You personally own the software. Isn't that wonderful for you?
I never said I worked for the government. I said I work in a highly regulated industry. I have not performed the "employee" role for many years.
You are correct. You don't have to prove anything. That does not change the fact that your habit here at MT is drive-by snipe posts. Some are nonsensical. I am not sure what the problem is. If it is your intent or a language issue or something else. I do know part of your short, abrupt and logic-shorted posts arises as a result of making your posts from a smartphone. The posting style is immediately identifiable as being done on a phone.
Security is not software. It is a process. When Bruce Schneier said "process" he meant a top-to-bottom holistic security architecture that is designed to mitigate all the people that can or do affect the data environment security. If "catching apps" actually provided robust security, then the world would have been very secure long ago because there have been security programs that are extremely good at "catching apps" for the past 30 years. Any security model that is based primarily on software fails immediately as it does not address the one variable - people - that do all the things that undermine, circumvent, and bypass all that security provided by software. And by people I mean the owners, the users, the administrators, and the attackers\threat actors.
If you and your software are "catching apps left, right and center" that is great. But the two parts of that system are allowing those unwanted apps to either breach the security boundaries or allowing legitimate apps to perform security violations within the security boundaries in the first place - or - more probably they are not designed to prevent that part. They work as post-breach or post-infection systems. That problem is not inherent to just your own product, now is it? So from the very beginning I was not slighting you nor your product, although I am sure that has been your interpretation. The critical point that is implicit here is that security software is only a small part of a much larger security picture and performs a minor role at that. The fundamental mistake is that many adhere to the exact opposite of this truth, and because of this it accounts for the current state of poor global security.
