Ha, ha . So editors who use Office 2007 (unsupported by Microsoft) have to wait until I finish WDDS (Windows Default-Deny Security) which will block active content (macros, OLE, ActiveX, and DDE) in MS Office or use SysHardener. Even without this, Hard_Configurator default-deny settings apply a pretty good protection against malicious documents (including fileless PowerShell attacks). I analyzed many malicious samples, and so far, all of them could be stopped by default-deny setup. That is because all samples used JS or VBS scripts, or PowerShell with advanced functions, or payloads from the Userspace. I do not think that attackers will change soon their attack techniques, which are so successful against most targets.There is no need, unless your job is editor...
Editors who use MS Office 2010+ on Windows 10 FCU have already a decent protection when using Hard_Configurator + Windows Defender ASR.
It is worth to remember that without default-deny setup, the users are still vulnerable, even when all active content in Office documents is blocked. This follows from the ability to control MS Office executables programmatically by external programs. That can be used to defeat the anti-ransomware protection.
Of course, there are many solutions to the Office documents problem (anti-exe, sandboxing, etc.). NVT OSArmor and VoodooShield have very good modules that can protect against malicious documents in MS Office. Also, ReHips are sandboxing by default MS Office executables, and there is also Comodo Firewall with activated sandbox, Excubits drivers, etc.
I like very much two applications: AppGuard (paid) and Sandboxie (paid), which can also apply a decent protection.