavior of files in the locations where malware usually hides. Anything suspicious gets sent to the cloud, where it’s analyzed by two of the best antivirus engines available: Bitdefender and Kaspersky.

Good news: scanning is completely free, with no limits. You only need a license when it’s time to remove what was found — and even then, you can activate a free one-time 30-day trial to clean your PC at no cost. (A full license is $24.95 per year for 1 PC.)

1. Download HitmanPro

   Click the button below to download HitmanPro. Remember — the scan is free, so you have nothing to lose by checking your PC.

   DOWNLOAD HITMANPRO (FREE SCAN)
   (The link opens in a new page where your download will start)

2. Install HitmanPro

   When the download finishes, open your Downloads folder and double-click the file: “hitmanpro.exe” on 32-bit Windows, or “hitmanpro_x64.exe” on 64-bit Windows.

   

   If a User Account Control pop-up asks whether HitmanPro can make changes to your device, click “Yes” to continue.

   

3. Follow the On-Screen Prompts

   On the HitmanPro start screen, click “Next” to begin the system scan. No lengthy setup required — it goes straight to work.

   

   

4. Wait for the Scan to Finish

   HitmanPro will now check your computer for malicious programs. This usually takes just a few minutes thanks to its cloud-based scanning.
   

5. Review the Results and Click “Next”

   When the scan is done, HitmanPro will show you everything it found. Click “Next” to remove the detected threats.

   

6. Click “Activate Free License”

   To remove the malicious files, click the “Activate free license” button. This starts your free 30-day trial — no payment details needed — and unlocks the full cleanup.
   

   When the removal is complete, HitmanPro will show a summary of everything it cleaned. Click Next, then click Reboot if prompted. If there’s no reboot prompt, just click Close — your PC is clean.

STEP 4: Use AdwCleaner to remove Malicious Browser Extensions and Adware

In this next step, we will use AdwCleaner to remove malicious browser policies and unwanted browser extensions from your computer.

AdwCleaner is a free on-demand scanner that specializes in adware, browser hijackers, and unwanted toolbars — the exact threats that mainstream antivirus programs often miss. It also includes tools that repair the damage malware leaves behind, like hijacked browser settings and malicious policies. It’s a quick scan that’s well worth running.

1. Download AdwCleaner

   Click the button below to download AdwCleaner — it’s free, portable, and requires no installation.

   

   DOWNLOAD ADWCLEANER (FREE)
   (The link opens in a new page where your download will start)

2. Run AdwCleaner

   Open your Downloads folder and double-click the file named “adwcleaner_x.x.x.exe“. There’s no installation — the program starts right away.
   

   If Windows asks whether you want to allow AdwCleaner to run, click “Yes“. When the license agreement appears, click I agree to continue.

   

3. Enable “Reset Chrome policies”

   This setting removes malicious browser policies — a trick malware uses to lock your browser settings so you can’t change them back. Click “Settings” on the left side of the window, then turn on “Reset Chrome policies“.

   

4. Start the Scan

   Click “Dashboard” on the left side of the window, then click the “Scan” button.

   

5. Wait for the Scan to Finish

   AdwCleaner will now check your computer for adware and other malware. This usually takes only a few minutes — it’s one of the fastest scanners around.

   

6. Quarantine the Detected Threats

   When the scan finishes, AdwCleaner will list everything it found. Click the “Quarantine” button to remove all the malicious items at once.

   

7. Click “Continue” to Finish the Cleanup

   Save any open work first — AdwCleaner needs to close your open programs before it can clean. When you’re ready, click the “Continue” button.
   

   AdwCleaner will now delete all detected malware from your computer. If it asks you to restart your PC, allow it — your computer will be clean when you log back in.

STEP 5: Perform a final check with ESET Online Scanner

This final step involves installing and running a scan with ESET Online Scanner to check for any additional malicious programs that may be installed on the computer..

ESET Online Scanner is a free second-opinion scanner that performs a deep, full-system check for viruses, trojans, rootkits, and other malware. We use it as the final step because it’s thorough — if anything slipped past the previous scans, ESET will find it. A clean result here means your computer is malware-free.

