Please, show us the test details for SWH (or H_C) and I will explain to you where you made a mistake. This is probably a similar mistake like on your "test" when you "proved" that Microsoft policies and MS Office settings could not block macros (although they block macros all around the world). I tested Follina by myself here:
https://malwaretips.com/threads/simple-windows-hardening.102265/post-992545
Each infection stage was controlled by me via Event log, Process Explorer, and similar tools.
I did not exploit VS when "Always ON", but it can be done in "Auto Pilot" settings. Normally it would not be an exploit, because it used a method that was not covered by the VS design. It can be considered an exploit only in your particular case, because you consequently refused to accept that such a well-known attack could be successful. If you want I can publish this "exploit" - I found it on your clear request.
Andy, here are two very simple questions...
1) Are you comfy with HC or SWH allowing Winword to automatically spawn msdt.exe elevated?
2) Would you be equally comfy with HC or SWH allowing Winword to automatically spawn bcdedit.exe elevated?
If you answer "yes" to either of the two above questions, then there is no point in continuing this conversation.
However, if you answer "no" to both, then please let me know what test details you would like, I would be happy to provide them. Better yet, go to github and test until your heart is content. Who knows, you might even find a VS bypass.
And absolutely, I would love it if you found a bypass for VS. Anything we can do to better protect our uses is sincerely appreciated.
Anyway, this is the entire reason I am not a fan of SRP, and I have been preaching this for a very long time now, but now that we have a concrete, in-the-wild, real-world example, users can finally understand what I have been preaching about. The problem with SRP is that it does not have any context. At all. So sure, it can blindly block anything you want it to with zero context, but that is of little use. In order to block something correctly, you have to know certain elements of the attack chain, like the parent process, and the command line. The only real element that SRP sees is the process path. If SRP were so great, trust me, I would have created a SRP version of VS a long time ago. 10-20 years ago you probably could have gotten by with SRP and not knowing certain elements of an attack chain, but the problem is that in order to detect modern malware, you absolutely need to know these attack chain elements.
Andy, you should not take it personally that SRP is unable to block modern threats. And I welcome any and all VS bypasses. I would love for someone to post a video showing a valid bypass.