Multi-Stage Phishing Campaign Targets Russia with Amnesia RAT and Ransomware

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A new multi-stage phishing campaign has been observed targeting users in Russia with ransomware and a remote access trojan called Amnesia RAT.

The campaign leverages social engineering to distribute compressed archives, which contain multiple decoy documents and a malicious Windows shortcut (LNK) with Russian-language filenames.
The LNK file uses a double extension ("Задание_для_бухгалтера_02отдела.txt.lnk") to give the impression that it's a text file.

When executed, it runs a PowerShell command to retrieve the next-stage PowerShell script hosted on a GitHub repository ("github[.]com/Mafin111/MafinREP111"), which then serves as a first-stage loader to establish a foothold, readies the system to hide evidence of malicious activity, and hands off control flow to subsequent stages.

"The script first suppresses visible execution by programmatically hiding the PowerShell console window," Fortinet said. "This removes any immediate visual indicators that a script is running. It then generates a decoy text document in the user's local application data directory.
Once written to disk, the decoy document is automatically opened."

Once the document is displayed to the victim to keep up the ruse, the script sends a message to the attacker using the Telegram Bot API, informing the operator that the first stage has been successfully executed.
A deliberately-introduced 444 second delay later, the PowerShell script runs a Visual Basic Script ("SCRRC4ryuk.vbe") hosted at the same repository location.

This offers two crucial advantages in that it keeps the loader lightweight and allows the threat actors to update or replace the payload's functionality on the fly without having to introduce any changes to the attack chain itself.

The Visual Basic Script is highly obfuscated and acts as the controller that assembles the next-stage payload directly in memory, thereby avoiding leaving any artifacts on disk. The final-stage script checks if it's running with elevated privileges, and, if not, repeatedly displays a User Account Control (UAC) prompt to force the victim to grant it the necessary permissions.
The script pauses for 3,000 milliseconds between attempts.

In the next phase, the malware initiates a series of actions to suppress visibility, neutralize endpoint protection mechanisms, conduct reconnaissance, inhibit recovery, and ultimately deploy the main payloads -
  • Configure Microsoft Defender exclusions to prevent the program from scanning ProgramData, Program Files, Desktop, Downloads, and the system temporary directory
  • Use PowerShell to turn off additional Defender protection components
  • Deploy defendnot to register a fake antivirus product with the Windows Security Center interface and cause Microsoft Defender to disable itself to avoid potential conflicts
  • Conduct environment reconnaissance and surveillance via screenshot capture by means of a dedicated .NET module downloaded from the GitHub repository that takes a screengrab every 30 seconds, save it as a PNG image, and exfiltrates the data using a Telegram bot
  • Disable Windows administrative and diagnostic tools by tampering with the Registry-based policy controls
  • Implement a file association hijacking mechanism such that opening files with certain predefined extensions causes a message to be displayed to the victim, instructing them to contact the threat actor via Telegram
One of the final payloads deployed after successfully disarming security controls and recovery mechanisms is Amnesia RAT ("svchost.scr"), which is retrieved from Dropbox and is capable of broad data theft and remote control.

The second payload delivered by the script is a ransomware that's derived from the Hakuna Matata ransomware family.

"This attack chain demonstrates how modern malware campaigns can achieve full system compromise without exploiting software vulnerabilities".
"By systematically abusing native Windows features, administrative tools, and policy enforcement mechanisms, the attacker disables endpoint defenses before deploying persistent surveillance tooling and destructive payloads."

 
Payloads

Amnesia RAT (svchost.scr)

Retrieved from Dropbox; capable of full system control and broad data exfiltration.

Ransomware
A variant of the Hakuna Matata family.

Surveillance
A .NET module captures screenshots every 30 seconds and exfiltrates them via Telegram.

Remediation & Mitigation Plan

Consistent with NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 (Incident Handling) and SANS Institute best practices.

Endpoint Protection Hardening
Enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules in Microsoft Defender, specifically "Block all Office applications from creating child processes" and "Block executable content from email client and webmail."

