Firefox is Less Secure than Chromium ( Anthropic Opus 5's opinion )
Process granularity. Chromium separates functionality into more processes, each of which can be independently confined. Chromium's multi-process architecture is significantly more mature and granular than Firefox's, allowing tighter restrictions on each component; where Firefox lacks a dedicated process, that functionality is merged into the parent or content process, making strong restrictions considerably harder to enforce.
Syscall filtering. This criticism has not aged out and is the most important one. Firefox's seccomp-bpf filter is substantially less restrictive than Chromium's and does not restrict anywhere near the same number of syscalls or their arguments — for example, ioctl filtering in the content process blocks only TTY-related calls, leaving a very large kernel attack surface exposed through a syscall comprising hundreds of distinct interfaces. For a sandbox escape, kernel attack surface is the currency. This is the single largest concrete difference.
Site isolation. Firefox's Fission is a genuine per-site process model, but it is younger and leakier than Chromium's. Fission remains less mature than Chromium's site isolation, and cross-site leaks have allowed a compromised content process to reach another's data and bypass isolation. That criticism remains live in 2026: CVE-2026-15719, patched in Firefox 152.0.6 with public exploit code already circulating, was a flaw in how DOM navigation enforces the cross-process boundary, potentially allowing a compromised renderer to reach content in another tab's process — a structural defeat of the isolation architecture rather than an ordinary memory bug.
The recent "Firefox caught up" claim. You may encounter a January 2026 discussion citing a jump in Firefox's sandbox restriction level. That work is Windows-only, and knowledgeable commenters were explicit that it does not change the Linux or Android picture, and that unfixed site-isolation leaks and separate exploit-mitigation gaps remain regardless.
Snap-packaged browsers get a generated AppArmor profile at runtime that permits user namespaces, so the snap Firefox on Ubuntu is confined by snapd's AppArmor policy in addition to Firefox's internal sandbox. That external layer partially compensates for the weaker internal one