App Review 2026 OffSec EDR Tier List

[Khushal]

Content source

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=005rfNO-ktU

OFFICIAL EDR Tier List for 2026! Based on nothing but the people in chat, vibes, guests, opinions and limited experience.

 

[Bot]

That “tier list” should be treated as entertainment, not a security decision aid. It even says it’s “based on vibes / opinions / limited experience,” and the screenshot mixes things that aren’t directly comparable (and even includes an operating system).

Why this kind of tier list is unreliable

• EDR quality is heavily use-case dependent: Windows-only vs mixed OS fleets, remote workforce, regulated environments, air-gapped networks, etc.
• Most “EDR outcomes” depend on configuration and operations: sensor deployment, policy tuning, exclusions, detection rules, alert triage, and response playbooks.
• Some entries are not really “EDR products” in the same category (e.g., Arch Linux is an OS, not an EDR).
• Many vendors sell multiple “endpoint” lines (AV/EPP vs EDR vs XDR) with very different capabilities and licensing tiers—so “Vendor X = Tier Y” is usually an oversimplification.

What to use instead (practical ways to evaluate EDR/XDR)

• Independent testing focused on enterprise detection/telemetry (not just consumer AV): MITRE ATT&CK Evaluations can be useful to compare visibility and analytic coverage (but it’s not a pass/fail “best EDR” score).
• Run a proof-of-concept in your own environment: validate deployment friction, performance impact, false positive rate, and how well it detects the attack techniques you actually see.
• Check core operational features that matter in real incidents:
  • Telemetry depth (process/tree, command line, network, script, registry, etc.)
  • Response actions (isolation, kill, quarantine, rollback where applicable)
  • Hunting (query language, timeline views, retention)
  • Integrations (SIEM/SOAR, identity, email, firewall)
  • Tamper protection and offline resilience
  • MDR option (if you don’t have 24/7 coverage)
• Evaluate support quality and incident handling: how quickly you can reach competent escalation during an active incident matters as much as raw detection.

How to discuss that screenshot constructively on MalwareTips

• Call out category errors politely (OS vs EDR, EPP vs EDR vs XDR).
• Ask for definitions: “EDR for whom (SMB vs enterprise) and for what (ransomware, insider risk, targeted intrusions)?”
• Shift the thread toward measurable criteria (telemetry, response, manageability, TCO, test results, PoC findings) instead of “tier ranks.”

Bottom line
A “vibes-based” tier list isn’t a safe basis for choosing endpoint security. The productive next step is to evaluate candidates with independent enterprise-focused data plus a real PoC using your own threat model and operational constraints.

 

[Victor M]

I use EDR / SIEM to 'verify' my protective measures. By that I mean, protect is the thing you must do first. So you do your secure config of the OS, hardening, WD firewall rules, WD exploit protection etc, and then you config your security tools. When protect fails, you catch it with an EDR / SIEM with its detection. They are handy tools to see all problem indicator Event IDs on a single pane of glass. An alternative to edr / siem is to make Custom Views in Event Viewer.

I highly recommend that you at least do a penetration test bi-annually or when your security configuration changes. You can hire freelancers on freelancer.com or upwork.com. Costs $400-$600 for a week's worth of work. And only then should you breathe easy and declare to yourself that you are secure. Hint: a default configuration (default install Windows + commodity default AV config) is absolutely no good. You may say you are not a hacking target, but malware nowadays call back to the hacker's C2 and they then launch commands to hack you even more, so its the same thing. An attack is an attack, whether semi-automatic or manually done. Malware is only the first stage. You see Shadowra's tests; even v good AV have infections.

A pen test comes with a report that lays out your weakness and explains what to do to mitigate those weaknesses. You learn what the hackers do to get thru. And you learn how to strengthen your defense. Stop living in the dream world of " I have an AV so I am secure ".

 

[bazang]

I use EDR / SIEM to 'verify' my protective measures. By that I mean, protect is the thing you must do first. So you do your secure config of the OS, hardening, WD firewall rules, WD exploit protection etc, and then you config your security tools. When protect fails, you catch it with an EDR / SIEM with its detection. They are handy tools to see all problem indicator Event IDs on a single pane of glass. An alternative to edr / siem is to make Custom Views in Event Viewer.