Implement PowerShell Constrained Language Mode to limit the execution of advanced scripts used by loaders.

Network-Level Defenses

Monitor and restrict outbound traffic to known malicious GitHub repositories and the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) if not required for business operations.

Block access to unauthorized file-sharing services like Dropbox at the firewall/web proxy level.

Credential & Identity Management
Enforce the Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP). Ensure standard users do not have local administrative rights, which mitigates the impact of the UAC bypass/spamming.

User Awareness
Train staff to recognize double extensions and suspicious LNK files, especially those delivered via unsolicited archives.

References

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 (User Execution: Malicious File)
T1562.001 (Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools)
T1059.001 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell).

SANS Institute
Critical Security Control #2
(Inventory and Control of Software Assets)

NIST
SP 800-83 Rev. 1
(Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling)
 
It's much easier and simple, WHHL will block the LNK file, process aborted 🙂
Andy Ful’s hardening tools (such as Windows Hardening Helper or Simple Windows Hardening) are exceptional for reducing the attack surface and would likely block the initial LNK execution or the default PowerShell behavior in this campaign. However, "the fact is that no single tool is a complete substitute for an incident response plan, especially against a campaign that uses UAC Spamming and Security Center manipulation to force its way past existing restrictions once a user is coerced into providing credentials.

The Persistence/Bypass Factor.
The danger of this specific campaign lies in its social engineering and evasion tactics.

UAC Spamming

If the user, frustrated by prompts every 3 seconds, provides administrative credentials, the malware gains the ability to modify the very Registry keys and policies Andy Ful’s tool relies on.

Defense Neutralization (defendnot)
The malware uses a specialized tool to register a fake Antivirus with the Windows Security Center. This causes Windows to automatically disable its built-in defenses to "avoid conflict," a technique that bypasses many standard hardening configurations.

Memory-Only Execution
The campaign uses highly obfuscated VBS (SCRRC4ryuk[.]vbe) to assemble payloads directly in memory, which can bypass tools that only monitor for disk-based artifacts.

To complement Andy Ful’s hardening, follow SANS/NIST best practices for defense-in-depth.

Immutable GPO

In a business environment, ensure hardening policies are pushed via Active Directory Group Policy Objects (GPOs), which are harder for local malware to revert than local Registry tweaks.

User Identity Isolation
Ensure the primary account used is a Standard User, not an Administrator. This makes the UAC spamming ineffective, as the malware cannot escalate without a separate admin password.

Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
While hardening prevents, EDR detects. Use tools that monitor for anomalous process behavior (e.g., PowerShell making remote connections to GitHub) to catch the attack even if a prevention layer is bypassed.
 
Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication.
Simple it is

Gemini_Generated_Image_ogiyseogiyseogiy~2.jpg
 
WHHL will block the initial step (LNK file); you will not be exposed to any of those steps.
@Andy Ful is a genius.
Attributing absolute safety to a single tool or script (like WHHL) is a dangerous oversimplification in modern cybersecurity. While Andy Ful's hardening tools are excellent for Attack Surface Reduction (ASR), they are preventative gates, not comprehensive security solutions. The Amnesia RAT campaign specifically utilizes techniques designed to bypass or neutralize the very OS-level defenses that hardening scripts attempt to configure.

@bazang , I would appreciate your insight on this matter for the user's benefit. Since they have initiated a public debate on a topic they claim to understand well, I am inviting you to join the conversation as well. ;)
 
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Attributing absolute safety to a single tool or script (like WHHL) is a dangerous oversimplification in modern cybersecurity. While Andy Ful's hardening tools are excellent for Attack Surface Reduction (ASR), they are preventative gates, not comprehensive security solutions. The Amnesia RAT campaign specifically utilizes techniques designed to bypass or neutralize the very OS-level defenses that hardening scripts attempt to configure.
I'll take the risk.
 
