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<blockquote data-quote="Andy Ful" data-source="post: 909065" data-attributes="member: 32260"><p>Such LOLBins are used by scripting, shortcuts, or when the attacker uses a file with active content (like .chm). So, it is not a problem for H_C settings. These methods and generally LOLBins can be a problem for AVs on default settings that allow running scripts, shortcuts, and files with active content. They have to block the malware on the second or later infection chain. This is much harder, because there are many more things to consider.</p><p>It is similar to the fight against the virus (like COVID-19). If you can quickly isolate the first infected person, then you will avoid much effort to recognize and quarantine tenths of other people on the infection tree.</p><p>Of course, the H_C setup is not magic, but only a smart-default-deny. One has to sacrifice some convenience for security.<img src="" class="smilie smilie--sprite smilie--sprite109" alt=":)" title="Smile :)" loading="lazy" data-shortname=":)" /></p><p></p><p>Edit1.</p><p>As it was mentioned in the article, this LOLBin can be used to bypass such strong enterprise security as WD Application Control (WDAC), if not properly configured. Unfortunately, WDAC (and Applocker) cannot block shortcuts and files with active content (like .chm, etc.). So, one <s>has to</s> can block LOLBins by adding custom rules.</p><p>The same is true for most setups based on SRP, because users commonly allow shortcuts (and DLLs).</p><p></p><p>Edit2.</p><p>I tested this LOLBin against WDAC. Although it can be bypassed in some WDAC settings, this will not happen if WDAC is properly configured even <strong>without blocking any LOLBin</strong>. Simply, WDAC default-deny setup will block the malicious DLL (Id 3077) like in the below example:</p><p></p><p>"<em>Code Integrity determined that a process (\Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\wuauclt.exe) attempted to load \Device\HarddiskVolume4\Users\reflective_dll.x64.dll that did not meet the Enterprise signing level requirements or violated code integrity policy (Policy ID:{a244370e-44c9-4c06-b551-f6016e563076}).</em>"</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Andy Ful, post: 909065, member: 32260"] Such LOLBins are used by scripting, shortcuts, or when the attacker uses a file with active content (like .chm). So, it is not a problem for H_C settings. These methods and generally LOLBins can be a problem for AVs on default settings that allow running scripts, shortcuts, and files with active content. They have to block the malware on the second or later infection chain. This is much harder, because there are many more things to consider. It is similar to the fight against the virus (like COVID-19). If you can quickly isolate the first infected person, then you will avoid much effort to recognize and quarantine tenths of other people on the infection tree. Of course, the H_C setup is not magic, but only a smart-default-deny. One has to sacrifice some convenience for security.:) Edit1. As it was mentioned in the article, this LOLBin can be used to bypass such strong enterprise security as WD Application Control (WDAC), if not properly configured. Unfortunately, WDAC (and Applocker) cannot block shortcuts and files with active content (like .chm, etc.). So, one [S]has to[/S] can block LOLBins by adding custom rules. The same is true for most setups based on SRP, because users commonly allow shortcuts (and DLLs). Edit2. I tested this LOLBin against WDAC. Although it can be bypassed in some WDAC settings, this will not happen if WDAC is properly configured even [B]without blocking any LOLBin[/B]. Simply, WDAC default-deny setup will block the malicious DLL (Id 3077) like in the below example: "[I]Code Integrity determined that a process (\Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\wuauclt.exe) attempted to load \Device\HarddiskVolume4\Users\reflective_dll.x64.dll that did not meet the Enterprise signing level requirements or violated code integrity policy (Policy ID:{a244370e-44c9-4c06-b551-f6016e563076}).[/I]" [/QUOTE]
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