Introducing SiriusGPT: The First Real-Time GPT / LLM AI based Antimalware Solution

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Google safe brwosing blocking this site, but i try to report them of false positive, dns currently shomehow blocking the reporting of domain but ill do that
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Thank you guys, I appreciate your help! I went through a several step process earlier today where I had to verify ownership of the site and request a review of the site.

It is still marked as Dangerous, so please report it as Safe if you have not done so, thanks again!
 
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Thank you guys, I appreciate your help! I went through a several step process earlier today where I had to verify ownership of the site and request a review of the site.

It is still marked as Dangerous, so please report it as Safe if you have not done so, thanks again!
Reported as false positive. Even NextDNS's AI Protection blocks it now. Did you change anything that may cause this? :unsure:

Screenshot 2025-09-06 013548.png
 
I don't get it. When I access the site through the link you provided in your first post in this thread - it is getting blocked still.
When I access it through the link on Bleeping Computers it isn't blocked. Anyone can reproduce?

 
Yes I can confirm danb's link in post #142 is still blocked by Google SafeBrowsing.
 
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Yes, the blocks are logged in the Windows Event Viewer / Windows Logs / Application, under Event ID 1111, and source "SiriusGPT Block".

Here is an example event...

SiriusGPT blocked: c:\users\user\desktop\virustotalscanner.exe
Action: User Blocked
Hash: c0eaf19a0a77620b22f0a043330da184993b76c934e88153b3b8e90caa0b34ee
Commandline: "c:\users\user\desktop\virustotalscanner.exe"
File size: 2368000
Parent process: c:\windows\explorer.exe
Publisher:
Digital signature verified:
WhitelistCloud: Not Safe
RuleID: 17

Please keep in mind that CyberLock is soon going to have 100% of the SiriusGPT tech very soon, including the new user prompt. And obviously, it already has the Whitelist Editor and User Log. I just do not want to create another product just like CyberLock... and besides, SiriusGPT is targeted even more toward business endpoints than CyberLock, thank you!

That's good news, especially given the great video @Shadowra made where SiriusGPT preformed very well. I'm looking forward to the integrated version. But, if I might ask, what happens in between the time when auto-block begins and when it actually blocks something. I mean, if the file allowed to run during that time? Can the auto-block timer be changed? It seems awfully long to me.
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Reported as false positive. Even NextDNS's AI Protection blocks it now. Did you change anything that may cause this? :unsure:

View attachment 290798
Thank you for letting me know, this is frustrating. No, there have not been any changes on our website since it was updated with the Sirius page, and that has been at least a month.

I went through the process to figure out exactly why they are flagging it as Dangerous, and they did not provide a reason or a specific URL...

google.PNG


The only thing that has changed is that I emailed a guy I know who works at google in their security / AI department to tell him about Sirius a few days ago. I am 100% certain he would not cause issues for us, but I wonder if that somehow led to this. We need to figure it out either way because this is a serious issue for us.
 
That's good news, especially given the great video @Shadowra made where SiriusGPT preformed very well. I'm looking forward to the integrated version. But, if I might ask, what happens in between the time when auto-block begins and when it actually blocks something. I mean, if the file allowed to run during that time? Can the auto-block timer be changed? It seems awfully long to me.
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The process is suspended by the kernel mode driver until the gui responds to the driver with the decision. 95% of the analysis time is due to the WhitelistCloud analysis... only about 5% is the SiriusLLM analysis. That is why some files are super fast to analyze and some are slow. For example, if a file was added to the WhitelistCloud database a year ago, it does not have to be reanalyzed by Sirius... it just grabs the WLC result then performs the Sirius analysis. The samples in Shadowra's test were probably very new, so they were certainly not in the WLC database... that is why they took a long time. For every day files, WLC contains most of those, so the Sirius analysis should be pretty quick.

The even better news is that once we are finished refining the Sirius prompt instructions, I am 99% certain we are going to be able to remove WLC completely from all of our products, because most of the time Sirius just kind of ignores the WLC anyway. I am in the process of testing the Sirius results with and without WLC, and so far it looks like Sirius does not need WLC. Although, I think it might be wise to keep WLC for now... it is quite accurate in determining if a file is Safe or Not Safe, but it does have some false positives. But if we do remove WLC completely, the analysis will be a lot faster. We will figure it out either way ;). Thank you!
 