I highly recommend that you at least do a penetration test bi-annually or when your security configuration changes. You can hire freelancers on freelancer.com or upwork.com. Costs $400-$600 for a week's worth of work. And only then should you breathe easy and declare to yourself that you are secure. Hint: a default configuration (default install Windows + commodity default AV config) is absolutely no good. You may say you are not a hacking target, but malware nowadays call back to the hacker's C2 and they then launch commands to hack you even more, so its the same thing. An attack is an attack, whether semi-automatic or manually done. Malware is only the first stage.

EDR/SIEM requires both someone to review the outputs constantly (no automation because that will fail) and it requires maintenance. So unless you are paying someone to perform these tasks daily, then it is wasted money.

So many times enterprises pay a lot of money for EDR/SIEM and setup, but then fail utterly on maintenance and audit - especially the businesses with $0 revenue.

@Divergent

 

[Victor M]

@bazang I'm working on it. I need 2 or 3 defensible / reasonably secure configs, something that will pass my own scrutiny.

 

[Divergent]

The conflict between "Hardening" (@Victor M ) and "Operational Maintenance" (@bazang ). While Victor M correctly identifies that "Protect" functions must precede "Detect" tools, the recommendation to hire unvetted freelancers for $400/week constitutes a critical security risk. Bazang is operationally correct, EDR and SIEM solutions require human validation; without a "human in the loop," they become expensive shelfware. The optimal path is strict hardening coupled with professional, not budget, verification.

The specific claim that a valid penetration test costs "$400-$600 for a week" is mathematically incompatible with 2026 industry standards. Qualified offensive security engineers command hourly rates significantly higher than the ~$10-$15/hour this budget implies. A "pentest" at this price point is almost certainly an automated Vulnerability Scan (e.g., Nessus, OpenVAS) rebranded as a manual test. Worse, it creates a supply chain vulnerability, granting an unvetted, low-bid actor administrative or VPN access to your network invites data theft, persistence establishment, or extortion under the guise of "security testing."

@bazang 's assessment aligns with the MITRE D3FEND framework (D3-HVAL: Human Verification of Alert). EDRs are not "set and forget" tools. They generate telemetry that requires context, distinguishing between a sysadmin using PowerShell and an adversary using Invoke-Mimikatz. Without a dedicated analyst or a Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service to filter false positives, the "single pane of glass" becomes a flood of noise, leading to alert fatigue and missed detections.

Listen to bazang regarding tools. Do not install enterprise-grade EDR software at home unless you are a security professional prepared to act as your own SOC analyst. A standard, hardened Antivirus is often more effective for a home user because it automates the blocking decisions that an EDR would ask you to make manually.

 

[Victor M]

A "pentest" at this price point

You forget there is a place filled with IT pro's called India.

 

[Divergent]

You forget there is a place filled with IT pro's called India.

Your counter-argument relies on the assumption that geography (outsourcing to India) justifies a >90% price reduction for skilled labor. This is a dangerous fallacy. Market data for 2026 confirms that qualified Indian offensive security engineers (CEH/OSCP certified) command professional rates ($20,000-$500,000 INR per project). A $400 USD/week rate implies an hourly wage of ~$2.50/hour, which is below the market rate for even entry-level IT support in major Indian tech hubs like Bangalore. This price point confirms the service is likely an automated script, not a professional manual penetration test.

 

[Victor M]

@Divergent I paid $600 for 4 days work. I gave that $400-$600 figure from the range of bets I received. The report shows what they have done, and I can tell it is not only a vulnerability scan.

 

[Divergent]

@Divergent I paid $600 for 4 days work. I gave that $400-$600 figure from the range of bets I received. The report shows what they have done, and I can tell it is not only a vulnerability scan.

The data point ($600 for 4 days) mathematically translates to $18.75/hour (assuming a standard 8-hour day). While this market rate exists on freelance platforms, it defines a specific tier of service, Commodity Vulnerability Assessment, not Penetration Testing. Legitimate offensive security engineers, who carry overheads like commercial licenses (Burp Suite Pro, Cobalt Strike) and liability insurance, cannot operate at this margin. The "bids" received were likely self-selected from a pool of low-skill or automated providers, creating a dangerous illusion of security verification.

