Serious Discussion Is your biggest risk the browser (extensions), the router (EoL gear), or “account takeovers” (phishing)?

What is the biggest security risk for typical home users right now?

  • Browser scams + malicious or risky extensions

  • Router / WiFi gear (especially end-of-life devices)

  • Account takeover (phishing, MFA tricks, password reuse)

  • Windows/macOS app patching and outdated software

  • Mobile app scams and social engineering (SMS, DMs, calls)

  • Not sure / Other


Results are only viewable after voting.

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We keep telling home users “just use common sense, update your stuff, and you’ll be fine.” But the last year has made that feel a little too simple.

On one hand, browsers are tightening extension rules (Manifest V3 in Chromium) in the name of security and performance. On the other hand, we’re still seeing large-scale campaigns living inside home routers, especially older end-of-life models, plus the usual wave of phishing and account takeovers. (arXiv)

So I’m curious what people here think is the “real” weakest link for typical home users right now, and what advice actually moves the needle.

Current context (why I’m posting this now)​

1) Routers as a long-lived foothold
Recent reporting and research summaries point to campaigns compromising ASUS home routers at scale, with a big emphasis on end-of-life devices and stealthy persistence. Even if you do not run an ASUS router, the pattern is familiar: consumer edge devices get ignored, they do not get patched, and they end up becoming someone else’s infrastructure. (Privacy Guides)

2) Browsers and extension power is being reduced
Manifest V3 is often framed as “security hygiene” because extensions can be a major malware path. But it also changes how effective privacy and content blocking can be, and for many users content blocking is part of staying safe (malvertising, scam popups, fake update prompts). There’s also research looking at how MV3 impacts blocking ability. (arXiv)

3) Account takeovers and “human layer” attacks are still escalating
Beyond pure malware, organized cybercrime ecosystems keep blending online intrusion with extortion and real-world harassment. That pressure tends to hit regular people first because they are easier targets. (The Guardian)


The debate: three “camps” with real arguments​

Side A: “The browser is the new perimeter”​

Argument: Most home user compromises start in the browser: phishing, drive-by scams, shady extensions, fake downloads, sponsored search traps. Tightening extension capabilities is a net win.

Points people bring up:

  • Extensions are a supply-chain risk: even good tools can be sold, updated, or cloned.
  • Reducing what extensions can do can reduce damage when something goes bad.
  • Built-in protections (Safe Browsing style features, sandboxing) matter more than “a pile of add-ons.”
Counterpoint to expect: If MV3 weakens the strongest blockers, some users will install random “ad blocker pro max” garbage and get owned anyway. Also, blocking is not just convenience, it is protection against malvertising and scam funnels. (AdBlock Tester)


Side B: “No, the router and IoT are the real soft underbelly”​

Argument: A compromised router can outlive OS reinstalls, new browsers, even new devices on the LAN. Home routers are “set-and-forget,” and attackers know it.

Points people bring up:

  • End-of-life routers are everywhere, and many owners never replace them.
  • Router compromises can enable DNS hijacking, transparent proxies, credential theft, and botnet activity.
  • Big botnets built from hacked routers and IoT keep showing up in DDoS and other campaigns. (Privacy Guides)
Counterpoint to expect: Many home users are behind ISP gear they cannot fully manage. Also, “router risk” feels abstract to people. They click the fake invoice today, they do not worry about firmware lifecycle.


Side C: “The real crisis is account takeover, not malware”​

Argument: Password reuse, phishing, MFA fatigue, SIM swaps, and social engineering are still the highest-frequency way normal people lose money and access.

Points people bring up:

  • Even perfect endpoint security cannot stop someone who gives away session tokens or approves a push.
  • Passkeys and phishing-resistant MFA help, but adoption is uneven and recovery flows can be messy.
  • Victims often lose email first, then everything else falls like dominoes.
Counterpoint to expect: People here will argue that a hardened browser plus good blockers prevents a lot of those funnels from ever showing up, so it still comes back to the browser.


My “boring” take (to poke holes in)​

If I had to rank advice for a typical home user who will only do a few things:

  1. Fix the router lifecycle (replace EoL, update firmware, disable remote admin, strong admin password, turn off UPnP if you do not need it).
  2. Browser minimalism (fewer extensions, only reputable ones, review permissions).
  3. Account hardening (unique passwords, authenticator-based MFA, passkeys where possible, lock down email first).
But I’m not convinced this order is right for everyone, and MV3 changes might reshape the “browser” part of the stack.


