App Review COMODO Internet Security Pro 2027

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Shadowra
I had read it in a moderator's post on the Comodo forum; maybe I misread the post. I tried to find the post but couldn't find it. Thank you for the info and detailed response.

You can ask the moderator about it. Some moderators may know interesting details about CIS.
 
There are some other ways to abuse Trusted executables to bypass auto-containment in CIS.
For example, the LOLBas project shows many LOLBins that can run DLLs. Some of them, like rundll32.exe or regasm.exe, can be hardened via Comodo Script Analysis, but most are not included, and some can be used to bypass CIS via a malicious MSI installation that runs one of those LOLBins + a malicious DLL.
In this scenario, the DLL does not have to be a false negative.
However, this could possibly happen in a highly targeted attack (no worry for home users).
 
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the DLL does not have to be a false negative
I doubt Comodo will have DLL hijacking protection; they had it and removed it a long time ago, including the manual tweak.

dll.png
 
I should write some good words about CIS.
In the case of a non-targeted attack against home users, the WiseConnect malware is rare. Furthermore, even if the connection to a malicious C2 server is established, the remote attacker can have a hard time doing anything dangerous. Simply, popular LOLBins and scripts are well restricted by Comodo Script Analysis settings.:)
 
I doubt Comodo will have DLL hijacking protection; they had it and removed it a long time ago, including the manual tweak.

View attachment 299085

It is true, of course. I already used it in my POC (you can see it in my video). However, the WiseConnect bypass here is unrelated to DLL hijacking.
CIS can see the difference because the LOLBin rundll32.exe is restricted by Script Analysis.
DLL hijacking abuses one of thousands of vulnerable but Trusted executables to load a malicious DLL instead of a dedicated DLL.
In this thread, the attacker uses a LOLBin (rundll32.exe) that is not vulnerable in any way, but it is generally intended to execute functions from DLLs (that is why it is restricted).

When using rundll32.exe, you must use a CmdLine that includes the concrete DLL.
In DLL hijacking, the Trusted vulnerable executable can be executed without a CmdLine (just double-click the executable in Explorer), and the DLL is loaded silently.
 
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