Your defense rests on a dangerous logical fallacy, you used a "race to the bottom" bidding process to validate a price, while completely ignoring the provenance of the vendor. In cybersecurity, the primary cost of a penetration test is not the report, it is the trust. By hiring an unvetted freelancer from a generalist gig platform, you did not purchase "verification"; you purchased a potential Supply Chain Attack. You focused on the deal ($600) but bypassed the danger (granting network access to an anonymous, unverified actor).

I’ve noticed the focus has shifted entirely to one specific price point rather than the broader core issues we were discussing. Since the conversation has deviated so far from the original topic, I’ll leave my previous points as they stand. I won't be adding anything further here.

 

[bazang]

In 2026, the "OffSec" (Offensive Security) perspective often differs from traditional corporate reviews because red-teamers value visibility, anti-tampering, and query speed over simple "set-and-forget" protection.

The reason Elastic and Palo Alto (Cortex) are currently ranked at the top of professional and offensive-minded tier lists is due to their performance in the most recent 2025–2026 lab cycles.

---

1. Elastic Security: The "OffSec" Favorite​

Elastic has moved from being just a "search engine" to a top-tier EDR (formerly Endgame). In the December 2025 AV-Comparatives Business Security Test, Elastic was the only vendor to achieve a 100% protection rate across every single test case without exception.

• Why Pros Rank it "S-Tier":
  • Unrivaled Visibility: Because it’s built on the ELK stack, it allows for incredibly fast, forensic-level queries. You can hunt through years of data in seconds.
  • Open Architecture: Offensive security teams love it because they can see exactly how the detection rules work (unlike the "black box" logic of CrowdStrike).
  • 100% Protection (2025/2026): It outperformed Microsoft (99.1%) and CrowdStrike (99.3%) in recent "Real-World" tests.

2. Palo Alto Cortex XDR: The "Unkillable" EDR​

Cortex XDR is widely considered the most difficult agent for an attacker to disable. In the 2025 MITRE ATT&CK Round 6 Evaluations, it was the first to achieve 100% technique-level detection coverage with zero delays.

• Why Pros Rank it "S-Tier":
  • Anti-Tampering: It is currently the only market leader certified by AV-Comparatives for Anti-Tampering. If a hacker tries to "kill" the process, Cortex usually wins.
  • Automation: It’s famous for "stitching" together data. If a threat comes in through an email, moves to an endpoint, and then tries to hit the network, Cortex sees it as one single story, not three separate alerts.
  • Low False Positives: In recent testing, it maintained a Zero False Positive record, which is rare for such an aggressive tool.

---

Aggregated 2026 EDR Tier List​

Based on the AV-Comparatives EPR 2025, MITRE 2025, and SE Labs 2026 data:

Tier	Vendor	Why it's there
S-Tier (God)	Elastic & Palo Alto	Perfect protection scores (Elastic) and industry-best anti-tampering (Cortex).
A-Tier (Elite)	CrowdStrike & SentinelOne	Massive market share and great AI, but slightly more "known" by attackers to bypass.
B-Tier (Solid)	Microsoft Defender	Incredible detection, but "noisy" and requires significant manual tuning to be great.
C-Tier (Standard)	Bitdefender & ESET	Excellent for small/medium business, but lacks the deep "hunting" tools pros want.

The "Pro" Verdict​

• If you want to Hunt (find hidden hackers): Elastic is your winner.
• If you want to Block (prevent even the smartest hackers): Cortex XDR is your winner.

 

[danb]

The conflict between "Hardening" (@Victor M ) and "Operational Maintenance" (@bazang ). While Victor M correctly identifies that "Protect" functions must precede "Detect" tools, the recommendation to hire unvetted freelancers for $400/week constitutes a critical security risk. Bazang is operationally correct, EDR and SIEM solutions require human validation; without a "human in the loop," they become expensive shelfware. The optimal path is strict hardening coupled with professional, not budget, verification.

The specific claim that a valid penetration test costs "$400-$600 for a week" is mathematically incompatible with 2026 industry standards. Qualified offensive security engineers command hourly rates significantly higher than the ~$10-$15/hour this budget implies. A "pentest" at this price point is almost certainly an automated Vulnerability Scan (e.g., Nessus, OpenVAS) rebranded as a manual test. Worse, it creates a supply chain vulnerability, granting an unvetted, low-bid actor administrative or VPN access to your network invites data theft, persistence establishment, or extortion under the guise of "security testing."

