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<blockquote data-quote="Andy Ful" data-source="post: 838247" data-attributes="member: 32260"><p>I did not want to bloat the discussion on another thread so I put my comments here to clarify some statements.</p><p></p><p>That is true especially for kernel exploits (both for home users and Enterprises).</p><p>The situation is more complicated with software exploits in the home environment. Most of the software exploits in the home environment will run with standard rights (medium integrity level). Such exploits cannot bypass what was blocked by H_C settings without bypassing UAC. Normally, UAC can be bypassed on Admin account without much effort, but not with H_C settings.</p><p>Furthermore, most exploits in the wild are introduced via scripts, MS Office and Adobe Reader documents, which can be blocked by H_C settings.</p><p></p><p></p><p>H_C default-deny settings can apply a thorough system lockdown only in the home environment. This lockdown is in practice (in the home environment) more restrictive than the lockdown that could be introduced safely via Applocker or WD Application Control (without using SRP). It follows from the fact, that some processes can be safely blocked only when running with standard rights.</p><p>This does not work so well in Enterprises, because of the malware attacks with admin rights from the local network. In H_C, the SRP protection is applied by design on the medium integrity level, so it could be bypassed by such attacks.</p><p></p><p></p><p><img src="" class="smilie smilie--sprite smilie--sprite130" alt="(y)" title="Thumbs up (y)" loading="lazy" data-shortname="(y)" /><img src="" class="smilie smilie--sprite smilie--sprite130" alt="(y)" title="Thumbs up (y)" loading="lazy" data-shortname="(y)" /><img src="" class="smilie smilie--sprite smilie--sprite135" alt=":giggle:" title="Giggle :giggle:" loading="lazy" data-shortname=":giggle:" /></p><p>Just like in the story about fox, hedgehog, and chickens.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Andy Ful, post: 838247, member: 32260"] I did not want to bloat the discussion on another thread so I put my comments here to clarify some statements. That is true especially for kernel exploits (both for home users and Enterprises). The situation is more complicated with software exploits in the home environment. Most of the software exploits in the home environment will run with standard rights (medium integrity level). Such exploits cannot bypass what was blocked by H_C settings without bypassing UAC. Normally, UAC can be bypassed on Admin account without much effort, but not with H_C settings. Furthermore, most exploits in the wild are introduced via scripts, MS Office and Adobe Reader documents, which can be blocked by H_C settings. H_C default-deny settings can apply a thorough system lockdown only in the home environment. This lockdown is in practice (in the home environment) more restrictive than the lockdown that could be introduced safely via Applocker or WD Application Control (without using SRP). It follows from the fact, that some processes can be safely blocked only when running with standard rights. This does not work so well in Enterprises, because of the malware attacks with admin rights from the local network. In H_C, the SRP protection is applied by design on the medium integrity level, so it could be bypassed by such attacks. (y)(y):giggle: Just like in the story about fox, hedgehog, and chickens. [/QUOTE]
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