So when the user of standard account do that, it is like doing the same from admin account!
I can imagin the standard account is originally created to let IT admins control who can make changes to the endpoints, to grant the permission only for authorized empolyees who have password.
If malware could escape VM, it is easier to breach standard account.
I do not believe it can help much; when I double click an executable, I expect to receive a uac prompt, and consequently I will select ok.
UAC might really matter if I get a prompt without double clicking anything; then I should select NO.
You've made some excellent points, and you're touching on the nuances that separate theory from real-world human behavior. Let's break down your thoughts, because you're right about some things, but I believe you're underestimating the core security benefits.
"
When the user...do that, it is like doing the same from admin account!"
You are correct in a very specific sense, for that one moment, for that one task, you have granted the program administrator-level power. However, you're missing the crucial difference between a temporary visitor's pass and a permanent master key.
As an Administrator
Your entire user session runs with high privilege. Every program you open, every website script that runs in your browser, every background process inherits this power. Malware that infects your machine doesn't need to ask for permission; it's already "inside the gates" and can often use known exploits to bypass UAC silently to do its work. You may never even see a prompt.
As a Standard User
Only the specific program for which you entered the password gets elevated. The rest of your system, your web browser, your email client, your documents, continues to run in a low-privilege, protected state. If that elevated program closes, the privilege is gone. The attack surface is drastically smaller and limited to that single, deliberate action.
"
I can imagine the standard account is originally created to let IT admins control... endpoints"
You're absolutely right! Its origins are deeply tied to corporate environments where IT departments need to prevent users from installing unauthorized software and destabilizing their computers. However, the underlying security principle, the Principle of Least Privilege, is universal. It benefits a home user just as much as a corporation. Preventing accidental system damage and containing malware is valuable for everyone, not just IT admins.
"If malware could escape VM, it is easier to breach standard account."
This is a false equivalence. A VM escape is an incredibly complex and rare type of exploit that targets the hypervisor (the software that runs the virtual machine). These are the tools of sophisticated, often state-sponsored attackers.
In contrast, the overwhelming majority of malware is opportunistic. It relies on common, high-volume attack methods, tricking users into running a malicious executable, exploiting a browser vulnerability, or using a malicious document macro. A standard user account is a powerful, frontline defense against these everyday threats. It's the difference between locking your front door (standard account) and building a nuclear fallout shelter (defending against VM escapes). You should always lock your door.
"
When I double click an executable, I expect to receive a UAC prompt, and consequently I will select ok."
This is the most critical point you've made, and it highlights a real phenomenon called "prompt fatigue." You are right that users can become habituated to clicking "OK."
However, consider these two scenarios,
You, as an
Administrator, double-click a malicious file. It might show a UAC prompt, which you approve. Or, it might use a common UAC bypass technique and never show you a prompt at all, silently gaining full control of your system.
You, as a
Standard User, double-click the same malicious file. It must show you a prompt. It cannot bypass this. Furthermore, it doesn't just ask for a "Yes/No" click, it demands the administrator password. This extra step, this friction, is a powerful security feature. It forces you to switch from a passive "OK" to an active authentication.
You are correct that if a prompt appears when you didn't do anything, you should always select "NO." But the true security gain of the standard account is that it eliminates the possibility of silent, no-prompt elevation that is a genuine threat when you are already logged in as an administrator.
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