The process is suspended by the kernel mode driver until the gui responds to the driver with the decision. 95% of the analysis time is due to the WhitelistCloud analysis... only about 5% is the SiriusLLM analysis. That is why some files are super fast to analyze and some are slow. For example, if a file was added to the WhitelistCloud database a year ago, it does not have to be reanalyzed by Sirius... it just grabs the WLC result then performs the Sirius analysis. The samples in Shadowra's test were probably very new, so they were certainly not in the WLC database... that is why they took a long time. For every day files, WLC contains most of those, so the Sirius analysis should be pretty quick.

The even better news is that once we are finished refining the Sirius prompt instructions, I am 99% certain we are going to be able to remove WLC completely from all of our products, because most of the time Sirius just kind of ignores the WLC anyway. I am in the process of testing the Sirius results with and without WLC, and so far it looks like Sirius does not need WLC. Although, I think it might be wise to keep WLC for now... it is quite accurate in determining if a file is Safe or Not Safe, but it does have some false positives. But if we do remove WLC completely, the analysis will be a lot faster. We will figure it out either way ;). Thank you!

I guess I see WLC and VoodooAI to be repetitive and not needed with SiriusGPT. But, I am a self-proclaimed dumbass.
 
Why is this malicious in WLC? Just because of lack of digital signature?
Sending request to SiriusLLM Model 0...

Model 0 confidence (60% Not Safe) is below the 90% confidence threshold.
Sending request to Model 1...

Model 1 confidence (75% Not Safe) is below the 90% confidence threshold.
Sending request to Model 2...

Model 2 confidence (75% Not Safe).
Selected optimal result: Not Safe with 75% confidence from Model 1 (priority-based tie-break).

Database updated with result from Model 1.

Total tokens: 0 (0 request / 0 response)

File path: C:\Program Files\Hasleo\Hasleo Backup Suite\bin\BackupSystemTray.exe
File hash: 8dfe38b5a307e14245f48b40dfebc62f347d8502247d74c1f35f4a265a868c66
File size: 1.03 MB
File publisher: This file is a signable file type but has not been digitally signed.
WhitelistCloud verdict: Not Safe

Final Verdict: Not Safe with 75% confidence.

## Analysis Summary
The file `BackupSystemTray.exe` presents a mixed profile. While its path, version metadata, and resource usage are consistent with a legitimate system-tray utility from Hasleo Backup Suite, several red flags emerge: the file is unsigned, WhitelistCloud flags it as malicious, and the import table contains functions that could be abused for system-level manipulation. However, the entropy values are within normal ranges, no overlay is present, and the imports are also typical for a backup application that needs volume, file, and network operations. The balance of evidence leans toward **malicious**, primarily because the external reputation signal overrides the otherwise plausible legitimate appearance.

## Detailed Analysis

### Portable Executable Features
- **ASLR & DEP enabled** – Good security posture, but not exclusive to benign software.
- **No digital signature** – A reputable backup vendor would almost always sign its binaries; this is a significant red flag.
- **ResourceTableSize 57 KB** – Large enough for a modern GUI tray application, consistent with the product description.
- **Section entropies 4.75–6.99** – Typical for compiled C/C++ code; no packed or encrypted sections.
- **OverlaySize 0** – No appended data, reducing suspicion of hidden payloads.
- **ImportTableSize 300 bytes, 597 imports** – Substantial API surface, but not excessive for a backup utility.

### Portable Executable Imports
Key imports fall into these functional groups:

1. **Volume & disk operations**
`FindFirstVolumeW`, `FindNextVolumeW`, `GetVolumeInformationW`, `DeviceIoControl`, `DecryptFileW` – expected for backup software.

2. **Process & service control**
`CreateProcessW`, `CreateProcessAsUserW`, `OpenSCManagerW`, `ControlService`, `AdjustTokenPrivileges` – allows service installation and privilege escalation; suspicious in unsigned code.

3. **Network communication (libcurl)**
`curl_easy_init`, `curl_easy_perform`, `curl_mime_*` – legitimate for cloud-backup features, but also useful for exfiltration.

4. **Crash-dump & debugging**
`MiniDumpWriteDump`, `IsDebuggerPresent` – common in legitimate utilities, yet also abused by malware to harvest credentials.

5. **Registry & persistence**
`RegCreateKeyExW`, `RegSetValueExW`, `RegDeleteValueW` – standard configuration storage, but can establish persistence.

The combination of service control, token manipulation, and libcurl without a signature is concerning.