I'll take the risk.
While you might be fine taking the risk, the misinformation being spread here can negatively impact other users who are looking for reliable data. Let’s keep this thread focused on factual information so it remains a useful resource for everyone.
 
While you might be fine taking the risk, the misinformation being spread here can negatively impact other users who are looking for reliable data. Let’s keep this thread focused on factual information so it remains a useful resource for everyone.
No misinformation
WHHL will block the initial step of the attack (LNK) file
Mission aborted 🙂
 
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I'll take the risk.

@Divergent is right by saying that: "Attributing absolute safety to a single tool or script (like WHHL) is a dangerous oversimplification in modern cybersecurity.":)
However, you are right in the case of the attack noted in this thread. (y)

The initial shortcut "Задание_для_бухгалтера_02отдела.txt.lnk" will be blocked by default SWH settings.
Without the above protection, the attack would be blocked by FirewallHardening default settings (blocked outbound connections of PowerShell).
Without the above, the payload "SCRRC4ryuk.vbe" would be blocked by default SWH settings (script restrictions).
I did not examine the first-stage loader (PS1 script), but @Divergent may be right that PowerShell set to Constrained Language mode can also mitigate the attack (Constrained Language mode is forced by default SWH settings in WHHLight).
 
@Divergent is right by saying that: "Attributing absolute safety to a single tool or script (like WHHL) is a dangerous oversimplification in modern cybersecurity.":)
However, you are right in the case of the attack noted in this thread. (y)

The initial shortcut "Задание_для_бухгалтера_02отдела.txt.lnk" will be blocked by default SWH settings.
Without the above protection, the attack would be blocked by FirewallHardening default settings (blocked outbound connections of PowerShell).
Without the above, the payload "SCRRC4ryuk.vbe" would be blocked by default SWH settings (script restrictions).
I did not examine the first-stage loader (PS1 script), but @Divergent may be right that PowerShell set to Constrained Language mode can also mitigate the attack (Constrained Language mode is forced by default SWH settings in WHHLight).
I know, of course, the attack chain will be blocked by WHHL at several levels, but I mentioned the first level as it will not proceed to the next ones.

What is great about you tool is the ability to stop the malicious process very early, not taking the chances to allowing it to proceed to the next levels; the more the levels it reach, the more the risk to cause some collateral damage or aborting the attack might fail.
 
What is great about you tool is the ability to stop the malicious process very early, not taking the chances to allowing it to proceed to the next levels; the more the levels it reach, the more the risk to cause some collateral damage or aborting the attack might fail.

Yes, such an idea (PREVENTION) is implemented in some Windows built-in features. Of course, this cannot replace AV and other security layers.

Edit.
Most AVs will try to detect the attack by using AMSI upon the execution of the first-stage loader (PS1 script), and when executing the payload "SCRRC4ryuk.vbe". So, in Microsoft Defender, activating some ASR rules can help.
 
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Yes, such an idea (PREVENTION) is implemented in some Windows built-in features. Of course, this cannot replace AV and other security layers.
Indeed; MD and WHHL is a very competent combination, with no extra cost (the performance of MD alone).
 
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I have no other apps to demonstrate how they are going to stop the attack; I have only MD and WHHL.

SAC can also block shortcuts (and prevent the attack) if the RAR archive (used in the attack) is downloaded via the web browser and opened in Explorer.
If I correctly recall, some commercial applications (like AppGuard) can also be configured to block shortcuts (or scripting).
WDAC (App Control for Businesses) and AppLocker can mitigate the attack by restricting the .vbe payload.
The attack can also be mitigated when Windows Script Host is disabled by policy, or VBScript is removed from the system:

1769294402198.png


Post edited.
 
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SAC can also block shortcuts (and prevent the attack) if the RAR archive (used in the attack) is downloaded via the web browser and opened in Explorer
SRP of WHHL is better; if the file is lacking MoTW for any reason, it will be skipped by SAC, not by SRP.
VBScript is removed
Always removed among most of the optional features after Windows install.
 
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