1. Download ESET Online Scanner

   Click the button below to download ESET Online Scanner.

   

   DOWNLOAD ESET ONLINE SCANNER (FREE)
   (The link opens in a new page where your download will start)

2. Run the Installer

   When the download finishes, open your Downloads folder and double-click “esetonlinescanner.exe“.
   

3. Install ESET Online Scanner

   On the start screen, select your language from the drop-down menu and click Get started.

   

   On the Terms of use screen, click Accept.
   

   Choose your preferences for the Customer Experience Improvement Program and the Detection feedback system (either choice is fine), then click Continue.
   

4. Start a Full Scan

   Click Full Scan — this checks your entire computer, not just the common hiding spots.

   

   Select Enable for Detection of Potentially Unwanted Applications — this lets ESET catch adware and bundled junk programs, not just viruses. Then click Start scan.

   

5. Wait for the Scan to Finish

   ESET will now check every file on your computer. Because it’s a full scan, this can take a while — often an hour or more, depending on how much data you have. Leave it running in the background and check on it from time to time.

   

6. Review the Results

   When the scan completes, the Found and resolved detections screen appears. Any threats found were automatically cleaned and quarantined — there’s nothing extra you need to do. Click View detailed results if you want to see exactly what was removed.
   

   If ESET found nothing — congratulations, your computer has passed the final check and is malware-free.

STEP 6: Restore the files encrypted by ransomware

Unfortunately, in most cases, it’s not possible to recover the files encrypted by this ransomware virus because the private key which is needed to unlock the encrypted files is only available through the attackers. However, below we’ve listed three options you can use to try and recover your files.

Option 1: Search a decryption tool for this ransomware

The cybersecurity community is constantly working to create ransomware decryption tools, so you can try to search these sites for updates:

• https://id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com/
• https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/
• https://noransom.kaspersky.com/
• https://www.avast.com/ransomware-decryption-tools

Option 2: Use EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard Free to recover the encrypted files

EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard Free can restore files and repair corrupted files with simple clicks. Its powerful scanning algorithms can identify and retrieve huge file type library, including all of the popular video files, audio files, photos, and document formats.
While the free version only allows you to recover 2 GB of data, this can be helpful to see if the recovery is possible and restore back the most important files from your computer.

1. Download EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard Free.

   You can download EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard Free by clicking the link below.

   

   EASEUS DATA RECOVERY WIZARD FREE DOWNLOAD LINK
   (The above link will open a new page from where you can download EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard)

2. Double-click on the EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard Free setup file.

   When EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard Free has finished downloading, double-click on the setup file to install EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard on your computer. In most cases, downloaded files are saved to the Downloads folder.

   

   You may be presented with a User Account Control pop-up asking if you want to allow EaseUS to make changes to your device. If this happens, you should click “Yes” to continue with the EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard Free installation.

3. Follow the on-screen prompts to install EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard.

   When the EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard installation begins, click on the “Install Now” as seen in the image below.
   

   When your EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard installation completes, click the “Start Now” button to start the program.
   

4. Select a location to start recovering the encrypted files.

   Choose the drive or folder where you are the encrypted files that you want to recover and click “Scan“.
   

5. Wait for the EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard scan to complete.

   EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard will now scan your computer files that can be restored. This process can take a few minutes, so we suggest you do something else and periodically check on the status of the scan to see when it is finished.
   

6. Find the files you want to recover.

   When the EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard scan is finished scanning it will show a screen that displays the files that can be recovered. This tool can recover a lot of data, use the “Filter” button to quickly filter specific file types and find the files that you want to recover.
   

   Click the “Preview” button or double-click on a file for a full preview.
   

7. Select your files and click “Recover”.

   Finally, select the the files you want to recover and click “Recover“.
   
   Choose a safe location to save all the files.
   
   The free version only allow you to recover 2 GB of data, however, this will allow you to recover the most important files and see if EaseUS Data Recovery Wizard can correctly recover them.
   

