- Aug 17, 2014
- 11,108
Safeguarding the Tor network: our commitment to network health and supporting relay operators
Some of you may have noticed that we have recently removed a large number of relays from the Tor network. We did this to protect network health and the safety and security of our community and users. This process has sparked larger discussions within our teams and community members about the state of Tor relay policies and the potential for incentivization models that can better support our relay operators and the growth of the Tor network. It has also encouraged us to reflect more deeply on our mission and the role of free, open-source technology.
In this blog post, we want to reaffirm our commitment to keeping Tor free, and provide insight into the rationale behind our recent actions to protect the network from bad actors.
The problem with for-profit schemes
As a free and open-source project, the Tor network is built on the principles of openness, collaboration, and community-driven development. It's powered by a community that relies on the support of volunteers who donate their resources and bandwidth to ensure that users around the world can access the free and open internet. This gives our users and the larger community the freedom to access, run, co-develop, and share the software without being locked into a particular vendor, platform, or service provider.
This openness makes our network (and the privacy guarantees it offers) more robust and resilient to attacks. But this openness can also open up avenues for malicious operators. This is why we have put in place relay requirements, relay policies and criteria for rejecting bad relays to ensure the overall health of our network, safety of our users, and alignment with our values.
Safeguarding the Tor network: our commitment to network health and supporting relay operators | Tor Project
In this blog post, we want to reaffirm our commitment to keeping Tor free and provide insight into the rationale behind the recent removal of certain bad relays.
blog.torproject.org