Hardware Apple is reportedly looking to buy chips from a US-blacklisted Chinese company

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Apple is trying to get the Trump administration's permission to buy memory chips from a blacklisted Chinese company, according to the Financial Times. Specifically, Apple is reportedly looking to buy from Chinese memory chipmaker CXMT, which was recently added to the Pentagon's 1260H list of companies. The Defense Department adds companies it believes are linked to the Chinese People's Liberation Army to that particular list.

While Apple is technically not prohibited from doing business with CXMT, it could face repercussions from the US government if it doesn't get the White House's blessing. The Defense Department cannot can't sign contracts with any companies in the list or use their products or services through third parties. Apple first approached the commerce department about this a month ago, the Times says, and it's also talking to its connections in Washington.

Purchasing memory chips from CXMT could help Apple's business weather the current shortage in memory chips. The company recently raised its prices for most of its hardware, shortly after Tim Cook warned that it can no longer escape the memory crunch. Apple's 1TB M5 MacBook Pro now costs $300 more, and even the entry-level MacBook Neo got a $100 price hike. All iPad Pros will set you back $200 more than what it would have cost you just a week ago. At the moment, Apple purchases memory chips from American company Micron and South Korea's Samsung and SK Hynix.

The Times says Congress is expected to object if the Trump administration agrees with Apple's plan. "Apple choosing to partner with a Chinese military company would be a grave mistake," John Moolenaar, who leads Congressional efforts to investigate China's geopolitical influence, told the publication.

Read More: Apple is reportedly looking to buy chips from a US-blacklisted Chinese company - Engadget
 
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This report is mainly about supply-chain and geopolitical risk, not a confirmed “malware/security backdoor” situation.

What the 1260H list means (in practical terms)
The Pentagon’s “1260H” list (often referred to as the Section 1260H/“Chinese Military Companies” list) is a designation that a company is believed to have ties to China’s military.

Key point: being on 1260H is not automatically the same as being on the U.S. Commerce Department “Entity List,” and it does not always create a blanket prohibition for all U.S. private companies to buy parts. However, it raises scrutiny and can trigger downstream restrictions in U.S. government procurement and contracting, plus reputational and political pressure.

Why Apple would even consider it
The article frames it as a supply constraint/price-pressure issue (memory shortages and pricing impacts). From a business continuity standpoint, diversifying suppliers can reduce shortages.

That said, any move toward a supplier tied to a military-linked designation predictably attracts attention from Congress and regulators.

Security implications for end users (what’s realistic to say)
Without hard evidence, nobody can responsibly claim “chips from X are malicious” or “safe.” What can be said with confidence is:

  • Supply-chain trust becomes harder when a supplier is politically sensitive or restricted, because transparency, independent auditing, and long-term availability can be affected.
  • Regulatory changes can create sudden disruptions (e.g., forced supplier changes, blocked imports, or rushed redesigns), which can indirectly affect security practices like validation and qualification timelines.
  • For consumers and enterprises, the bigger practical issue is usually compliance and provenance (what’s inside the device, and whether it creates policy/legal issues in regulated environments), not a proven technical compromise.

What to watch for before drawing conclusions
  • Whether CXMT is only on 1260H or also faces additional U.S. restrictions (e.g., Entity List / export controls affecting tools, IP, or downstream customers).
  • Any official statement from Apple, or reporting that includes verifiable documentation (licenses, filings, or confirmed supply agreements).
  • Whether U.S. government procurement rules or contractor rules would treat devices containing those components differently (relevant for corporate/regulated buyers).

Bottom line
This is a plausible example of supply-chain pressure colliding with national-security policy. It’s worth monitoring, but it’s not evidence by itself of an end-user security threat. The most grounded takeaway is “heightened scrutiny and potential compliance risk,” not “confirmed compromise.”

Sources
 

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