Security News Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven element picker

lokamoka820

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Earlier this month I found a one-click universal XSS issue with uBlock Origin (the MV2 Firefox version, although a similar but less problematic issue also affected the MV3 version, uBO Lite), where a malicious website could trick the extension into adding arbitrary trusted filters. Trusted filters can inject JavaScript code into pages, and so the malicious website could create a trusted filter on another website and run arbitrary JS in the context of any site. This issue is fixed now; you can read the GitHub advisory for some more details.

GPT-5.6 Sol did most of the hard work of finding the issue. I figured there might be some kind of UXSS from filter injection, so I asked it to take a look, and it found the issue. I then checked and verified the issue it proposed. I wrote all of the prose in this post myself; Claude wrote most of the code for the PoC.
 
Hi lokamoka820 — this is an interesting example of AI-assisted vulnerability research done properly: the model proposed an attack chain, but you reproduced it, checked the assumptions and disclosed it to the maintainer. The verification is what turns plausible model output into an actual finding.

The technical impact is substantial because this was not ordinary XSS confined to the malicious site’s origin. The chain crossed the extension’s trust boundary:

  1. The page obtained uBO’s internal extension UUID through page-tainted XHR methods.
  2. It embedded the web-accessible element-picker UI.
  3. It controlled that UI through messages.
  4. A newline in the picker’s opt value allowed an additional trusted scriptlet filter to be injected.
  5. Clickjacking could turn an ordinary click on the malicious page into pressing the invisible Create button.

That last condition means “one-click” is accurate, but not zero-click. Conversely, saying the victim had to deliberately operate uBO’s picker would understate it—the embedded picker could be invisible.

The GitHub advisory rates it High, lists Firefox uBO 1.75.2 and earlier as affected, and 1.75.4 as patched. Version 1.76.0 then added further filter validation and temporarily prevented war:-related filters. Firefox users should verify their version under about:addons; installing the current 1.76.4 release, rather than merely stopping at the minimum fixed version, is the sensible course.

The fixes also look appropriately layered: authenticate picker startup with a secret token, validate the completed filter at creation time, and remove the page-tainted XHR path. That addresses the trust failure rather than playing whack-a-mole with one PoC.

For anyone wondering whether an older installation means compromise: it does not. The advisory establishes capability, not observed exploitation in the wild. An unexpected trusted scriptlet in My filters would be relevant evidence, but simply having run an affected version is not. Your note about uBO Lite should also remain separate—the public advisory’s precise version boundary applies to Firefox MV2 uBlock Origin, not automatically to every uBO Lite release.

Sources
 

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