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- Mar 13, 2016
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In december I have a meeting with Florian the owner/developer of Excubits to discuss some ideas of zero config sandboxes. The DISadvantage of zero config sandboxes is that you can not make granular rules. When the rules are tight and narrow you run into exceptions and have to create specific rules to allow these exceptions.
Still for the average user the attack surface can be restricted significantly without reducing the functionality. To tackle this two sided sword I would like to have your input and thoughts. When your ideas or suggestions are used you will be rewarded with a lifetime license.
General hardening rules
Usage drawbacks
What programs to protect?
I was thinking of Office, Internet Explorer and Windows Media Player to target organisations on Windows 7 and Office 2007 not seeing the necessity or having the budget to upgrade to Windows 10/Office 365. For average home users I was thinking of Firefox (has a lot of users), Thunderbird (still a popular email client on desktops), VLC media player (as alternative to WMP) and Libre Office (as alternative to Microsoft Office). Chrome can't be omitted, so will be included also (as Adobe PDF reader thx to @Umbra ).
What pricing and license fee structure is competitive?
This zero config sandbox blend of Excubits programs can be best compared with AppGuard. It also enforces a LUA-sandbox for protected programs (like AppGuard). With MemProtect it probably has stronger exploit protection than AppGuard (probably even stronger than MBAE and HMPA). The user folder protection is simpler (AppGuard's privacy has more configuration options) but in default setting is probably stronger (only allowing write access to Download folder by internet facing software). The deny execute in user folders is more specific (for protected programs and shared folders only) and less restrictive (for user documents/music/photo/video folder) than the generic deny execute of unsigned of AppGuard's default setting.
Excubit's current pricing model is 12 euro for a lifetime license. Other Excubits programs are all controlled by user defined ini-config files. A zero config program needs updating of the configuration files centrally. Compared to AppGuard a lifetime license fee of 10 euro's is a bargain with mandatory first year support of 2 euro. This would total first years license costs to 'only' 12 euro (10+2). To receive configuration file updates an annual fee of 2 euro's is asked. Would that sound reasonable?
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO POST SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS
In december I have a meeting with Florian the owner/developer of Excubits to discuss some ideas of zero config sandboxes. The DISadvantage of zero config sandboxes is that you can not make granular rules. When the rules are tight and narrow you run into exceptions and have to create specific rules to allow these exceptions.
Still for the average user the attack surface can be restricted significantly without reducing the functionality. To tackle this two sided sword I would like to have your input and thoughts. When your ideas or suggestions are used you will be rewarded with a lifetime license.
General hardening rules
- Restrict ACL access holes in Windows folder
No execution access to the ACL (Widows Access Control List mechanism) user writeable subfolders in the Windows directory holes. This is a tweak which has been on the internet for ages, so this should not give any conflicts.
- Restrict access to risky Windows commands
No execution access to risky commands like 16 bits DOS, cmd.exe, cscript, wscript and powershell from protected programs. These risky commands are also not allowed to be started from user folders.
- Limit execution to 'safe' folders for protected programs.
When you open an attachement in a mail program like Thunderbird, the file extention triggers an installed program to start. To prevent extension of drive by's, double extension ore other malicious code execution the 'protected' program is only allowed to execute programs from UAC protected folders (Windows, Program Files and Program Files (x86).
- Limit write access to UAC protected folders (Windows, Program Files) to update service only
It makes no sense for daily use of application programs (like Thunderbird) to write to 'safe' UAC protected folders. Only the update services of the protected programs would be allowed to write to their default installation folders. Together with rule 3 this effectively puts protected programs in a Limited User sandbox (LUA-box).
- Limit write access of internet facing software to Download folder and Desktop
By simply restricting write access to the download folder and specific AppData files/folders for internet facing software (subset of protected programs), the operating room for malware (e.g. ransomware) is restricted.
- Limit execute access of Download folder (and Desktop) to 'safe' parents
To limit drive-by infection risk only 'safe' parents like Windows Explorer are allowed to execute from Download folder (most programs update using temp folders, so this should not interfere with other updates).
- Block executables (MZ-header) located in user folders
Block executables from running dropped in all public folders and specific user folders like Documents, Music, Video's and Picture folders. Because Appdata is not included for compatibility. This still leaves an Appdata 'hole' in the deny execute, but in combination with safe execution of protected programs (rule 3) and write protection of internet facing (rule 5) the attack surface is reduced substantially.
- Generic priority whitelist for windows update and restore
For zero config and intended user base, it is better to be safe than sorry, so always allow some critical Windows functions.
Usage drawbacks
- Software should be installed in default directories
Average users normally just click to install. Since this zero config sandbox is targetted at average users, this limitation should be low in practice. Remember that this new sandbox combines the goodies of Bouncer, MemProtect, Pumpernickel, MZ Write scanner, Command Line Scanner which are all ini-file managed programs (directed at power users).
- User must be made aware that internet facing software can only save files in downloads
The excubits products have a tray warning, maybe this could be used specifically for rule 6 to warn and guide the user t save something in the download folder. With this addition this limitation hopefully does not limit the usefulness of this Excubits program.
- Exception feature is always needed to deal with unexpected conflicts
Some sort of exception should be available for problem solving and user assistance in case of conflicts. So this zero config sandbox, should still have a mechanism to overrule the default rule set to deal with unexpected conflicts/incompatibilities. A simple screen showing ON-OFF switches per protected program allows the user to turn off protection in case of conflicts for specific 'protected' programs.
What programs to protect?
I was thinking of Office, Internet Explorer and Windows Media Player to target organisations on Windows 7 and Office 2007 not seeing the necessity or having the budget to upgrade to Windows 10/Office 365. For average home users I was thinking of Firefox (has a lot of users), Thunderbird (still a popular email client on desktops), VLC media player (as alternative to WMP) and Libre Office (as alternative to Microsoft Office). Chrome can't be omitted, so will be included also (as Adobe PDF reader thx to @Umbra ).
What pricing and license fee structure is competitive?
This zero config sandbox blend of Excubits programs can be best compared with AppGuard. It also enforces a LUA-sandbox for protected programs (like AppGuard). With MemProtect it probably has stronger exploit protection than AppGuard (probably even stronger than MBAE and HMPA). The user folder protection is simpler (AppGuard's privacy has more configuration options) but in default setting is probably stronger (only allowing write access to Download folder by internet facing software). The deny execute in user folders is more specific (for protected programs and shared folders only) and less restrictive (for user documents/music/photo/video folder) than the generic deny execute of unsigned of AppGuard's default setting.
Excubit's current pricing model is 12 euro for a lifetime license. Other Excubits programs are all controlled by user defined ini-config files. A zero config program needs updating of the configuration files centrally. Compared to AppGuard a lifetime license fee of 10 euro's is a bargain with mandatory first year support of 2 euro. This would total first years license costs to 'only' 12 euro (10+2). To receive configuration file updates an annual fee of 2 euro's is asked. Would that sound reasonable?
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO POST SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS
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