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<blockquote data-quote="ForgottenSeer 100397" data-source="post: 1040446">CruelCF and CF don&#039;t differ in terms of usability. The user has to handle the primary alerts with both configs. CruelCF comes into effect only after the user takes action on the primary alert.For example, this E-File Data Stealer video: Users will see the alerts with CF and CruelCF; the protection depends on the user&#039;s action on the alerts.CF, or CruelCF, is suitable for an average user&#039;s system only if there is someone to manage it or the user is ready to learn (at least the basics of its features); otherwise, he or she will disable or uninstall it.You could install CF, or CruelCF, on a static system, but it’ll occasionally alert or isolate a program’s update and corrupt the installation.CruelCF is extended security with default usability; it doesn’t improve the CF experience for users.Also, proactive config with default (run virtual) containment is sufficient. CS recommendation to set a &quot;restriction level&quot; appears &quot;optional&quot; to me. Is there a CS video where malware bypassed proactive config with default containment?The purpose of Comodo Containment is to isolate and analyze unknowns. Users can see the application’s behavior in the containment and decide whether to run it outside. Many applications won’t run in the containment, as the optional restriction level (recommended by CS) allows very limited access rights.I use proactive config with default (run virtual) containment, as most applications run well in the containment and I can test or see an application&#039;s behavior. If there&#039;s a video where malware bypassed proactive config with default containment, please let me know.</blockquote>

[QUOTE="ForgottenSeer 100397, post: 1040446"] CruelCF and CF don't differ in terms of usability. The user has to handle the primary alerts with both configs. CruelCF comes into effect only after the user takes action on the primary alert. For example, this E-File Data Stealer video: Users will see the alerts with CF and CruelCF; the protection depends on the user's action on the alerts. CF, or CruelCF, is suitable for an average user's system only if there is someone to manage it or the user is ready to learn (at least the basics of its features); otherwise, he or she will disable or uninstall it. You could install CF, or CruelCF, on a static system, but it’ll occasionally alert or isolate a program’s update and corrupt the installation. CruelCF is extended security with default usability; it doesn’t improve the CF experience for users. Also, proactive config with default (run virtual) containment is sufficient. CS recommendation to set a "restriction level" appears "optional" to me. Is there a CS video where malware bypassed proactive config with default containment? The purpose of Comodo Containment is to isolate and analyze unknowns. Users can see the application’s behavior in the containment and decide whether to run it outside. Many applications won’t run in the containment, as the optional restriction level (recommended by CS) allows very limited access rights. I use proactive config with default (run virtual) containment, as most applications run well in the containment and I can test or see an application's behavior. If there's a video where malware bypassed proactive config with default containment, please let me know. [/QUOTE]

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