Questions to drive the debate​

  • If MV3 makes “best-in-class” blocking harder, do you consider that a net security improvement or a net security loss for home users? (arXiv)
  • Would you rather have a browser that restricts extension power, even if it reduces user control, or do you prefer maximum capability with the risk that extensions can be abused?
  • If you could only convince a non-technical relative to do ONE thing this weekend, would it be: router replacement, browser change, or account hardening?

 
If I had to pick just one, account takeover. If I can choose multiple, account takeover and scams (browser and mobile).

Once someone gains access to your account, your other accounts are compromised as well (if you reused your password as most of people do). And you're hardly getting them back. Sometimes that means losing everything even access to your bank accounts.
 
@Bot


I would like to correct some inaccuracies in your analysis and also in the article you linked to regarding MV3 extensions.
The weak point of MV3 adblocks is the updating of filter lists, which occurs, on average, with a frequency that is certainly lower than MV2 adblocks.
This weak point can be corrected, albeit with an efficiency that depends greatly on the user, by combining filtering at the DNS level.
 
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@Bot


I would like to correct some inaccuracies in your analysis and also in the article you linked to regarding MV3 extensions.
The weak point of MV3 adblocks is the updating of filter lists, which occurs, on average, with a frequency that is certainly lower than MV2 adblocks.
This weak point can be corrected, albeit with an efficiency that depends greatly on the user, by combining filtering at the DNS level.
You’re making a solid point on account takeover: once the attacker gets control of a “hub” account (usually email), they can reset passwords elsewhere, enroll new MFA methods, and lock you out—often with a painful recovery process.

Account takeover: why it’s the #1 single fix
If someone can only do one thing, I’d also put it here because it has the best “blast-radius reduction”:

  • Protect the email account first (unique password + strong MFA + recovery options reviewed).
  • Use a password manager so password reuse stops being the default.
  • Prefer phishing-resistant MFA when available (passkeys, security key). Authenticator apps are still a big step up from SMS.
  • Harden account recovery (remove old numbers/emails, set a strong recovery code, lock SIM/port-out with your carrier if possible).

About MV3 ad blockers: what I can and can’t confirm
I can’t reliably validate the specific “weak point” claims in the linked MV3 article without doing a deeper source-by-source review, so you’re right to challenge it. What I can say more generally (and more safely) is:

  • MV3 moves Chrome/Chromium-based blockers toward declarative rules (e.g., declarativeNetRequest), which changes how filtering is applied and what kinds of filtering are possible.
  • One practical concern people often raise is responsiveness to fast-changing filter needs (including how quickly rules/lists can be updated and applied), compared with the older MV2 model where extensions had more freedom to process requests “live.”
  • There are also other commonly discussed constraints besides update cadence (rule limits, flexibility/expressiveness of rules, certain advanced techniques), but the details vary by browser and by extension implementation.

So I wouldn’t frame it as “MV3 is automatically worse” or “MV3 is automatically better”—it depends on what the user needs, which browser they use, and which blocker they choose.

DNS-level filtering as a mitigation (good call, with caveats)
Yes: combining DNS filtering with browser-level filtering can meaningfully reduce exposure to malvertising/scam domains and “new” bad infrastructure, and it can partially compensate when browser blocking is less agile.

But it’s not a full substitute for a strong in-browser blocker because DNS filtering typically cannot:

  • Block same-domain ads/trackers (first-party hosting).
  • Do cosmetic filtering (removing page elements) or anti-annoyance rules.
  • Help much with in-page scam content that loads from the same site you intentionally visited.

Also, effectiveness can be reduced/complicated by DoH/DoT settings, VPNs, or apps using their own DNS behaviors.

If we merge both of your points into practical advice
If someone will do “two things,” I’d pick:

  • Account hardening (password manager + MFA + protect email).
  • Scam surface reduction (reputable content blocker + cautious app installs + DNS filtering if they can handle it).

If you want, tell me which platform you’re mainly thinking of (Windows + Chrome? Android? iOS?), and whether you’re trying to optimize for “set-and-forget” vs “maximum control.” I can suggest a minimal, low-maintenance setup that matches that.
 
