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Hard_Configurator Tools
Hard_Configurator - Windows Hardening Configurator
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<blockquote data-quote="Andy Ful" data-source="post: 944216" data-attributes="member: 32260"><p>Why the enforcement for 'All users' can support <strong>Admin account</strong> on older Windows versions or with default-allow setup (blocked Sponsors, LOLBins)?</p><p></p><p>The older Windows versions can have unpatched privilege escalation exploits. The recommended way in such a case is using SUA. If one cannot use SUA then the enforcement for 'All users' is logical to prevent bypassing the H_C restrictions based on SRP. But, this solution requires extended knowledge about Windows. The more SRP restrictions, the more problems can arise with this enforcement. Only the expert users can evaluate the cons and pros of such solutions.</p><p></p><p>While using default-allow SRP setup with blocked LOLBins, the risk of problems is much lower compared to default-deny, but the attack surface is much greater. This can increase the chances of UAC bypass and high privileged malware will still be able to use all LOLBins. So, applying the enforcement for 'All users' is also logical. Blocking LOLBins for 'All users' can be useful only as one of the possible security layers - it can cover many fileless vectors of attack, even when the malware could elevate via UAC bypass.</p><p></p><p>When using the H_C Basic_Recommended_Settings the risk of problems with 'All users' enforcement can be (in theory) greater compared to default-allow setup. Also, on the well patched Windows 10 with these H_C restrictions + SmartScreen, the chances of privilege escalation via exploits or UAC bypasses are minimal. So probably, the support of 'All users' enforcement will be limited in this case to vulnerable systems (older Windows versions). Anyway, if the problems related to applying 'All users' enforcement will be negligible in the Home environment (we will see this after some extended testing), there will not be also serious contraindications for using it also on the well patched Windows 10.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Andy Ful, post: 944216, member: 32260"] Why the enforcement for 'All users' can support [B]Admin account[/B] on older Windows versions or with default-allow setup (blocked Sponsors, LOLBins)? The older Windows versions can have unpatched privilege escalation exploits. The recommended way in such a case is using SUA. If one cannot use SUA then the enforcement for 'All users' is logical to prevent bypassing the H_C restrictions based on SRP. But, this solution requires extended knowledge about Windows. The more SRP restrictions, the more problems can arise with this enforcement. Only the expert users can evaluate the cons and pros of such solutions. While using default-allow SRP setup with blocked LOLBins, the risk of problems is much lower compared to default-deny, but the attack surface is much greater. This can increase the chances of UAC bypass and high privileged malware will still be able to use all LOLBins. So, applying the enforcement for 'All users' is also logical. Blocking LOLBins for 'All users' can be useful only as one of the possible security layers - it can cover many fileless vectors of attack, even when the malware could elevate via UAC bypass. When using the H_C Basic_Recommended_Settings the risk of problems with 'All users' enforcement can be (in theory) greater compared to default-allow setup. Also, on the well patched Windows 10 with these H_C restrictions + SmartScreen, the chances of privilege escalation via exploits or UAC bypasses are minimal. So probably, the support of 'All users' enforcement will be limited in this case to vulnerable systems (older Windows versions). Anyway, if the problems related to applying 'All users' enforcement will be negligible in the Home environment (we will see this after some extended testing), there will not be also serious contraindications for using it also on the well patched Windows 10. [/QUOTE]
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