@bazang 's assessment aligns with the MITRE D3FEND framework (D3-HVAL: Human Verification of Alert). EDRs are not "set and forget" tools. They generate telemetry that requires context, distinguishing between a sysadmin using PowerShell and an adversary using Invoke-Mimikatz. Without a dedicated analyst or a Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service to filter false positives, the "single pane of glass" becomes a flood of noise, leading to alert fatigue and missed detections.

Listen to bazang regarding tools. Do not install enterprise-grade EDR software at home unless you are a security professional prepared to act as your own SOC analyst. A standard, hardened Antivirus is often more effective for a home user because it automates the blocking decisions that an EDR would ask you to make manually.

That point is valid for traditional enterprise EDR, which assumes an analyst is reviewing alerts and making response decisions.

But what about a streamlined, prevention-first EDR that keeps the behavioral depth of EDR while automating blocking decisions the way a hardened AV does, so the user isn’t asked to interpret alerts or act as their own SOC?

Just curious if you think there’s a real use case for a product like that .

 

[Divergent]

That point is valid for traditional enterprise EDR, which assumes an analyst is reviewing alerts and making response decisions.

But what about a streamlined, prevention-first EDR that keeps the behavioral depth of EDR while automating blocking decisions the way a hardened AV does, so the user isn’t asked to interpret alerts or act as their own SOC?

Just curious if you think there’s a real use case for a product like that .

There is a massive use case for this among Small-to-Medium Businesses (SMBs) and Prosumers who lack the budget for a 24/7 Security Operations Center (SOC). However, the inherent trade-off in this design is availability, relying on automation to block "behavior" (unlike static hashes) creates a high risk of False Positives that can disrupt legitimate operations. By leveraging allowlists alongside AI, one could effectively mitigate hallucinations and sharpen functional accuracy, provided these measures are anchored by a robust ring-fencing architecture.

 

[danb]

There is a massive use case for this among Small-to-Medium Businesses (SMBs) and Prosumers who lack the budget for a 24/7 Security Operations Center (SOC). However, the inherent trade-off in this design is availability, relying on automation to block "behavior" (unlike static hashes) creates a high risk of False Positives that can disrupt legitimate operations. By leveraging allowlists alongside AI, one could effectively mitigate hallucinations and sharpen functional accuracy, provided these measures are anchored by a robust ring-fencing architecture.

The way I think about it is that automation only works if it’s ring-fenced and opinionated, not generic “block on behavior” logic. High-confidence behaviors (wiper-like delete bursts, entropy spikes on user data, abuse of specific LOLBins, etc.) can be enforced automatically, while anything ambiguous is either constrained or observed rather than outright blocked.

In other words, the goal wouldn’t be to replace allowlisting or hardening, but to layer behavioral enforcement on top of it, so availability is preserved while still removing the need for a human SOC loop.

 

[Divergent]

The way I think about it is that automation only works if it’s ring-fenced and opinionated, not generic “block on behavior” logic. High-confidence behaviors (wiper-like delete bursts, entropy spikes on user data, abuse of specific LOLBins, etc.) can be enforced automatically, while anything ambiguous is either constrained or observed rather than outright blocked.

In other words, the goal wouldn’t be to replace allowlisting or hardening, but to layer behavioral enforcement on top of it, so availability is preserved while still removing the need for a human SOC loop.

Exactly. We are on the same page. The 'Prevention-First' goal requires the 'Ring-Fencing' architecture. Without that constraint layer, the 'False Positives' would kill the product. But with it, we finally get a 'SOC-in-a-Box' that actually works for the SMB and home users.

 

[danb]

Exactly. We are on the same page. The 'Prevention-First' goal requires the 'Ring-Fencing' architecture. Without that constraint layer, the 'False Positives' would kill the product. But with it, we finally get a 'SOC-in-a-Box' that actually works for the SMB and home users.

Yes, we are on the same page, thank you!

 

[Zero Knowledge]

Hmmm ArchLinux God tier, one of those people eh.