Exactly! If user isn't careful, it can make any device unsecure.I don't think iPhone more secure than android these days, I think user behavior is the biggest factor here.
Security is a process; hoomans are the real security vulnerability (bazang - 2025)I don't think iPhone more secure than android these days, I think user behavior is the biggest factor here.
Agree. User factor is numero uno.I don't think iPhone more secure than android these days, I think user behavior is the biggest factor here.
Hooman Nature it seems! HeheSecurity is a process; hoomans are the real security vulnerability (bazang - 2025)
hooman matches implying ignorance moreHooman Nature it seems! Hehe
Security on iPhone :
“ All third-party apps are “sandboxed,” so they are restricted from accessing files stored by other apps or from making changes to the device. “
“ The entire operating system partition is mounted as read-only. “
The Android platform takes advantage of the Linux user-based protection to identify and isolate app resources. This isolates apps from each other and protects apps and the system from malicious apps. To do this, Android assigns a unique user ID (UID) to each Android app and runs it in its own process.
Android uses the UID to set up a kernel-level Application Sandbox. The kernel enforces security between apps and the system at the process level through standard Linux facilities such as user and group IDs that are assigned to apps. By default, apps can't interact with each other and have limited access to the OS. If app A tries to do something malicious, such as read app B's data or dial the phone without permission, it's prevented from doing so because it doesn't have the appropriate default user privileges. The sandbox is simple, auditable, and based on decades-old UNIX-style user separation of processes and file permissions.
Because the Application Sandbox is in the kernel, this security model extends to both native code and OS apps. All of the software above the kernel, such as OS libraries, app framework, app runtime, and all apps, run within the Application Sandbox. On some platforms, developers are constrained to a specific development framework, set of APIs, or language. On Android, there are no restrictions on how an app can be written that are required to enforce security; in this respect, native code is as sandboxed as interpreted code.
Protections
Generally, to break out of the Application Sandbox in a properly configured device, one must compromise the security of the Linux kernel. However, similar to other security features, individual protections enforcing the app sandbox are not invulnerable, so defense-in-depth is important to prevent single vulnerabilities from leading to compromise of the OS or other apps.
Android relies on a number of protections to enforce the app sandbox. These enforcements have been introduced over time and have significantly strengthened the original UID-based discretionary access control (DAC) sandbox. Previous Android releases included the following protections:
- In Android 5.0, SELinux provided mandatory access control (MAC) separation between the system and apps. However, all third-party apps ran within the same SELinux context so inter-app isolation was primarily enforced by UID DAC.
- In Android 6.0, the SELinux sandbox was extended to isolate apps across the per-physical-user boundary. In addition, Android also set safer defaults for app data: For apps with targetSdkVersion >= 24, default DAC permissions on an app's home dir changed from 751 to 700. This provided safer default for private app data (although apps can override these defaults).
- In Android 8.0, all apps were set to run with a seccomp-bpf filter that limited the syscalls that apps were allowed to use, thus strengthening the app/kernel boundary.
- In Android 9 all nonprivileged apps with targetSdkVersion >= 28 must run in individual SELinux sandboxes, providing MAC on a per-app basis. This protection improves app separation, prevents overriding safe defaults, and (most significantly) prevents apps from making their data world accessible.
- In Android 10 apps have a limited raw view of the filesystem, with no direct access to paths like /sdcard/DCIM. However, apps retain full raw access to their package-specific paths, as returned by any applicable methods, such as Context.getExternalFilesDir().
Basically either iphone or pixel (graphene os )Security is the most important consideration for me.
Samsung fork of Android has much bigger attack surface I wouldn't use it if I cared for securityMaybe, but I think nowadays Samsung's Android (One UI with maximum restrictions for Auto Blocker) could be even better at security compared to iPhone.
For reference:
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Protect your Galaxy device with the Auto Blocker feature
A guide to discover effective strategies to safeguard your Samsung device with Auto Blocker. Learn how to prevent installing unauthorized apps, secure your device against malicious activity, and enhance privacy and security.www.samsung.com
Samsung fork of Android has much bigger attack surface I wouldn't use it if I cared for security
I mean in general all the other stuff they modified over AOSP there is many published research and cves specifically targeting the modified version of Android Samsung is usingSamsung Knox (hardware based) and Auto Blocker have more positive impact in security than a theoretical flaw caused by a theoretical bigger attack surface.