Notepad++ addressed a flaw in its updater that allowed attackers to hijack update traffic due to improper authentication of update files in earlier versions.
Beaumont explained that although downloads are signed, older Notepad++ versions used a self-signed root certificate publicly available on GitHub, weakening validation. Because traffic to notepad-plus-plus.org is rare, ISP-level redirection is feasible for well-resourced actors.
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Notepad++ fixed updater bugs that allowed malicious update hijacking
Notepad++ addressed an updater vulnerability that allows attackers hijack update traffic due to weak file authentication.securityaffairs.com
I have been using notepad++ for many years and still use it. I have even donated them twice. But i still use it despite this disclosure. Fortunately in Q2 2025, i was not hit by their updater malware as i use winget to update my apps.Just had to look as I'm using an alternative Notepad, & its Notepad Classic, this is why this forum is so useful as I may not know of such things.
How can winget detect a tampered update file?i use winget to update my apps
winget tells me where file is being fetched from which is github in this case.How can winget detect a tampered update file?
The source of update file for Notepad ++ was not the problem; the file was downloaded from their own server, but it was tampered, as far as I can get.winget tells me where file is being fetched from which is github in this case.
I suppose u reread my comments and the article for more details but when i have mentioned github, i think it was clear what the problem was. The vuln was in Wingup not in Winget so i don't know what are u talking about. If i am downloading from Winget a microsoft certified app from github another Microsoft owned site how the hell it can be dns spoofing etc. I fortunately was able to reduce the attack vectors by avoiding Wingup and using Winget.The source of update file for Notepad ++ was not the problem; the file was downloaded from their own server, but it was tampered, as far as I can get.
If it is a dns spoofing, it would be blocked by secure dns provider.
I suppose u reread my comments and the article for more details but when i have mentioned github, i think it was clear what the problem was. The vuln was in Wingup not in Winget so i don't know what are u talking about. If i am downloading from Winget a microsoft certified app from github another Microsoft owned site how the hell it can be dns spoofing etc. I fortunately was able to reduce the attack vectors by avoiding Wingup and using Winget.
Also it is almost certain it is act of a Chinese Apt group which used such advanced TTPs.
If the above mentioned correct, then winget or notepad++ does not matter.However, is still unclear how attackers hijacked updater traffic in the wild. Beaumont speculates threat actors may have intercepted traffic at the ISP level to deliver malicious updates, though this would require substantial resources.
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Notepad++ fixed updater bugs that allowed malicious update hijacking
Notepad++ addressed an updater vulnerability that allows attackers hijack update traffic due to weak file authentication.securityaffairs.com
speculations just speculations. ISP level interception is also highly unlikely.If the above mentioned correct, then winget or notepad++ does not matter.
If the above mentioned correct, then winget or notepad++ does not matter.
Notepad++ 8.8.8 fixes the updater issue by forcing updates to download only from GitHub, making interception far harder.
atleast that's not what author of NPP thinks so.Cannot files on Github get compromised?
Speculations because no body knows the exact scenario of the infection process; all the possibilities are on the table.speculations just speculations. ISP level interception is also highly unlikely.
Need to wait until the entire true scenario is clear; who knows?atleast that's not what author of NPP thinks so.
I think it is pretty clear. Plus from Dec 9th 50+ days from original discovery.Need to wait until the entire true scenario is clear; who knows?
A hijacked hosting provider account modified the getDownloadUrl.php script to redirect specific targets' WinGUp requests to malicious servers.Speculations because no body knows the exact scenario of the infection process; all the possibilities are on the table.
Did not answer my previous inquiry; cannot files on github (update files) get compromised, just as they are supposed to be compromised on the culprit update server?I think it is pretty clear. Plus from Dec 9th 50+ days from original discovery.
Not necessarily.Did not answer my previous inquiry; cannot files on github (update files) get compromised, just as they are supposed to be compromised on the culprit update server?
Could files on GitHub be compromised? Yes, theoretically, if the developer's GitHub credentials were stolen. Were they compromised in this incident? No. The evidence confirms the breach was strictly isolated to the web hosting provider and the update manifest logic, not the Git repository or the GitHub release assets.Did not answer my previous inquiry; cannot files on github (update files) get compromised, just as they are supposed to be compromised on the culprit update server?
The same way such a server was compromised, the one on github can also.Not necessarily.
https[:]//notepad-plus-plus.org/update/getDownloadUrl.php server was only compromised.