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<blockquote data-quote="Andy Ful" data-source="post: 992627" data-attributes="member: 32260"><p>There is some misunderstanding about PowerShell and Follina exploit.</p><p><span style="color: rgb(184, 49, 47)"><strong>How PowerShell Constrained Language Mode can stop PowerShell in Follina exploit without spawning PowerSell?</strong></span></p><p><strong>The issue is imprecise language.</strong></p><p> </p><p>PowerShell is rooted in .NET Framework and most of the PowerShell functionality comes from the System.Management.Automation.dll. We have also EXE files (powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, sdiagnhost.exe, etc.) that can import PowerShell functions from this DLL to run PowerShell scripts (CmdLines and script files).</p><p>The Follina uses a special way to access the PowerShell:</p><p><span style="color: rgb(41, 105, 176)"><strong>msdt.exe --> IScriptedDiagnosticHost COM Object ---> DcomLaunch service --> sdiagnhost.exe ---> runs PowerShell scripts.</strong></span></p><p></p><p>In this way, the final payload is not a child process of Word. The attackers like such indirect methods to hide their actions and break the parent-child process tree used by AVs to detect threats.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Andy Ful, post: 992627, member: 32260"] There is some misunderstanding about PowerShell and Follina exploit. [COLOR=rgb(184, 49, 47)][B]How PowerShell Constrained Language Mode can stop PowerShell in Follina exploit without spawning PowerSell?[/B][/COLOR] [B]The issue is imprecise language.[/B] PowerShell is rooted in .NET Framework and most of the PowerShell functionality comes from the System.Management.Automation.dll. We have also EXE files (powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, sdiagnhost.exe, etc.) that can import PowerShell functions from this DLL to run PowerShell scripts (CmdLines and script files). The Follina uses a special way to access the PowerShell: [COLOR=rgb(41, 105, 176)][B]msdt.exe --> IScriptedDiagnosticHost COM Object ---> DcomLaunch service --> sdiagnhost.exe ---> runs PowerShell scripts.[/B][/COLOR] In this way, the final payload is not a child process of Word. The attackers like such indirect methods to hide their actions and break the parent-child process tree used by AVs to detect threats. [/QUOTE]
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