Malicious zip files use Windows Shortcuts to drop malware

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Brownie2019

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A new wave of phishing attacks has been detected by the cybersecurity research firm, Blackpoint Cyber, that is exploiting users’ trust in sensitive documents. This research, shared with Hackread.com, reveals a campaign that uses identity-themed phishing archives.

These include fake certified documents, passport scans, and payment files, to deliver malicious code. By leveraging familiar file themes, the attackers increase their chances of success and gain initial access to victims’ systems.

In one case examined for this research, a custom-designed spear phishing message was delivered as a ZIP archive, specifically targeting a senior employee or manager with files mimicking routine executive workflows, including identity verification and payment approvals.
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Thanks for sharing this, Brownie2019. It's a timely reminder of how phishing tactics are evolving to exploit everyday trust in documents like passports or payment files. Blackpoint Cyber's findings highlight the risks of ZIP archives and Windows shortcuts being weaponized for malware delivery—definitely something to watch out for in executive or financial workflows.

  • Quick tips to stay safe: Always scan attachments with reliable antivirus software before opening, even if they seem legitimate. Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) wherever possible, and be cautious with unsolicited emails requesting identity verification.
  • If you're dealing with sensitive docs, consider using secure file-sharing platforms instead of email attachments.

Looking forward to more discussions on this—has anyone encountered similar phishing attempts recently?
 
I am lost. If it was not freshly downloaded, it should not have MotW. No SS checking.
I freshly download cmd file (with motw), the copied and removed motw from the copy.
I would like also to ask if wdac policy included dynamic code security (for dll files), does it make it comparable to SAC for blocking malicious dll sideloading?
 
I would like also to ask if wdac policy included dynamic code security (for dll files), does it make it comparable to SAC for blocking malicious dll sideloading?

The first is related to .NET DLLs that are created on the fly. However, it will block many .NET applications. SAC does not use it.
 
Attackers are actively exploiting this vulnerability in Windows for which no security update is available, according to security firm Arctic Wolf. The vulnerability is believed to have been used in attacks against European diplomats, including those in Belgium. The vulnerability (CVE-2025-9491) occurs during the processing of .LNK files. Specially crafted data within the .LNK file prevents dangerous command line arguments from being visible when users inspect the file.

Why does MS not address this. :unsure:
 
Attackers are actively exploiting this vulnerability in Windows for which no security update is available, according to security firm Arctic Wolf. The vulnerability is believed to have been used in attacks against European diplomats, including those in Belgium. The vulnerability (CVE-2025-9491) occurs during the processing of .LNK files. Specially crafted data within the .LNK file prevents dangerous command line arguments from being visible when users inspect the file.

Why does MS not address this. :unsure:
If you have script files blocked outside system space (such as using WHHL or AppLocker), the execution chain will be disrupted.

attack_flow_unc6384.png
 
If you have script files blocked outside system space (such as using WHHL or AppLocker), the execution chain will be disrupted.

Blocking script files can block many attacks. However, it seems that in this particular attack, PowerShell CmdLines are used directly from the shortcut (no script file).
One has to block shortcuts in UserSpace (like SWH in WHHLight) to fully prevent the attack. AppLocker and WDAC can mitigate the attack by blocking DLL hijacking (side-loading).
 
@Parkinsond

Yes blocking powershell.exe should block the infection chain at the start for that sample.

Tried to run the .lnk file from inside the .zip file (double-click on it):

test1.png


Then have disabled all rules except "Block execution of powershell.exe" and it was blocked too:

test2.png


The .lnk malware sample file can be found on MalwareBazaar with SHA256 hash:
911cccd238fbfdb4babafc8d2582e80dcfa76469fa1ee27bbc5f4324d5fca539
 
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