### Portable Executable Exports
No exports – normal for a GUI system-tray executable.

### Portable Executable Strings
Human-readable strings are dominated by C/C++ runtime error messages, locale data, and generic DLL names (`ADVAPI32.DLL`, `USER32.DLL`). No suspicious URLs, commands, or hard-coded IPs are present. The absence of overtly malicious strings does not outweigh the external reputation flag.

### Speculative Software Type
The file purports to be the “Hasleo Backup Suite System Tray Application.” Its imports (volume enumeration, libcurl, service control) align with a backup utility that can perform local and cloud backups. However, the lack of code-signing and the WhitelistCloud “Malicious” verdict cast doubt on its authenticity; it could be a trojanized or repackaged build.

- Malware type: Trojanized Backup Utility
- Malware name: Trojan.FakeBackup.Hasleo
Final verdict: Malicious with 75% confidence.
 
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@Divergent - thanks again for the list... here are my favorites so far, in no particular order.

The Trinity Engine: A direct reference to the three models working as one.

Reflex Security: Suggests an instantaneous, automatic response to threats, much like a biological reflex.

Iterative Guard: A name that comes directly from your own description ("iterative configuration"). It's accurate and unique.

Dynamic Threat Shield: Combines the "Dynamic" posture with the classic "Shield" security metaphor.

Sirius Sentinel: "Sentinel" means a soldier or guard whose job is to stand and keep watch. It's a classic and strong security term.

Sirius Guard: Simple, strong, and to the point.
I believe a different name would serve the product more effectively.

 
Why is this malicious in WLC? Just because of lack of digital signature?
The WLC verdict can actually change over time based on the file's reputation, although it is quite uncommon. So just to be sure, I deleted the old WLC result and tested again, and the new WLC verdict is Safe. The new Sirius verdict did not change, and the confidence actually increased significantly to 92%, and after reading the Sirius Analysis Report, we know exactly why...

"While the internal metadata looks legitimate, the file is **completely unsigned** and imports a mixture of low-level system, privilege, and cryptographic routines together with the cURL library – a combination that is highly atypical for a mere “tray” helper. Coupled with the absence of any export table and the presence of multiple entropy-rich sections, the binary exhibits classic traits of a **dropper / downloader** rather than a bona-fide backup utility. WhitelistCloud’s “Safe” rating is overridden by the stronger behavioural evidence."

### 4. Imports – Suspicious Syscalls & cURL
Beyond the usual CRT and kernel32 routines, the binary explicitly imports:
- **Token impersonation**: `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser`, `RevertToSelf`, `DuplicateTokenEx`, `AdjustTokenPrivileges`, `LookupPrivilegeValueW` – allows running in the context of another user.
- **Service control**: `OpenSCManagerW`, `OpenServiceW`, `ControlService` – can stop/start services (useful for disabling AV or backup agents).
- **Environment-block creation**: `CreateEnvironmentBlock` / `DestroyEnvironmentBlock` – almost exclusively used when spawning processes under a different token.
- **Mini-dump capability**: `MiniDumpWriteDump` – classic credential-stealing or LSASS-dumping primitive.
- **Registry persistence**: `RegCreateKeyExW`, `RegSetValueExW`, `RegDeleteValueW`.
- **File encryption flag**: `DecryptFileW` – suggests awareness of encrypted filesystems (often used to decrypt then re-encrypt ransomware targets).
- **Full cURL API**: `curl_easy_init`, `curl_easy_perform`, `curl_mime_*` – clear network download/upload capability.

The combination of **impersonation + service control + minidump + cURL** is a textbook feature set for:
- Dropping a second-stage payload fetched from an external server.
- Escalating privileges, dumping credentials, then covering tracks.


I have to agree with Sirius on this one... a tray utility does not typically need to perform these types of functions. It would be extremely interesting to see what Sirius would say if the file was signed. Hopefully Hasleo will start signing their files soon and we can see what it says then.

In other words (if I can speak for Sirius for a second ;))... that is fine if a tray utility genuinely does need to perform these functions, but it at least needs to be signed and the signature needs to be verified, so what we at least know where the file originated and that it was not tampered with or altered in any way.
 
I believe a different name would serve the product more effectively.

I totally agree... Sirius is a great name but there are at least 4-5 AI related Sirius products on the market, and if we are going to change the name, it would be better to do it now since we are just getting started. Thanks again!