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Video Reviews - Security and Privacy
NotPetya vs Comodo Firewall
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<blockquote data-quote="Andy Ful" data-source="post: 647688" data-attributes="member: 32260"><p>This is not so simple. In the case I mentioned, DoublePulsar is activating the malware DLL without using the standard methods (like rundll32.exe, or calling LoadLibrary API). In my example, DoublePulsar is simply nonstandard reflective DLL loader, that is already running in the kernel. If the payload DLL is self sufficient and does not spawn new processes, then Comodo will have a problem. It would be not wise to believe that Comodo should block/contain the malware DLL, without testing it.</p><p></p><p>Edit1.</p><p>Such scenario is similar to NotPetya only at the exploit stage. It is very different at the payload stage.</p><p>I am also not saying, that in the Zoltan video (from my previous post), FuzzBunch module for stealing passwords was using such scenario. It could spawn some processes, that were ignored by the security program installed on the target computer.</p><p></p><p>Edit2.</p><p>It is also possible, that malware DLL executed by DoublePulsar, could run system executables whitelisted by Comodo. That possibility depends on HIPS, "Heuristic Command Line Analysis" and "Embedded Code Detection" features. This also should be tested, because DoublePulsar does not use the standard method to execute the malware DLL.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Andy Ful, post: 647688, member: 32260"] This is not so simple. In the case I mentioned, DoublePulsar is activating the malware DLL without using the standard methods (like rundll32.exe, or calling LoadLibrary API). In my example, DoublePulsar is simply nonstandard reflective DLL loader, that is already running in the kernel. If the payload DLL is self sufficient and does not spawn new processes, then Comodo will have a problem. It would be not wise to believe that Comodo should block/contain the malware DLL, without testing it. Edit1. Such scenario is similar to NotPetya only at the exploit stage. It is very different at the payload stage. I am also not saying, that in the Zoltan video (from my previous post), FuzzBunch module for stealing passwords was using such scenario. It could spawn some processes, that were ignored by the security program installed on the target computer. Edit2. It is also possible, that malware DLL executed by DoublePulsar, could run system executables whitelisted by Comodo. That possibility depends on HIPS, "Heuristic Command Line Analysis" and "Embedded Code Detection" features. This also should be tested, because DoublePulsar does not use the standard method to execute the malware DLL. [/QUOTE]
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