@Bot

Yes, I am well aware of what you have written.

Can you estimate, in percentage terms, if we take a list of DNS-level filters such as EasyPrivacy, which is almost entirely network-based filtering, to make this question easier, how much more inefficient it is compared to the same list of adblock-level filters?
 
@Bot

Yes, I am well aware of what you have written.

Can you estimate, in percentage terms, if we take a list of DNS-level filters such as EasyPrivacy, which is almost entirely network-based filtering, to make this question easier, how much more inefficient it is compared to the same list of adblock-level filters?
I can’t give a defensible “X% less efficient” number for DNS filtering vs an in-browser blocker using the *same* list, because there isn’t a single universal percentage—it varies massively by site mix, device/apps, whether the tracker is on a dedicated hostname vs shared/first‑party, whether CNAME cloaking is in play, whether the browser/app uses DoH, and the DNS product’s feature set (blocklists only vs additional heuristics).

What I can do is explain why a clean percentage isn’t stable and give you a practical way to measure it yourself on a representative browsing set.

Why DNS-level filtering can’t “match” adblock-level filtering (even with EasyPrivacy)
DNS filtering can only decide based on the hostname. Most adblock engines can decide based on:

  • Hostname + full URL (path/query)
  • Request type (script/image/xhr/frame, etc.)
  • First-party vs third-party context
  • Per-site exceptions and advanced logic
  • Cosmetic filtering (not “network”, but it affects perceived effectiveness)

So even if EasyPrivacy is “mostly network rules,” the moment a rule depends on anything beyond hostname (path-based endpoints, resource type, context), DNS cannot apply it.

Typical places where the gap becomes large
  • Same-host / first-party served tracking (e.g., tracking endpoints on the site’s own domain). DNS can’t block “/collect” without blocking the whole site hostname.
  • Shared hostnames (CDNs, tag managers, “one host serves many things”). Browser blockers can target specific URLs/types; DNS can only nuke the hostname.
  • CNAME cloaking: some DNS filters can mitigate this if they actively resolve and map CNAMEs, but many “basic” DNS blockers won’t.
  • Apps and DoH/VPN bypass: DNS rules may not see the same queries your browser sees (or vice versa).

A more meaningful way to express “inefficiency” than a single %
If you really want a number, you need to define which metric:

  • Coverage: “Of the tracker requests blocked by the browser list, what fraction does DNS also block?”
  • Residual requests: “How many tracker requests still fire with DNS-only?”
  • Outcome: “How much tracking/ID sync actually occurs?” (harder to measure)
  • User-visible: “How many ads/widgets still appear?” (cosmetic matters here)

Those can yield very different “percentages.”

How to measure it (recommended)
You can estimate this for your own usage pretty reliably:

  1. Pick ~20–50 sites you actually use (news, shopping, video, forums, etc.).
  2. Test three modes:
    • A) Browser blocker (e.g., uBO) with EasyPrivacy enabled
    • B) DNS filtering only (with a DNS list that’s derived from/close to EasyPrivacy, if possible)
    • C) Both together
  3. Collect counts:
    • In the browser: uBO’s logger / blocked request counts
    • At DNS: Pi-hole/AdGuard Home/NextDNS query logs (blocked vs allowed)
  4. Compute:
    • DNS overlap ratio = (hostnames blocked by DNS that correspond to browser-blocked requests) / (total browser-blocked requests)
    • And note “cannot be blocked by DNS without breaking site” cases (first-party endpoints).

That will give you a percentage that is meaningful for your browsing profile.

If you want, I can help design the test
Tell me which DNS solution you mean (Pi-hole / AdGuard Home / NextDNS / something else) and which browser blocker you’re comparing against, and whether you want to measure “requests blocked” or “trackers prevented” (the former is much easier).
 
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@Bot
OK, as I thought.
Thank you.
No problem.

If you ever decide you do want a rough, usage-specific percentage, the quickest “good enough” method is:

  • Enable DNS filtering logs (Pi-hole/AdGuard Home/NextDNS).
  • Run a browser blocker with logging (e.g., uBO logger) for a day of normal browsing.
  • Compare which tracker hostnames appear in uBO’s blocked list but never get blocked at DNS (those are your DNS “misses,” often first‑party/path-based cases).

That gives you a practical overlap figure without needing perfect lab conditions.