Option 3: Try to restore your files with ShadowExplorer

This ransomware will attempt to delete all shadow copies when you first start any executable on your computer after becoming infected. Thankfully, the infection is not always able to remove the shadow copies, so you should continue to try restoring your files using this method.

1. Download ShadowExplorer.

   You can download ShadowExplorer from the below link.

   SHADOW EXPLORER DOWNLOAD LINK
   (This link will open a new web page from where you can download “ShadowExplorer”)

2. Install ShadowExplorer.

   Double-click on the ShadowExplorer-x.x-setup file to start the installation process, then follow the on-screen promts to install this program.
   

3. Select snapshot date.

   Open ShadowExplorer and then from the top bar select the drive where the files that you want to save are located, then select from the snapshot available one previous to this infection.

   

4. Export the files that you want to recover.

   Once you have found a copy of the original file or folder, right-click on it and the select “Export”. A window will prompt you where you want to save the file or folder.
   

Keep every victim-ID name exactly as it is. Do not bulk-rename 1.jpg.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA back to 1.jpg, or 2.png.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA back to 2.png, or invoice-2026.pdf.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA back to a normal PDF, or taxes.xlsx.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA back to a spreadsheet, or family.mp4.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA back to a video. Stripping the extra ending is not a repair. It can make a later trusted tool worse, not better. The original name is already sitting in front of the ID. You do not need to edit it to know what you lost.

Keep README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt with the locked files, and keep at least one sample that still ends in the victim ID. Do not “clean up” every copy of the note. Do not fill in a $ figure so the flyer looks complete. The blank invoice, or the string on your disk, is part of how you prove this was this strain and not a different locker that only sounds similar. Keep the contact marks as identifiers: README-[victim’s ID].txt, the AES-256 and RSA-2048 line, username sid, the victim ID used as a password, and hpo7htcpddfanilknttsymttzfr4usxwjycjpazkleggnvry5bngszyd.onion. Those artifacts are evidence. They are not instructions you should carry out.

Do not open that Tor login. Do not type sid plus the victim ID into any form. Do not ask a friend to log in “just to see.” A calm username is still the people who locked the files. If a later message quotes README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt and offers “the real portal,” that is still the same shop. If a later message skips the original onion and asks for coin over a different address, that is still the same shop, or a copycat standing in the same doorway.

If someone claims they can already decrypt MORTAR files for a fee because they can recite AES-256, RSA-2048, and sid, they are selling a report, not a key. If they mention 4RcrXfvVksS5ACA as proof they “already called the crew,” they read the same note you did. Do not answer. Do not complete their checkout. Do not help them fix the flyer.

If Windows still offers to pick an app for the .4RcrXfvVksS5ACA type, decline it. There is no player for that ending.

The Bottom Line

MORTAR ransomware is a locker with a victim ID for an extension, a README named after that ID, and a checkout that lives on Tor. It keeps the old name and appends a unique ID. In the sample, 1.jpg becomes 1.jpg.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA and 2.png becomes 2.png.4RcrXfvVksS5ACA. The note is README-4RcrXfvVksS5ACA.txt, following the pattern README-[victim’s ID].txt. It claims a corporate-network breach, names AES-256 and RSA-2048, and says the only way back is to buy their tool. It points at hpo7htcpddfanilknttsymttzfr4usxwjycjpazkleggnvry5bngszyd.onion, prints username sid, and uses the victim ID as the password. There is no printed $ amount. There is no 50% sale. There is no wallet. There is no public free decryptor known for this strain.

Do not open that Tor login. Do not use sid plus the victim ID as a password. Do not pay. Do not invent a wallet, a Session inbox, a second onion, or a victim $ figure. Do not rename the pile in bulk. If you take one sentence with you, take this. A folder of names ending in a victim ID, plus README-[ID].txt with a corporate AES-256 and RSA-2048 pitch, username sid, and that onion, is ransomware on the first sighting. Treat it that way before anyone offers to fill the blank $ line.