- Apr 13, 2013
- 3,224
- Content source
- https://youtu.be/hrzVL-jOQpQ
Note that the website was subsequently un-hacked and the malicious C&C servers (initially in Tokyo, then in Singapore) were taken down.
The malware was totally undetected by any vendor for the first week, then Crowdstrike picked it up. From there, as publicity about it hit the wires, everyone and their cat started to detect the malware.Norton 360 deluxe when it comes to E-File Data Stealer? This will give a broader picture of how good CF really is
Yeap my parents would keep chosing yes in order to make it work. Without knowing that making it work causes an infectionThe problem is that it depends on the user's decision, which reduces the real effectiveness.
That’s awesome. I personally keep CF on silent mode, with WV being just a hair more talkative. I also have AppCheck Free for the vault feature, in case anything ever manages to break through all defenses.Thank you! An you make an excellent point. But note that when the malware was initially run the Default action was to contain it. Not doing so is essentially equivalent to disregarding the typical AV alert.
Also, for those that you feel will disregard alerts (know-it-all IT folk, oblivious Grandpa's and nasty disgusting children), a simple setting will allow one to suppress alerts, so all unknown would be Contained and any Outbound transmission from it blocked. Therefore in this case Ignorance really can be Bliss.
Sadly those tools would have been inadequate as this was a truly zero-day file and had a legitimate certificate as well (the latter is what could really cause detection issues for some).@cruelsister - my dear cruel one, I'm curious how Hard_Configurator or VS would compare to CF against this. I suppose H_C wouldn't protect the initial browser popper, and VS wouldn't hinder the download but block the final payload.
Hey CS! VS should have absolutely no problem blocking this file, whether it is ON or OFF (like in Smart Mode). I could not find the sample or the signer in the database, so it looks like it has not been tested against VS. If you get a chance, please test the file with VS. VS will block the file, although I would be curious what the WhitelistCloud and VoodooAi results are (just out of pure curiosity... it is still going to be blocked). Please remember, VS does not auto allow on signature alone, whether it is verified or not. If VS does not block this file for some odd reason, please let me know because that would mean there is a bug I need to fix. Thank you!Sadly those tools would have been inadequate as this was a truly zero-day file and had a legitimate certificate as well (the latter is what could really cause detection issues for some).
This particular attack is troubling as it mimics in many ways how Nation State malicious attacks are created. Those responsible had to code the malware, acquire a certificate, code the popper, setup a Server, and somehow gain Admin control of the website to insert the popper. These things are not done either cheaply or without great organization.
Any person (or cat) can code a stealer, but not many can do this.
Unfortunately there was (emphasis on "was") a secondary payload in the infection routine. Previously hosted in Japan and Singapore it was wiped by the actors involved, so no meaningful test can now be done. However if VS would whitelist a legitimately signed app (even in the absence of dumb detections by AV vendors) prior to allowing it then all would be good,If you get a chance, please test the file with VS
It would have been nice to put this bit in the video.This particular attack is troubling as it mimics in many ways how Nation State malicious attacks are created. Those responsible had to code the malware, acquire a certificate, code the popper, setup a Server, and somehow gain Admin control of the website to insert the popper. These things are not done either cheaply or without great organization.
Hey CS, I found both samples and VS blocked both as expected, both while ON and OFF. The files are on MalwareBazaar if anyone wants to play with them.Unfortunately there was (emphasis on "was") a secondary payload in the infection routine. Previously hosted in Japan and Singapore it was wiped by the actors involved, so no meaningful test can now be done. However if VS would whitelist a legitimately signed app (even in the absence of dumb detections by AV vendors) prior to allowing it then all would be good,
An obvious (to me, at least) issue with this malware was the absence of a countersignature. On the other hand, The lady doth protest too much, methinks as a recent IceID file seems to be honky-dory:
View attachment 274614
That was initially my intention, but pretty much right after I finished up the analysis and verification process the nasty buggers took the Singapore server down and I couldn't access the secondary payload (something.php.vbs). Also that original compromised website had been returned to the un-malicious original by the bad guys before the site owners wee aware (can't confirm this myself, but a friend assures me that this is so). To fill the resultant void in the video I tacked on at the beginning the signed malware drivel (originally from a video that I trashed as uninteresting). So if things seemed a tad disjointed, this is the reason why.It would have been nice to put this bit in the video.
As I suspected.(ps- Forgot to mention that the signed malware that I noted in Post 15 above was detected by VoodooSield and murdered without mercy.
None needed. We are human. We are not Devo. At least not yet!Apologies for the omission!