Privacy News Microsoft Office alternative Euro-Office could be vulnerable to Russian modifications

Brownie2019

Brownie2019

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https://cybernews.com/security/microsoft-office-alternative-euro-office/
Euro-Office is being launched as Europe’s answer to Microsoft Office and Google Docs to reduce reliance on US tech. Yet it could be vulnerable to Russian modifications, according to Cybernews analysis.

Key takeaways:
Euro-Office, marketed as Europe’s answer to Microsoft Office, is mostly based on code from OnlyOffice, a Russian-linked open-source project, raising security concerns.
Despite a formal split, Euro-Office continues to import changes from developers operating in Russian time zones, with European contributions making up only a tiny portion, according to Cybernews analysis.
The project’s reliance on Russian-origin code and ongoing disputes with OnlyOffice spark doubts about Euro-Office’s claims to digital sovereignty and independence from Russian influence.
Euro-Office developers say they are thoroughly reviewing the OnlyOffice codebase, aiming to build a more open, trustworthy, and community-driven alternative.
ng to build a more open, trustworthy, and community-driven alternative.
Euro-Office is a fork of an open-source software developed by OnlyOffice, a Russia-linked project, and has been transparent about it. In March, it announced a split, promising to “liberate” the OnlyOffice codebase and citing both technical and geopolitical reasons for the move.

However, the vast majority of the code that Euro-Office runs on – and continues to import – appears to be written by developers working on Russian time-zone settings, a Cybernews analysis of its source code shows.

Only a fraction of the code can be attributed to the European consortium behind Euro-Office, mostly to German firm Nextcloud, while up to 99% can be traced to work performed on Russian clocks, the findings suggest.
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Brownie2019 said:
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The Cybernews piece is a useful reminder that “digital sovereignty” isn’t just branding — it depends on governance, transparent development practices, and a verifiable supply chain, not only on where a project is registered or hosted.

What the analysis does (and doesn’t) prove
  • A fork “importing changes” from its upstream is normal in open source. Many forks start by tracking upstream closely, then gradually diverge.
  • Attributing code origin by developer time zone/commit timestamps can highlight patterns, but it is not a definitive security indicator by itself. Time zones can be misconfigured, developers can be distributed, and commits can be rebased/relayed through CI systems.
  • None of this, on its own, proves malicious intent or “Russian modifications.” It mainly points to potential dependency and governance risk (i.e., how independent the fork truly is).

The real security question: supply-chain trust and control
If a project claims independence, the practical questions are:
  • Who controls the repositories, release process, and signing keys?
  • Is there a documented security program (vulnerability handling, advisories, patch SLAs)?
  • Are releases reproducible and verifiable (so third parties can confirm binaries match source)?
  • Is there an SBOM and dependency policy (including how upstream changes are reviewed and merged)?
  • Is there evidence of independent code review and meaningful divergence from upstream over time?

How to evaluate Euro-Office safely (without guessing)</B>
If you’re considering deploying it (especially in an organization), the safest approach is to treat it like any new third-party software supply chain and ask for verifiable artifacts and processes:
  • Check whether releases are code-signed and whether the signing chain is documented.
  • Look for third-party audits or a public security assessment (not just marketing claims).
  • Review the project’s governance: maintainers, commit rights, and how contributions are accepted/rejected.
  • Prefer deployment methods that reduce trust assumptions (pinned versions, verified hashes, controlled update channels).
  • If you need “sovereignty,” require clear criteria (EU-based maintainers with decision authority, transparent build pipeline, independent security response), not just a fork announcement.

Practical takeaway
Based on what’s quoted, the main actionable conclusion is not “it’s malicious,” but “treat the independence claim as unproven until the project demonstrates measurable control over development and releases.” For anything sensitive, waiting for broader community review and/or an independent audit is the cautious path.

Sources
 

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